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Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 2: January 2009 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
 
 
Graham Sansom 
Centre for Local Government,  
University of Technology Sydney, Australia 
 
 
The diverse contributions to this second issue of the Commonwealth e-Journal of 
Local Governance cover three continents as well as the Pacific Islands, and explore 
two broad themes: firstly, challenges for decentralisation and emerging systems of 
local government; and secondly, the nature and quality of democratic local 
governance and community cohesion. 
 
Jaap de Visser examines the quite remarkable transformation of local government 
in South Africa since the end of apartheid – in many ways a model for other 
emerging systems. He finds that substantial progress has been made towards the 
goal of ‘developmental local government’ that can advance the vision of a better 
life for all South Africans. However, ‘institutional fault lines’ are holding back 
further advances. These include capacity constraints, deficiencies in municipal 
governance and inter-governmental relations, failure to recognise the potential of 
big cities to play a much stronger role, an overly ambitious and uniform planning 
framework, and – intriguingly – ‘overzealous institutionalisation of community 
participation’.   
 
Related issues are addressed in the practice note by Annette Christmas and Jaap de 
Visser. This discusses some of the issues explored in a recent review of provincial 
and local governments in South Africa, including the need to clarify respective 
roles and responsibilities, and the scope to transfer more functions to those local 
governments with the necessary capacity to deliver. Christmas and de Visser again 
highlight the need to abandon a ‘one size fits all’ approach and to give the big cities 
more autonomy, whilst recognising that much of South African local government 
still faces severe developmental challenges. They put forward a set of criteria to 
guide decisions on where powers and functions are best situated. 
A number of contributions focus on moves towards decentralisation in African and 
Asia-Pacific countries where local government is for the most part less advanced 
than in South Africa. John Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Yasin Olum assess the progress of 
local governance and local democracy in Uganda since the advent of radical 
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decentralisation policies in the early 1990s. They find a significant gap between 
intent and reality: the legislative framework is sound and real advances have been 
made, but local governments are burdened with responsibilities and expectations 
far in excess of the resources allocated to them and their institutional capacity to 
deliver. The problem is exacerbated by very low levels of civic awareness and 
education. 
 
BC Chikulo provides a similar overview of Zambia’s efforts to transform and 
institutionalise democratic local governance, and ‘take power to the people’, as part 
of a longstanding decentralisation program. He identifies four distinct phases of 
activity since independence in 1964, and three key constraints to further progress: a 
financial crisis facing local governments, lack of ‘whole of government’ planning 
and management at the district level, and limited scope for meaningful citizen 
participation at ‘grassroots’ levels. There are obvious parallels here with the 
Ugandan and South African experiences. An important theme is the reluctance of 
central government and their agencies to cooperate effectively with local 
governments, or to ensure that they have access to sufficient resources to discharge 
their responsibilities.  
 
The huge challenges inherent in decentralisation are brought into sharp focus in the 
two practice notes from India. N. Ramakantan describes the extraordinary ‘big 
bang’ efforts of the state of Kerala to build capacity for decentralised governance 
and participatory planning. In this case very considerable resources were devolved 
to local governments, and literally hundreds of thousands of people participated in 
training programs. Importantly, training was extended to civil society in order to 
foster grassroots democracy, inclusive governance and accountability. 
Nevertheless, weaknesses in capacity and performance persist and require 
continuing efforts on a large scale. 
 
Mani Shankar Aiyar and Nupur Tiwari report on action being taken to establish 
effective institutions of local governance in India’s north eastern region. They 
outline the problem of unequal growth: India’s economy is growing rapidly but 
many people and some regions – such as the north east – are missing out. A 
strategy is needed to produce ‘inclusive growth’, and that requires inclusive, 
decentralised governance. However, progress is patchy: there are needs for further 
incentives to encourage some states to empower local governments, for new 
financial arrangements to overcome lack of resources at the local level, and for 
measures to overcome a ‘silo’ mentality amongst central agencies. 
 
Phil Richardson explores similar issues in the very different context of two very 
small Pacific Island countries, Kiribati and Tuvalu. Both consist of scattered 
islands, many of which retain an attractive semi-traditional lifestyle, although there 
is continuing migration to growing urban settlements on the ‘capital’ islands. 
Decentralisation policies have been pursued to address this urban drift and in part, 
as Richardson points out, to conform with donor policies. He concludes that some 
of those policies are inappropriate in Pacific Islands settings. In situations of very 
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scarce resources, devolution to local governments may simply prove unworkable. 
Moreover, institutions of traditional governance often still hold sway in the small 
island communities and adding a layer of ‘western’ democratic local government 
can generate disruptive tensions.     
 
The remaining three contributions focus on various aspects of local governance in 
Australia. Chris Aulich reviews progress towards effective community engagement 
and participatory governance. He concludes that despite reform processes designed 
in part to increase engagement, and increased recognition of the need to treat 
people more as citizens rather than merely customers of service delivery, 
consultation remains piecemeal and haphazard. Further development of 
participatory governance may have to take place in organisations outside 
institutional local government. 
 
Chris Hearfield and Brian Dollery consider another dimension of political 
governance, namely how local government functions as representative democracy. 
They examine changes over the years in the local government franchise, the nature 
of political representation, methods of vote-counting, and the implications of a 
steady reduction in the number of councils and councillors, which has led to a 
substantial increase in the ratio of population to elected representatives. This may 
have created a ‘democratic deficit’, although other changes may have offset this 
effect and improved the representative quality of local government. However, an 
underlying problem is the lack of recognition of local government in Australia’s 
federal constitution: this is seen by some to undermine its democratic legitimacy. 
 
A further critical variable in local governance is the functioning of civil society. 
Louise Holdsworth and Yvonne Hartman examine the concept of ‘community 
cohesion’ in the context of a small rural community. They note that building 
strong, safe and socially cohesive communities has become an important goal of 
public policy, and seek to identify a set of indicators of social cohesion based on 
the experiences of local residents as well as the academic literature. They highlight 
a sense of neighbourliness as the key factor, supported by good service provision 
and a well-designed physical environment that promotes accessibility, engagement 
and a perception of safety. These findings can assist local governments and other 
agencies to implement policies and initiatives that strengthen the ‘social glue’ that 
binds potentially fragile communities. 
 
This issue also includes three reviews of books that also address some of the 
themes canvassed in other contributions: Robin Hambleton and Jill Simone’s 
collection of papers on urban and metropolitan governance, which among other 
things highlights the importance of effective government; Fumihaiko Saito’s 
compilation of studies of local governance and decentralisation in six countries 
(including South Africa, Uganda and India); and Liz Richardson’s account of 
community self-help in disadvantaged communities in Britain. We thank Peter 
McKinlay, Randal Smith and Jenny Wills for these reviews.   
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I also wish to acknowledge the financial support now being given to the journal by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat. This has made it possible to appoint an editorial 
assistant, Anna Vo, to help liaise with contributors and process the increasing 
number of submissions being received. The Commonwealth Secretariat is a very 
welcome additional partner. 
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION 
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Jaap de Visser 
University of the Western Cape,  
South Africa 
 
 
Abstract
This paper provides a brief introduction to the recent history of, as well as the 
legal and policy framework for, local government in South Africa. It discusses the 
transformation of local government from a racially configured, illegitimate arm of 
the apartheid government into a system designed to produce developmentally 
oriented municipalities. The progress made by South African municipalities 
towards realising the vision of developmental local government is remarkable and 
unprecedented. Over the last 13 years, municipalities have embarked on the 
extension of infrastructure and development, whilst absorbing fundamental 
changes to their internal governance and management arrangements, financial 
management systems and intergovernmental responsibilities. The new local 
government system offers great potential for the realisation of a better life for all 
citizens, facilitated by a new generation of municipalities. However, the challenges 
remain huge and some of these can be attributed to institutional fault lines. These 
include challenges that come with large, inclusive municipalities, new executive 
systems and the political appointment of senior officials. The paper also identifies 
the downside of overzealous institutionalisation of community participation. With 
regard to intergovernmental relations, the paper highlights the need for a clearer 
definition of local government mandates and a greater recognition of the role of 
big cities. The current insistence on comprehensive intergovernmental alignment of 
policies and budgets is questioned, and suggestions are made to substitute this with 
an approach of selective alignment around key national priorities. 
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1. Introduction 
Thirteen years since the advent of democracy and seven years into the operation of 
an entirely new local government dispensation, local government in South Africa is 
in a critical phase. On the one hand, local government has not only survived a 
fundamental restructuring but has also made great strides towards extending 
service delivery and development to marginalised communities. In thirteen years, 
local government has emerged from being an institution that was subservient, racist 
and illegitimate to an institution with democratically elected leadership, 
constitutional status and a developmental agenda. On the other hand, as 
expectations of local government service delivery, quite correctly, have risen, it has 
become evident that the broader transformation of local government is by no means 
complete.  
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it provides a brief introduction to the 
recent history of, as well as the legal and policy framework for, local government 
in South Africa. Secondly, it examines some fault lines in the design and 
functioning of the system of local government, focusing on the national 
institutional and policy framework. Where possible, suggestions are made for a 
change of direction. It is hoped that this discussion of the local government 
framework, as well as some of its major challenges, may make a positive 
contribution to the search for avenues of improvement. 
 
The areas of concern highlighted in this paper are located in the practice of internal 
municipal governance, the functionality of current intergovernmental arrangements 
with regards to big cities, and the feasibility of the intergovernmental planning 
framework. However, before these areas of concern are traversed, a brief history 
and introduction into the main tenets of the local government framework follows. 
 
2. History of Local Government 
Local Government Pre-1994 
Before 1994, no single, uniform system of local government existed across the 
country: each province had its own configuration of local government institutions. 
Local government as an institution of governance was subservient, racist and 
illegitimate. The subservience of local government was manifest in that local 
authorities existed in terms of provincial laws, and in that their powers and 
functions were dependent on and curtailed by those laws. The development of 
separate local authorities for separated racial groups, under the leading theme of 
‘own management for own areas’, produced a clever scheme of naked exploitation 
on the basis of race. Without exception, the well-resourced and viable commercial 
centres with their strong revenue bases were reserved as white areas. The outlying 
and poor areas without meaningful formal economies were reserved for black 
people. In the homeland areas, traditional authorities were tasked with performing 
local government functions. Transformation of local government into a fully-
fledged and non-racial institution of governance was thus impelled by a legacy of 
DE VISSER: 
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an “urban economic logic that systematically favoured white urban areas at the cost 
of black urban and peri-urban areas,” with “tragic and absurd” results.1  
 
Negotiations on local government between the apartheid government and the 
liberation movements commenced in earnest in the beginning of the 1990s. They 
produced a foundation for local government transformation. Essential to the 
outcome was the adoption of the principle of ‘one city one tax base’, the slogan 
with which the grossly inequitable distribution of resources was opposed by the 
liberation movement. Furthermore, a chapter on local government for the Interim 
Constitution was agreed upon, as well as a transition Act (the Local Government 
Transition Act of 1993) to guide the transformation towards democratic local 
government. 
 
Local Government Transformation 
The Interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993) paved 
the way for the first democratic elections in 1994 and for the formulation of a final 
Constitution by the newly elected Parliament. It ushered in constitutional 
recognition for local government by recognising its autonomy and guaranteeing it 
revenue generating powers, as well as a right to a share of nationally generated 
revenue. The Interim Constitution set the scene for the amalgamation of over 1000 
racially defined and disparate local government structures into 842 transitional 
local authorities (Steytler 2006:187). 
 
The final Constitution of 1996 then contained a definitive statement on local 
government, in the form of a progressive chapter in which local government is 
firmly established as a mature sphere of government. Furthermore, the Constitution 
posited local government as a critical development agent by listing the 
‘constitutional objects’ and ‘developmental duties’ of local government. These 
centre around democracy, sustainable service delivery, social and economic 
development, environmental protection, community participation, poverty 
alleviation and intergovernmental cooperation (Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1993, ss 152 and 152). 
 
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government (Department of Constitutional 
Development 1998) preceded the implementation of the constitutional provisions. 
It proved to be a policy that rallied friend and foe around new concepts. It 
introduced a discourse that would reverberate until long afterwards. It translated 
the constitutional objects and duties into the concept of ‘developmental local 
government’, and defined the new mandate as “local government committed to 
working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to 
meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their 
lives.” Developmental local government would be characterised by four features.  
 
                                                
1
 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
and Others 1998 (2) BLCR 1458 (CC), para 122.
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• Maximising economic growth and social development: local government is 
instructed to exercise its powers and functions in a way that has a 
maximum impact on economic growth and social development of 
communities. 
• Integrating and coordinating: local government integrates and coordinates 
developmental activities of other state and non-state agents in the 
municipal area. 
• Democratic development and public participation: local government 
becomes the vehicle through which citizens work to achieve their vision of 
the kind of place in which they wish to live. 
• Leading and learning: municipalities must build social capital, stimulate 
the finding of local solutions for increased sustainability, and stimulate 
local political leadership. 
 
The transformation of local government institutions began in earnest with the 
adoption in 1998 of the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, providing 
for the demarcation of municipal boundaries by an independent Municipal 
Demarcation Board (MDB). The Constitution contains the imperative of creating a 
‘wall-to-wall’ system of inclusive and viable municipalities (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(1)). This represented a break with the past 
where not all areas, particularly traditional rural areas, were governed by a local 
authority. The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 provided a 
legal framework for the establishment of local government institutions. It 
established two modes of local government: single-tiered metropolitan 
municipalities in large urban areas, and a two-tiered system of district and local 
municipalities throughout the rest of the country. It further provided a framework 
for the internal functioning of municipalities. Critical new aspects were the 
introduction of firstly, an ‘executive mayor’ system of municipal governance 
alongside the classic ‘collective executive committee’ system; secondly, a separate 
municipal speaker; and thirdly, ward committees as vehicles for community 
participation. The impact and success of these changes is discussed below.  
 
On 5 December 2000, municipal councils were elected into this new system of 
local government. A new generation of municipalities thus commenced their 
journey towards realising the constitutional vision of developmental local 
government.  
 
In the meantime, transformation work had continued with the adoption in 2000 of 
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act. This Act represents a detailed 
definition of developmental local government as espoused in the White Paper on 
Local Government. It engages the developmental vision of municipalities working 
together with citizens by establishing a framework that instructs municipalities to 
involve citizens in decision making, particularly through the regulation of a 
framework for participative development planning. 
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In 2003, the institutional and developmental chapters of local government 
transformation were complemented by a financial chapter. The Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 establishes a robust framework for 
local government finance, dealing with financial management and accounting, 
revenue, expenditure and debt management, responsibilities of accounting officers 
and mayors, and financial supervision by national and provincial governments. The 
Act was widely welcomed as a long awaited and necessary framework and 
financial management tool for municipalities. 
 
3. Local Government’s Record of Delivery 
Before venturing into a critical analysis of the progress achieved to date with 
regard to local government transformation, it is important to recall some of the key 
benefits to be had from engaging local government in development and service 
delivery (De Visser 2005:19). Firstly, local government is the level of government 
that is closest to the citizens. At least in theory, municipalities are best able to 
obtain and understand people’s wishes and aspirations for the locality. They should 
also be best placed to identify and unlock local potential, and mobilise resources 
present in the locality. These characteristics do not automatically lead to a higher 
quality and legitimacy of decisions but certainly have the potential to do so. This 
depends on whether local governments are indeed configured and behave 
responsively, and to what extent local governments are able to pursue their 
communities’ wishes for the locality through broader government structures and 
partnerships.  
 
Secondly, there is the promise that local government holds for deepening 
democracy: having many sites of democratic practice is fertile ground for the 
growth of new leadership and the consolidation of multi-party democracy. Thirdly, 
the allocation of responsibility to municipalities creates room for local creativity 
and avoids the phenomenon where the entire country needs to experience the same 
experiment before it can be evaluated. Fourthly, municipalities are key players in 
multi-sectoral coordination as they are the witnesses of the actual delivery by all 
development actors on the ground. 
 
Against this background, a broad assessment of progress to date indicates an 
impressive record of expansion of service delivery. Through the leadership of 
municipalities, basic service delivery has been extended to the marginalised to a 
degree that is unprecedented in South Africa’s history, and at a pace that is noted 
and commended internationally. Access to water supply increased from 59% of 
total households in 1994 to 86% by April 2007. Access to sanitation increased from 
48% to 73% over the same period. In 1994, 30% of houses in South Africa had 
access to electricity, but by 2006/07 this figure had increased to 73%. From 1994 to 
2006 a total of 2,243 million houses were delivered at an average of 249,290 units 
per annum (Department of Provincial and Local Government 2007:5). 
 
However, the incomplete and, in certain respects, imperfect nature of local 
government transformation is evidenced by social protests that emerged most 
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intensively during 2005 and 2006 and continued in 2007. Protests revolved around 
poor records of service delivery, real and perceived instances of corruption, and a 
lack of developmental impact by municipalities (Atkinson 2007:58). 
 
It is also relevant to note that whilst municipal political leadership in South Africa 
is democratically elected under a national electoral system, voter turnout over the 
last three local government elections has not been impressive, averaging around 
48% (Independent Electoral Commission 2006; Human Sciences Research Council 
2006:3). Negative sentiments that contribute to a lower turnout for local than for 
national and provincial elections relate mainly to a lack of interest and trust in local 
government (Good Governance Learning Network 2008:34) 
 
It is argued here that certain fault lines in the design of the local government 
system may have contributed to this negative sentiment and the groundswell of 
protest against municipalities. These fault lines relate to some of the key elements 
of the legal and policy framework for local government. 
 
4. Central Tenets of the System 
The Constitution terms each sphere of government ‘distinctive, interrelated and 
interdependent’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 40(1)). These 
three labels define the values underlying South Africa’s system of 
intergovernmental relations. The status of local government in the South African 
system of government can be explained by making use of this constitutional 
terminology. 
 
Local government’s ‘distinctiveness’ as a sphere of government manifests itself in 
a number of ways. Firstly, municipalities are headed by democratically elected 
councils (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 157(1)). The 
electoral framework, laid down in the Constitution, the Municipal Structures Act 
and the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act of 2000, provides that 
municipal councils generally comprise 50% ward councillors, elected on a ‘winner 
takes all’ constituency system, and 50% councillors elected via a party list 
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 20). 
 
The second manifestation of the ‘distinctiveness’ of local government is the fact 
that the Constitution itself allocates ‘original’ powers and functions to 
municipalities. It does this by providing a list of ‘local government matters’ over 
which local government has authority (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1993, s. 156).2 Additional powers and functions can be transferred by national and 
provincial governments to local government as a sphere, or to individual 
municipalities (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 156(2)). 
 
Furthermore, a significant part of local government’s financial authority is 
guaranteed through constitutional provisions that secure local government’s power 
                                                
2
 Read with Schedules 4A and 5B of the Constitution. 
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to levy property rates and surcharges on fees (Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1993, s. 229). Finally, the Constitution provides that local government is 
entitled to an ‘equitable share’ of nationally generated revenue, providing 
municipalities with a legal claim to unconditional revenue streams (Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 227(1)(a)). It also instructs national and 
provincial governments to respect local government’s distinctiveness (Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(4)). 
 
The emphasis on the distinctiveness of local government is balanced by the two 
other constitutional labels, namely the ‘interdependence’ and ‘interrelatedness’ of 
the three spheres. 
 
Local government’s interdependence in relation to other spheres of government 
connotes a relationship of supervision. National and provincial governments are 
constitutionally entitled and mandated to supervise the performance of 
municipalities. The constitutional division of functions between national 
government and provincial governments determines the extent to which either of 
them may supervise municipalities with respect to a particular functional area. A 
detailed exposition of this division goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
it is safe to say that both spheres of government exercise significant supervisory 
powers with regard to municipalities. National government establishes an 
institutional framework for local government that is largely uniform across the nine 
provinces. National and provincial governments must monitor the performance of 
municipalities so as to ensure that they discharge their developmental and service 
delivery responsibilities (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 
155(6) and (7)). National and provincial governments must support local 
government (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 154). Finally, 
provincial governments have the right to intervene in the event of serious problems 
in a municipality (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 139). 
 
The ‘interrelatedness’ of local government with other spheres of government 
connotes cooperation: organs of state in the three spheres of government are 
instructed to cooperate with one another in a relationship of equality (Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 41). This constitutional instruction to 
cooperate is particularly relevant in the South African context where the 
constitutional division of functions between the three spheres is not neatly defined. 
Many overlaps between national, provincial and local functions exist (Steytler and 
De Visser 2007:5-16; Steytler and Fessha 2007:325). For example, when the 
Constitution makes national and provincial governments responsible for ‘Public 
Transport’ and municipalities for ‘Municipal Public Transport’,3 it is clear that the 
‘fuzzy edges’ between municipal and provincial functions require intensive 
cooperation between the two spheres to avoid and address role confusion.  
 
A key instrument of cooperation is integrated development planning. An important 
premise of South Africa’s planning framework is that the municipality coordinates 
                                                
3
 See Schedule 4 of the Constitution. 
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the planning of development and service delivery by all three spheres of 
government in its municipal area.4 Another key manifestation of the inclusion of 
local government into the broader cooperative venture is that local government is a 
partner in intergovernmental relations: through organised local government 
structures (local government associations), it is represented on most relevant 
intergovernmental structures and institutions (Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act 2005). 
 
Municipal Governance 
Effectiveness of municipal governance institutions is a precondition in order for 
any country to reap the benefits of decentralisation. Olowu and Wunsch (2004:9) 
remark that: 
 
[w]eak authority and defective institutional and operational rules can make it 
difficult to reach decisions, and thereby lead to policy failure and weakened local 
governance. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the transformation of local government governance systems 
introduced new systems of executive leadership in municipalities. These new 
systems have drastically changed the profile of a municipality and the desired 
relationship between its political and administrative components. 
 
Before 2000, the average municipality was governed by a small council with a 
weak, collective executive structure. The council was chaired by a mayor whose 
task was largely ceremonial. The municipal administration was led by a strong 
‘town clerk’ who initiated and drove much of the council agenda (Olowu and 
Wunsch 2004:89). This fitted the context of the municipality as a largely 
administrative, rather than policy making, authority. 
 
The new generation of municipalities is governed by a large council; it has a strong 
executive authority, in many cases concentrated in an executive mayor. The council 
meeting is chaired by a separately elected speaker (Municipal Structures Act 1998, 
ss. 36 and 37) and the administration is headed by a municipal manager (Municipal 
Structures Act 1998, s. 55). The municipal manager is appointed by the council 
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 82) and is expected to work very closely 
together with the municipal executive5. The new legal framework expects 
municipalities to extend their activities beyond administering national and 
provincial laws. Municipalities must adopt policies and by-laws, actively engage 
municipal communities, plan strategically and partner with external institutions. 
This requires strong political and administrative leadership. A critical difference 
from the system that prevailed before 2000 relates to the role of the municipal 
                                                
4
 See Chapter 5 of the Municipal Systems Act; see also below. 
5
 Municipal managers enter into a performance agreement with the mayor. See the Municipal 
Performance Regulations for Municipal Manager and Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal 
Managers, 2006, GN R805, Government Gazette 29089, 1 August 2006.
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executive. The municipal executive is expected to initiate policy, oversee the 
administration and take regular executive and administrative decisions. 
 
At an administrative level, the transformation has been fundamental. The new legal 
framework has resulted in an improved and rational system for municipal 
administration. The Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act have laid down a framework for the municipal administration that 
is based on modern public management principles. Concepts such as strategic 
planning, performance measurement, modern accounting principles, transparency, 
and separation of politics from administration, resonate throughout the legal 
framework. Community participation in municipal affairs has been firmly placed 
on the municipal agenda by the adoption of a progressive framework that instructs 
municipalities to involve communities in decision-making. Best practices on how 
best to implement these directives are emerging, albeit slowly.  
 
5. Current Challenges 
Despite significant progress in the rationalisation and modernisation of municipal 
governance, there are specific challenges inherent in the new system which are 
possibly hampering the successful transformation of local government. What 
follows is a examination of some of the most pertinent institutional difficulties that 
have arisen in the first decade of democratic local government in South Africa. 
 
Size 
A significant challenge is the size of the average South Africa municipality. The 
country has 283 municipalities that serve a population of close to 48 million and 
cover a landmass of 1,220,813 square kilometres (Statistics South Africa 2007:1.1 
and 2.1). Quick comparisons with Spain (50 provinces and 8,108 municipalities), 
and Germany (323 districts and 12,477 municipalities), show that South Africa’s 
municipalities are vast in size and population. In fact, municipalities are actually 
charged with a regional mandate. Not only are municipalities slowly emerging 
from the painfully difficult amalgamation of varied previous municipal 
administrations, but the management of often very diverse communities is itself a 
difficult task. There are many examples of contestation between communities in 
single municipalities. For example, when one group of communities succeeded, 
after a protracted and sometimes violent battle, to have their municipality (called 
Merafong) incorporated into the Gauteng province, another group of communities 
in the same municipality vehemently questioned that decision. 
 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the size of the South African municipality is a 
considerable challenge for that municipality when it wants to realise effective 
community participation. This challenge relates specifically to rural areas. In the 
quest for economically viable municipal units with redistributive potential, the 
norm is that a number of towns are demarcated into one municipality together with 
their rural hinterlands, which are thus very extensive and, again, often diverse in 
character. 
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Executive Mayors 
As stated above, strong municipal executive leadership is a characteristic of the 
new generation of municipalities. Many municipalities have ‘executive mayors’. 
This means that municipal executive powers are concentrated in one councillor 
who is elected by the council as its executive mayor (Municipal Structures Act 
1998, ss. 55 and 56).6 The executive mayor, in turn, ‘hand picks’ a mayoral 
committee (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 60).7 This system stands in contrast 
to the conventional collective executive system that obtained in all municipalities 
prior to 2000, and which is still practiced in those municipalities that do not have 
an executive mayor. The collective executive system entails the election by the 
council of an executive committee that broadly ‘mirrors’ the composition of the 
municipal council (Municipal Structures Act 1998, ss. 43 and 44). 
 
It is suggested that the introduction of the indirectly elected executive mayor has 
been particularly successful in large cities, where it has contributed to visible 
executive leadership. In general, stakeholders appear to be “relatively satisfied with 
the system”.8 There are, however, concerns around potential exclusionary effects. 
The executive mayor system appears to have created a wide gap between executive 
councillors (i.e. councillors on the mayoral committee) and ‘ordinary’ councillors 
who are not part of the mayoral committee. These councillors feel increasingly 
disadvantaged due to the lack of access to documentation and information flows. A 
report on the functioning of the mayoral executive system remarked that: “[i]t is 
clear that the relationships between the mayoral executive committee and non-
executive councillors are not based on democratic values, but display a lack of 
transparency; autocratic decision-making; and accountability. This is expressed by 
stakeholders as a lack of respect for one another, a culture of secrecy, and 
perceptions of marginalisation.”9  
 
Role Definitions 
The issue of the division of responsibilities and powers among political office-
bearers in a municipality has proved to be a persistent source of tension and 
contestation. As stated above, the speaker’s office was a novelty when it was 
introduced in 2000. Generally, municipalities have not found it easy to adapt to this 
new political office-bearer. A persistent source of tension and conflict can be found 
in the role definition of the speaker vis-à-vis the municipal executive, or more 
specifically, the mayor. An earlier study found the relationship between speakers 
and executive mayors to be poor: “Self-defeating patterns of behaviour characterise 
interaction between the executive mayor and the speaker. Both act in a way that is 
detrimental to themselves and the municipality and there is little understanding and 
                                                
6
 See further Steytler and De Visser 3-29ff. 
7
 
See DA v Masondo 2003 (2) BCLR 128 (CC) for a Constitutional Court judgment on the 
composition of mayoral committees. See also Wooldridge 2008:478. 
8
 
See Idasa, paragraph 9. 
9
 See Idasa, section 3; See also Atkinson 2007:64. 
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concern about the consequences of the poor relationship between them and the 
negative impact this has on the municipality.”10 
 
The constitutional reality that the municipal council possesses both legislative and 
executive authority (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(2)) 
sets the scene for a possibly uneasy relationship between the speaker and the 
municipal executive. South Africa’s national and provincial parliaments are 
configured in a Westminster style. Their speakers are responsible for managing the 
affairs of the legislature: they generally have no authority over the affairs of the 
executive save for the occasion when its members participate in the legislature. In 
contrast, the speaker in a municipality occupies a different role, simply because the 
municipal council is not a body that is exclusively tasked with passing laws and 
overseeing the executive. It is also tasked with discussing and disposing of a range 
of executive and administrative issues. The mere fact that the municipal speaker 
presides over and participates in meetings where administrative and executive 
issues are debated and discussed, calls for a more nuanced role definition. 
 
In terms of statutory law, the municipal speaker is at a minimum responsible for 
chairing council meetings and enforcing the Code of Conduct for Councillors 
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 37). However, additional powers may be 
delegated to the speaker (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 37(b)). It is common 
practice for the council to delegate to the speaker responsibilities related to 
community participation and councillor support. However, both these functional 
areas attract a great deal of politics. The engagement of municipal office-bearers 
with the municipal community is an intensely political activity where the municipal 
executive is involved. At times, speakers do not limit themselves to organising and 
guarding the quality of the community engagement. They then become active 
participants, often to the chagrin of the municipal executive. Similarly, councillor 
support may become an arena for ‘petty politics’ in the council. Unfortunately, the 
power to decide who is entitled to training, conference visits and other types of 
councillor support often represents political leverage. The mayor may seek to 
preserve control over this.  
 
Mostly, tensions arise from an unclear definition of roles. By law, municipalities 
must define the roles and responsibilities in written ‘terms of reference’ for each 
political office-bearer, and provide for internal conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Research indicates that most municipalities have not adopted such ‘job 
descriptions’ for their speakers and do not have standing procedures for resolving 
these possibly debilitating conflicts (De Visser, Baatjies and Akintan 2008).   
 
Council Appointees 
As stated earlier, the role of the most senior municipal official, now called the 
municipal manager, has changed significantly. Since 2000, the municipal council 
has had the authority to appoint the municipal manager as well as those managers 
                                                
10
 See Idasa , section 2. 
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that report directly to him or her (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 82; Municipal 
Systems Act 2000, s. 56). This configuration was designed to produce a senior 
management team in the municipality that understands, and operates in sync with 
its political principals in the municipal executive. Whilst this objective is 
supported, there appear to be a number of important side-effects. Firstly, political 
instability in a municipal council now has an immediate ‘knock-on’ effect on 
senior management. A change in local political leadership, shifts in a ruling 
coalition, or even a reform within a ruling party, often leads to the dismissal of the 
municipal manager and sometimes even to the dismissal of managers reporting to 
the municipal manager (Wooldridge 2008:475). This is evidenced by the large 
number of unfilled vacancies in the top two echelons of municipal administration. 
In 2006 and 2007, 15% of the posts in senior municipal management stood vacant 
(National Treasury 2008:184). Municipal administrations are thus suffering from a 
lack of continuity at senior management level (Municipal Demarcation Board 
2007:89). 
 
Secondly, the highly charged political profile of these positions has contributed to a 
shift in control over appointments from the municipal council to the internal 
workings of political parties. There is widespread concern that the need for 
‘political suitability’ is starting to eclipse the need for qualified and skilled senior 
managers in the municipality (Atkinson 2007:67). The fact that 30% or more of 
senior municipal management has five years or less local government experience 
reveals a disconcerting trend towards the appointment of inadequately skilled 
senior managers.11 It is suggested that this is partly the result of excessive political 
involvement in what should be appointments on the basis of merit. In order for 
local government to further improve its performance, a new balance needs to be 
struck between the need for political alignment of top management with the 
municipal executive on the one hand, and an insistence on quality on the other. 
Serious consideration should be given to removing the appointment of the second 
layer of management from the realm of the municipal council and leaving this to 
the municipal manager. It is suggested that this will assist in reducing political 
involvement in the administration, whilst leaving the political alignment between 
the municipal manager and the municipal executive intact. 
 
Improving Community Participation 
The involvement of communities in municipal affairs is not only a key objective of 
local government but also one of the main reasons for South Africa’s choice of 
developmental local government. Success is this area is thus of paramount 
importance. Government’s recognition of this importance is evidenced by an 
elaborate and progressive legal framework for participatory governance at 
municipal level.  
 
Municipalities are tasked to involve communities in the drafting of their integrated 
development plan, their budget, and in the taking of decisions regarding service 
                                                
11
 See Municipal Demarcation Board 2007:88; SALGA 2007:59; National Treasury 2008:185. 
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delivery and development. Furthermore, the law contains a legal framework for 
ward committees. These committees generally comprise ten representatives of 
various sectors or geographical areas in the ward. They are elected by the voters in 
the ward. The committee is chaired by the ward councillor. Its role is to advance 
participation of the community in the affairs of the municipality, particularly in 
relation to development planning. The concept of a ward committee follows similar 
practices elsewhere, such as the village development committees in Botswana 
(Serema 2002:1). 
 
However, an apparent contradiction exists between the progressive legal 
framework for community participation and persistent incidences of protest 
targeting councillors and municipal administrations.12 Although government has 
created ample spaces, platforms and procedures for community engagement with 
local government, it is clear that communities still elect to take their grievances to 
the streets. These protests expose not only the current shortcomings in service 
delivery but also the presence of untapped local energy and involvement with 
municipal governance. Atkinson suggests that the frustrations of communities are 
threefold. They relate to poor service delivery, unresponsive decision-making and 
conspicuous consumption by councillors and officials (Atkinson 2007:58).  
 
There are many underlying reasons for the protests that are not always within the 
realm of what municipalities are responsible for, and an extended discussion of 
these tensions falls outside of the scope of this paper. However, a general 
observation relates to the wisdom of institutionalising community participation. 
The legal framework impacting on municipal governance is awash with 
institutions, procedures and platforms that are used to capture diverse interests and 
channel them into a discourse to which a municipal bureaucracy can relate. The 
danger that lurks in the creation and nurturing of institutionalised forms of public 
participation such as ward committees, is that it removes the imperative to 
continuously look for innovative ways to engage communities. There may be good 
reason to revisit this approach and seek more insights into how communities really 
wish to relate to municipal administrations. This observation does not detract from 
the potential that local government has for deepening community participation or 
from the noble intentions behind the current legal framework. It rather emphasises 
the need for adequate strategies at municipal level for translating this potential and 
the enabling framework into genuine engagement. 
 
6. Intergovernmental Framework: A New Role for Cities? 
Central to many of the problems besetting local government is the lack of clarity 
with regards to the intergovernmental framework. The Constitution combines a 
strong expression of autonomy for municipalities with a weak definition of the 
areas that they are responsible for. The precise demarcation of the functional 
responsibility of a municipality is dependent on a variety of processes and 
                                                
12
 For an overview of the scale of protests, see Atkinson 2007:54; SALGA 2007:139; Mathekga and 
Buccus  2006. 
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interventions, such as functional definitions in statutes, the outcome of judicial 
proceedings solving disputes over who does what, or the conclusion of 
intergovernmental agreements and protocols (Steytler and Fessha 2007:325). The 
uncertainty over functional areas renders it difficult for municipalities to plan and 
budget for current and capital expenditure (National Treasury 2008:152). There is a 
perception that the goal posts are changing continuously (Atkinson 2007:71). The 
challenges pertaining to the mismatch between the constitutional allocation of 
powers and the realities of the developmental mandate are traversed in another 
contribution to this journal (Christmas and De Visser 2009). 
 
It may be argued that an insistence on a clear demarcation of functional local 
government responsibilities is naïve, that the complexities of governance cannot be 
confined to legal definitions, and that flexible governance arrangements are more 
important. However, three reasons are proffered for greater clarity. Firstly, the 
constitutional context in South Africa gives rise to an expectation surrounding 
clarity of responsibilities. If the Constitution itself puts forward a list of functional 
areas and seeks to protect municipal discretion with regard to these areas, there is 
an expectation that these constitutional prescripts should be given a reasonably 
precise meaning. It would not be in keeping with the constitutional promise of 
autonomy if the Constitution contains a list of functional areas but then the content 
of these areas is actually immaterial, and that flexible governance arrangements are 
considered more pressing than giving effect to constitutional provisions.  
 
Secondly, flexible governance arrangements are likely to work better in countries 
with strong municipal governments and a long history of decentralisation. In such a 
context, municipalities will enter these governance partnerships as equal partners. 
But in countries such as South Africa, where decentralisation is a new 
phenomenon, municipalities (with the exception of strong metropolitan 
municipalities) are underdogs in negotiations with strong provincial or national 
government departments. A reasonably clear understanding of the content of the 
functional areas equips municipalities to enter negotiations surrounding the fuzzy 
edges as equal partners.  
 
Lastly, the uncertainty surrounding functional responsibilities is undermining the 
legitimacy of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. In South Africa, fiscal 
arrangements and calculations are premised on an understanding of constitutional 
mandates. If this understanding is contested at a fundamental level, the integrity of 
the intergovernmental fiscal system is endangered. 
 
Role of Big Cities 
An example of incoherence in the intergovernmental framework that should impel 
law and policy makers to reflect on the adequacy of the institutional and policy 
environment for local government, relates to the role of big cities. A concern for 
more coherence in the institutions of local government and the powers it possesses 
should not be misunderstood as a drive for uniformity. In fact, the imposition of 
uniformity on an unequal environment produces a lack of coherence. It is argued 
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that this type of incoherence may be emerging in the system of local government. 
Despite having a dedicated institutional arrangement for metropolitan areas in the 
form of single tiered metropolitan municipalities, the local government system pays 
too little regard to the variations in challenges, capacity and progress between areas 
(Cities Network 2006:2-28; Van Ryneveld 2007). There are two bases for this 
concern. The first relates to the fundamental economic importance of large cities. 
 
• The majority of South Africans now live in cities and large towns and this 
figure is generally on the rise. In 2006, 42 percent of the national 
population lived in the 21 biggest cities and towns that cover just 2 per cent 
of the South African land surface.  
• The majority of wealth is created in urban areas. The 21 biggest cities and 
towns together contribute 70 per cent of the national General Value Added 
(GVA). 
• The 21 biggest cities and towns are also home to 25 per cent of persons 
living below the breadline (Cities Network 2006:2-12). 
 
The second basis for concern relates to the fact that this concentration of both 
economic activity and poverty in urban areas requires specific, specialised 
approaches to issues such as: 
 
• Dealing with the informal economic activity and settlements; and 
• Planning and implementing in an integrated manner around typical urban 
governance issues, such as housing, transport and infrastructure. 
 
South Africa’s biggest cities are consistently appealing to provincial and national 
governments, with varying success, to consider the devolution of certain critical 
functions. The Constitution itself permits and envisages an ‘asymmetrical’ 
approach to municipal powers by providing for individual assignments, that is the 
transfer of authority to individual municipalities (Steytler and De Visser 2007:5-
39). To date, this instrument has not been used to empower big cities with authority 
that goes beyond their ‘original’ functions. In reality, however, big cities perform a 
myriad of additional functions, on behalf of or in partnership with organs of state in 
other spheres of government. These are often based on fluid, informal or 
contractual arrangements.  
 
Critical areas that have been consistently identified as being in need of a 
differentiated approach include housing and transport (SALGA 2007:103,108). 
Authority over housing, and the entitlement to the intergovernmental finances for 
housing development, is with the provincial governments. However, the 
eradication of slums and inadequate shelter through the provision of low cost 
housing is without doubt a key priority of cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town 
and eThekwini (Durban). Similarly, the redesign and upgrade of South Africa’s 
appalling public transport system, historically designed to accommodate the 
transfer of the black labour force into city centres and white suburbs, is a top 
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concern of the cities. Yet, cities have little authority over public transport matters 
(National Treasury 2008:153). 
 
It is suggested that this lack of authority compromises cities’ ability to ensure an 
integrated approach to the provision of housing and the upgrading of public 
transport facilities in an environmentally sustainable manner. There is no doubt 
that, through innovative and cooperative arrangements at a regional and provincial 
level, much can be achieved without resorting to changing the formal division of 
powers (National Treasury 2008:153). However, it is submitted that the devolution 
of housing and public transport authority to South Africa’s cities would contribute 
to the acceleration of delivery in these areas. The same does not apply to smaller 
towns and rural municipalities: in that case, different public transport needs, 
economies of scale and capacity constraints render it necessary for housing and 
public transport authority to be exercised at a higher level than the municipality.  
 
7. Integrated Development Planning: Towards Selective Alignment? 
The legal and policy framework for development planning in South Africa 
envisages that municipalities will play an absolutely essential role in realising 
coherent planning across the three spheres of government. Each municipality is 
required by law to adopt an integrated development plan (IDP). The IDP must be 
adopted shortly after the beginning of a municipal council’s term. Furthermore, it 
must be reviewed annually. It is the municipality’s strategic plan that is based on an 
intensive community participation process to gauge and prioritise the municipal 
community’s needs. The IDP is expected to integrate the planning of all municipal 
departments under the umbrella of a united strategy for the municipal area. 
Importantly, the IDP must go beyond planning rhetoric and be the basis for the 
municipality’s annual budgets and its spatial planning. Furthermore, the 
municipality’s senior managers must be held accountable regularly, through a 
system of performance management, for the realisation of the IDP. As if this 
configuration is not sufficiently ambitious, the IDP is expected to integrate not only 
the municipality’s plans but also the plans of all national and provincial 
departments and parastatals (such as electricity-generating and telecommunication 
utilities) in that municipal area (Department of Constitutional Development 
1998:19) 
 
There is no doubt that the introduction of integrated development planning has 
forced municipalities to engage communities and gauge and prioritise their needs. 
It has also propelled municipalities into a thinking that goes beyond the municipal 
council’s term, and into a concerted effort at integrating service delivery and 
development across spheres, sectors and actors. 
 
In this framework, the municipality is expected to be the pivot that skilfully 
mediates the tremendous and varied needs of a municipal community with the 
requirements of departments and parastatals in two other spheres of government 
(Patel and Powell 2008:353). All of this is to be done within the parameters of a 
tight municipal budget. When the municipal capacity is set off against these 
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expectations, however, the picture looks bleak for many municipal areas. Capacity 
for integrated development planning at municipal level is low. The dependency on 
consultants to realise an IDP is staggering. A recent report suggests that 28% of 
local municipalities lack the most basic capacity to prepare an IDP and will 
struggle even with additional support. Only one in three (37%) municipalities has 
independent capacity to prepare an IDP, whilst another 35% have some basic 
capacity and can prepare an IDP with additional support (Good Governance 
Learning Network 2008:51). Against the backdrop of these figures, the assignment 
to municipalities to be the coordinator of all of government’s development efforts 
in the municipal area may be a tall order for some time to come. Thus when they 
reflect on the municipality’s role in intergovernmental planning, Pieterse and Van 
Donk remark that: “it is unlikely that municipalities will have the political clout (let 
alone the institutional capabilities) to persuade a national department to delay or 
redefine its particular programmes.” (Pieterse and Van Donk 2008:62) 
 
The intergovernmental aspiration, embedded in the planning framework, which 
envisages the IDP to be a reflection of the entire government’s vision for the 
municipal area, may be an ambitious attempt at cooperative planning across the 
three spheres. However, the insistence on this wholesale alignment of municipal 
budgets and plans with national and provincial budgets and plans may also just be 
an offshoot of the distrust of municipalities as the custodians of local development. 
There is no doubt that pervasive trends of corruption, mismanagement, immature 
politics and a skills deficit in many municipalities do little to dispel this distrust. 
However, the solution that is now imposed through legislation is, by all accounts, 
extremely difficult to achieve and harbours significant dangers for the achievement 
of bottom-up development.  
 
The IDP has become a tightly regulated process that must absorb the input of a 
multitude of development actors towards the adoption of a document within tight 
deadlines. This process has thus become a ‘pressure cooker’, which is incompatible 
with unwieldy community input which tends to disrupt intergovernmental cohesion 
and adherence to the intergovernmental deadlines (Good Governance Learning 
Network 2008:52). There is then a real danger that communities and community 
organisations will become disgruntled with the IDP, as they perceive the process to 
be inadequate in responding to their needs. A more realistic approach to 
intergovernmental planning and alignment may be apposite. It may be worthwhile 
to consider the identification of a limited number of national key priorities and 
insist on their alignment, whilst relaxing the effort towards synchronisation on 
other, less important policy areas. This may provide the necessary room for 
municipalities to develop their planning capabilities, devise mechanisms for 
genuine interaction with communities, and display creativity. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The progress made by South African municipalities towards realising the vision of 
developmental local government is remarkable and unprecedented. Over the last 13 
years, municipalities have embarked on the extension of infrastructure and 
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development, whilst absorbing changes to their internal governance and 
management arrangements, financial management systems and intergovernmental 
responsibilities. The new local government system thus offers great potential for 
the realisation of a better life for all citizens, facilitated by a new generation of 
developmentally oriented municipalities. 
 
However, this paper has identified several areas of contestation and conflict that 
impede service delivery and development. It has argued that an improvement in 
municipal governance is essential, and has identified key questions around 
governance arrangements and community participation. It has also proposed that 
municipal service delivery would benefit from more institutional coherence and 
predictability. An example given relates to the need for institutional 
accommodation of different spatial and economic realities that obtain in big cities. 
The paper also looked at the ambitious and progressive framework for integrated 
development planning and asked whether the insistence on comprehensive policy 
alignment should not be substituted with a policy of selective alignment around 
national key priority areas. 
 
Thus it cannot be assumed that communities will start reaping more benefits from 
the developmental system of local government. Municipalities operate in a 
complex system of intergovernmental relations, which places a high premium on 
both local discretion and intergovernmental integration. Capacity constraints in 
critical areas of municipal governance and administration are hampering service 
delivery. There is also a lack of connectivity between communities and 
municipalities, which flies in the face of the policy intent of ‘developmental local 
government’. The search for the right balance is far from over. 
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Abstract 
Uganda embarked in 1993 on radical decentralization, among other reasons, to 
enhance local governance and local democracy. The major focus of the 
decentralization policy was on empowering citizens to participate in decisions that 
affect their localities. This issue will be examined based on two major themes of the 
twelve principles of the Commonwealth’s ‘Aberdeen Agenda’ for local democracy 
– the enabling environment and participation. However, the paper argues that 
Uganda’s devolutionary decentralization can only foster local governance and 
local democracy if it is properly conceptualised, the facilitating conditions are 
given careful attention, and the institutional framework is sufficiently elaborate 
and effective to enable it to achieve its intended objectives. Short of these 
measures, the gap between intent and reality might be so great as to disable the 
decentralization policy from achieving real local governance and local democracy. 
 
Key words: Local governance, local democracy, Aberdeen agenda. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Uganda embarked on radical decentralization of powers from central to local 
governments in the early 1990s as a conscious strategy to enhance local 
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democracy, improve service provision and reduce poverty. The initial focus was on 
empowering citizens to participate in decisions that affect their localities. Later, 
however, attention shifted to strengthening administrative systems to enable them 
to respond to local service delivery needs and poverty reduction imperatives. This 
radical shift was in response to the earlier situation in which central government 
had long dictated developments at local levels in an aloof manner, leaving the 
populace dissatisfied and unable to participate in or influence their local 
governance.  
 
Because devolution of power to local levels has been quite rare in Africa, Uganda’s 
experiment has attracted significant attention regarding the extent to which it can 
promote local governance and democracy, enhance service delivery and help 
reduce poverty. This paper examines the contribution of Uganda’s decentralization 
to the promotion of local governance and democracy. It argues that decentralization 
can foster local governance and democracy at the local level if it is properly 
conceptualised, the facilitating conditions – especially the legal framework and 
citizen participation – are given careful attention, and the institutional framework is 
sufficiently elaborate and effective to enable it to achieve its intended objectives. 
Otherwise, the gap between intent and reality might be so great as to raise 
questions as to the extent to which decentralization can lead to real local 
governance and democracy. 
 
The paper discusses these interconnected concepts in the context of the ‘Aberdeen 
Agenda’, under which twelve principles to promote local democracy and 
governance were adopted by the Commonwealth Local Government Conference 
held in Aberdeen, Scotland in 2005, and subsequently adopted by Commonwealth 
Heads of Government.1 Uganda’s experience will be analysed based on two themes 
– the enabling environment, and participation and openness to attain local 
democracy, equity and continuous improvement – in order to illuminate the extent 
to which decentralization has promoted local governance and local democracy. The 
paper starts with an overview of ‘local governance’ and ‘local democracy’, and 
then proceeds to analyse how Uganda’s decentralization has faired in line with the 
two themes. 
 
2. Conceptualising Local Governance and Local Democracy  
There are several ways of conceptualising local ‘governance’ and ‘democracy’. 
This paper has used empirically verifiable indicators that can guide various levels 
of local government in determining how far they are moving along the two themes. 
Several tools have been developed to make such measurements, such as the UN-
Habitat and Transparency International Urban Governance Index (UGI) for cities 
                                                
1
 
The Aberdeen Agenda comprises twelve postulates, namely: 1. Constitutional and legal recognition 
of local democracy; 2. Ability to elect local representatives; 3. Partnership between spheres of 
government; 4. Defined legislative framework; 5. Opportunities to participate in local decision-
making; 6. Open local government: accountability; 7. Open local government: transparency; 8. 
Openness to scrutiny; 9. Inclusiveness; 10. Adequate and equitable resource allocation; 11. Equitable 
service delivery; 12. Building strong local democracy and good governance.   
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(UN-Habitat 2004; CLGF 2004); the Local Governance Barometer (LGB) which 
measures local government capacity using qualitative and quantitative indicators to 
produce a Local Government Index (LGI) (Dufils et. al. 2006), and the Citizen 
Report Card or Participatory Service Delivery Assessment (Hafidh 2005)2 which is 
used to measure local governance and service delivery impact using feedback 
provided by beneficiaries to service providers. 
 
Regardless of the tool used, it is now generally agreed that the following constitute 
the main attributes of good local governance: constitutionalism, rule-of-law, 
justice, security of person and property, electoral and participatory democracy, 
respect for human rights and basic freedoms, equity, citizen participation in local 
decision-making, effective and efficient service delivery, and transparency, 
accountability and integrity in the management of public and private corporate 
affairs (Kauzya 2002). 
 
There is no generally agreed conceptualisation of democracy, although it is widely 
believed that it has intrinsic human development value and promotes individual as 
well as collective freedoms, responsibility for individual choices, and opportunities 
for citizens to protect and advance their common interests and wellbeing (Cheema 
and Maguire 2002). Democracy not only conditions the way in which the poor can 
participate in decision-making and thereby facilitate the alleviation of their 
conditions, it also creates space in which individuals and groups can organize along 
social and economic lines to pursue their interests (Webster 2000). 
 
The concept of democracy is neither value-free nor can it be precisely or 
adequately defined because of differences in its interpretation by different people 
and classes (Novacx 1970). However, the most popular conception in current 
discourse is informed by liberal democracy which postulates that democracy is a 
system of government in which there is meaningful, extensive, regular and fair 
competition for all elected positions of government; a highly inclusive level of 
political participation; and civil and political liberties (freedom of expression, of 
the press, and to form and join organizations of one’s choice) sufficient to ensure 
the integrity of political competition and participation. Democracy can also be 
conceived in terms of institutions, procedures, formal rights and leadership 
responsiveness to the electorate. These defining components of democracy are 
necessary in everyday practice in governmental affairs, in NGOs, and in all other 
human relations to ensure social order and harmony. 
 
There is a clear connection between local democracy and local governance. Local 
democracy strengthens local government by creating strong, organized and 
representative councils to improve efficiency and responsiveness in local 
development. Sound local governance improves the management of political, 
economic, and social development at the local, community and grassroots level. 
                                                
2
 A discussion paper of the above four instruments is provided in J. Kiyaga-Nsubuga (ed.), Local 
Democracy, Good Governance and Delivering The MDGS in Africa, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2007:63-66.
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Decentralization by devolution of decision-making to the lowest levels is a 
fundamental principle of local democracy and thereby good governance because it 
gives rise to a more responsive organization and greater community involvement. 
Conceptually, therefore, organized local bodies with clear mandates are generally 
more efficient and effective in enhancing local democracy and good governance, in 
delivering services to the local people and in reducing poverty. 
 
3. Assessing Local Democracy and Local Governance in Uganda 
Uganda’s decentralization reforms contain an inherent paradox. On the one hand, 
the extent to which formal powers have been devolved from central to local levels, 
particularly over the management of local affairs, far exceeds what had happened 
in the country before and in many other African countries. On the other hand, the 
operation of decentralization indicates significant limitations with respect to how 
local governments apply those formal powers in practice. Recognizing these 
apparently contradictory tendencies is crucial to understanding how Uganda’s 
decentralization process has evolved since the early 1990s. The discussion that 
follows will expose this fact by showing that while decentralization has deepened 
local democracy and governance in Uganda through the establishment of 
appropriate institutions, structures, and capacity, the system has not been 
performing as expected in some crucial areas due to lack of political will by local 
and national leaders to translate intent into reality.   
 
The Enabling Environment 
Uganda’s local government system has a legally and constitutionally facilitating 
environment. It reflects devolution of powers (political, financial, personnel), 
functions and responsibilities to popularly elected councils and administrative 
units. These powers include making and implementing development plans based on 
locally determined priorities; making, approving and executing their own budgets; 
raising and utilizing resources according to their own priorities; appointing 
statutory committees, boards, and commissions; making ordinances and by-laws 
consistent with the 1995 Constitution and other existing laws, ordinances, and by-
laws; hiring, managing and firing personnel; managing their own payroll and 
personnel systems, and implementing a broad range of decentralized services 
previously handled by the centre.  
 
The system is based on the district as the primary unit, under which there are 
lower-level local governments (sub-county, municipal, division and town councils), 
and administrative units (county, parish and village). Kampala city has a separate 
legal status as an autonomous local government, with divisions, parishes and wards 
(parishes and wards are administrative units). Local governments are bodies 
corporate, while administrative units are not. A local government council is the 
highest political authority within its area of jurisdiction and has planning, 
administrative, financial management, budgeting, legislative and judicial powers 
which it exercises in accordance with the constitution, the Local Governments Act 
(1997) and central government policies and regulations. Local government councils 
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operate through executive committees and statutory organs (District Service 
Commissions, District/City Contracts Committees, Local Government Public 
Accounts Committees). 
 
The authoritative legislative framework on decentralization in Uganda, known as 
the Local Governments Act, was enacted in 1997 to consolidate and streamline the 
legal environment within which local governments are meant to operate. Between 
January 2001 and May 2006 the Act was amended ten times to respond to 
developments in the implementation of decentralization and to streamline local 
administration in the country.  These numerous amendments are indicative of the 
steep learning curve the local government system has gone through and the 
flexibility of the legal framework in adjusting to changing realities. From a design 
standpoint, therefore, the local government system has the requisite legal-
constitutional and institutional frameworks in which to operate effectively. 
Amending the law to address unforeseen contingencies or emerging issues is 
healthy, provided it does not jeopardize the operations of local governments. For 
example, amending the law to disband District Tender Boards (DTBs) and replace 
them with Local Government Contracts Committees under the control of 
accounting officers3 was clearly necessary because DTBs had been turned into 
instruments of cronyism to which people were appointed by local government 
councils as reward for political support after candidates have won elections. On the 
other hand, owing to lack of extensive analysis, considerable controversy followed 
the abolition of graduated tax4 in 2006 (not withstanding that it was abolished due 
to legitimate reasons including its regressive nature and difficulty in collection), 
because the resultant loss of revenue plunged local governments into a financial 
crisis from which they have not yet recovered (see below). 
 
4. Openness for Local Democracy 
Citizen Participation  
Generally, Uganda’s local government system is open and participative. However, 
there are serious challenges facing citizen participation in local development. The 
fact is that citizens cannot participate in public affairs, even over matters that affect 
them directly, unless they are empowered. ‘Empowerment’ refers to the political 
process of expanding the space for citizens to exercise their freedom of choice and 
action to have more control over resources and decisions that affect their lives 
(Deepa 2002). However, local people at the grassroots lack sufficient knowledge 
and organization, which exposes their agenda to the risk of ‘elite capture’. A 
classical case of elite capture can be seen in School Management Committees 
(SMCs) in primary schools where the majority of the parents are poor peasants who 
exercise minimal control over the decision-making process, for example, in 
financial matters (Prinsen and Titeca 2008). It is also not easy to get the necessary 
                                                
3
 District accounting officers, who are usually also the chief administrative officers, are responsible 
for receiving central government funds, dispersing them to the different departments in the district, 
and accounting for the use of those funds. 
4
 Graduated tax was levied on all able-bodied adults in the country. It was paid annually and fixed by 
committees constituted at the different levels of local governments.
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information, such as services to be delivered and the funds spent on them, to local 
people at the right time to facilitate appropriate decision-making. Furthermore, not 
all ideas get included in development plans during bottom-up participatory 
planning, leading to unfulfilled expectations. Yet a participatory planning approach 
has been adopted under the provisions of section 36 of the Local Governments 
(Amendment) Act of 1997 that encourages involvement of all key stakeholders in 
development planning and implementation so that they are more responsive to the 
needs of the people (Republic of Uganda 2003).     
 
A major premise upon which Uganda’s local government system was built was that 
local citizens would participate effectively in making decisions over local 
development in addition to holding their leaders to account. It was also assumed 
that elected leaders would always work in the best interest of their electorate. The 
reality has turned out to be different (Francis and James 2003). In most cases 
citizens have little understanding of their local economies, and also find the 
planning and budgeting process complicated and their decisions never 
implemented. Practice has also shown that the local people are easily hoodwinked 
by unscrupulous political elites who capture the planning and budgeting process to 
advance their selfish interests. Although all local governments are required to 
publicize fiscal transfers they receive from the centre, and many of them comply, 
there is little evidence that local citizens across the country have all the information 
they need or that they are capable of analysing the financial information even if it 
was put at their disposal.   
  
It is, therefore, imperative that citizens are regularly provided with adequate 
information on the nature and resources of local economies, and have their skills in, 
say, financial management, planning and budgeting enhanced so that they can 
sensibly participate in deciding over local plans, budgets and investments. Local 
governments should be assisted to develop effective communication strategies to 
enable this to happen. 
 
Equity 
Providing services equitably has been and still remains a major challenge to local 
governments in Africa in general (Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2007) and Uganda in 
particular. First, the cost of service delivery in Uganda has neither been established 
across the board nor taken into account when determining local government fiscal 
transfers. Instead, the deciding factor has been the amount of money that is 
available; which has frequently been meager. This situation is aggravated by late 
transfers of resources from the centre.5 Secondly, national standards of service 
delivery have been established only in a few social service areas, such as primary 
education and health. Given these limitations, local governments are finding it 
difficult to cope effectively with their responsibilities. It is essential, therefore, to 
complete the development of national standards of service delivery and link them 
                                                
5
 Numerous instances have been reported when Local Governments have received money from the 
centre in the very month they are supposed to account for its utilization. 
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to fiscal transfers, and to eliminate the problem associated with ‘unfunded 
mandates’ typical of the current arrangement. 
 
On the positive side, service delivery has been expanded to broaden access and 
enhance equity. In the education sector, for example, the Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) programme has corrected the imbalance that existed in primary 
school enrolment, which largely favoured boys.6 Some special variants of the 
programme have targeted children who are especially disadvantaged, such as the 
Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja (ABEK) which targets children in the 
pastoral and arid Karamoja region in the north east of the country. Also, reasonably 
well-equipped Health Centres have been established at sub-county level, with basic 
drugs and well-trained doctors and health workers. Water-points have also been 
established within 500 meters in most rural areas (except in very remote areas) to 
reduce the time women spend collecting water. Local Council Courts (LCCs) have 
also been established at village, parish and sub-county levels to dispense local 
justice, because people at the grassroots were finding serious difficulties in 
obtaining justice through the highly bureaucratic regular court system, which they 
do not trust anyway. Assessments done so far indicate that LCCs have improved 
access to social justice by local people as compared to the regular court system 
whose process tends to be too complex and expensive; they are also trusted by the 
local people. 
 
Society in Uganda in general is undergoing a critical transition with regard to 
inclusion of socially disadvantaged groups in national and local development 
processes. This transition is being engineered to ensure that marginalized groups 
are not left out with respect to allocation of authority, power and resources. The 
local government legal framework is very clear on this inclusion. Membership of 
local government councils is deliberately engineered to ensure representation of 
previously marginalized groups. For example, women now constitute at least 30% 
of every local government council; each council must also have two representatives 
of youth, one of whom must be female, and two representatives of the disabled, one 
of whom must also be female.  In addition, each district has a woman 
representative in the national parliament. This system reflects government’s desire 
to mobilize the formerly marginalized social groups and promote their participation 
in local and national decision-making.   
 
Legislation over inclusive decision-making does not necessarily lead to equal 
participation of all marginalized groups in local politics. Inclusiveness and equal 
participation are two different things. However, although the impact of this 
affirmative action is yet to be established, its progressiveness is self-evident. The 
challenge is to give it real effect so that it can generate positive change and benefits 
                                                
6
 In 2004 it was established that as a result of the UPE programme nationwide, levels of school 
enrolment of boys and girls were almost the same for the age group 6 – 12 at 91%. In the early 1990s 
net primary enrolment for the same age group was estimated at about 60% with girls lagging almost 
5% behind boys. See Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2007) “Public 
Service Delivery in Uganda: Abetting or Containing Inequality?” Discussion Paper No. 13, June, p. 
10.
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in addition to elevating the social standing of the affected groups. Increased 
numbers on representative bodies is of little consequence if it does not help the 
marginalized groups overcome the underlying bias against them in the allocation of 
power, social goods and services, and in values. 
 
Fortunately, local governments have been sensitised and some councillors have 
been trained in mainstreaming gender issues in local development planning. Civil 
society organizations have played a key role in training women leaders in 
advocacy, negotiation and articulation. However, the ultimate test is how to ensure 
that all this leads to improved access to resources and services by the marginalized 
groups. One of the major impediments is that the resources available to local 
governments to provide services are too limited. While pro-poor policies have 
improved access to basic services such as education, health and water and 
sanitation nationally, the impacts show spatial variations between and within local 
governments. For example, in the northern region two decades of insurgency have 
made it impossible for people to live normal livelihoods.  Even in other districts, 
limited resources and poor execution have prevented the benefits of local 
investments to be felt fully. Examples abound of shoddy construction of access 
roads and drainage channels, and of market and slum improvement schemes that 
have not made any noticeable difference. If anything, questions have been asked as 
to whether interventions in service delivery are making a real difference for the 
poor or whether they are, in fact, abetting further inequality.7 
 
Electoral Representation 
The culture of periodic elections at national and local levels has largely taken root. 
From the time the National Resistance Movement8 captured state power on 26 
January 1986, local and national elections have been held every four years. This 
culture has led to turnover in local leadership which is estimated to be as high as 
eighty percent. Whereas this development is good for nurturing political leadership 
at these levels, it has also produced unintended consequences in terms of the 
quality of leadership and representation.  
 
Many of those who get elected by the people turn out to be more interested in 
satisfying their own personal interests than those of the people who elected them. 
Also, as much as it would appear that every citizen above the age of eighteen is 
free to contest local elections, the reality is that because of the ‘monetised’ nature 
of politics in the country, many peasants can ill afford to buy their way into 
political office. This monetised electoral process has now taken root to the extent 
that even the annulment of results by the courts has not deterred those with money 
from buying their way into power. This elite capture of the governance process has 
become endemic. For example, in a study carried out by Reinikka and Svensson 
(Reinikka and Svesson 2004), the bulk of school grants was captured by local 
                                                
7
 
Ibid:10. 
8
 Until November 2005 the National Resistance Movement was the sole political organization. Today, 
under the multiparty system, it is one of the political parties.
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officials and politicians in primary schools with impunity. The end result has been 
poor service provision. 
 
Until 2006, political representation at the local level was based on the principle of 
‘individual merit’, whereby individuals contested elected public offices on the basis 
of what they could offer to the local people and not on the basis of political party 
competition. Under the current multiparty system, however, individuals are 
expected to promote the agendas of their political parties rather than their personal 
agendas. There are two major challenges associated with this new shift in politics. 
First, most individuals lack sufficient experience in and knowledge of how a 
multiparty system works. Political parties were re-introduced in the country in 
November 2005 (Uganda had been ruled on a ‘no party’ political arrangement from 
1986), and the first local, parliamentary and presidential elections based on the 
multiparty system were held in February and March 2006. Second, most, if not all, 
the political parties are not functioning in accordance with known democratic 
principles, values and regulations.  
 
These political challenges have gradually influenced how local government 
councils operate. On the one hand, party differences have created tension in the 
management of local public affairs.  On the other hand, some candidates have 
bribed their way into office using material gifts such as soap, sugar, and clothes, 
hoping to recoup their massive investments once in power. This buying of voters 
has been possible because of abject poverty across the country (up to 38% of the 
population is officially recognized as living in poverty). In addition, the majority of 
the local citizens lack adequate knowledge about their local economies to 
determine whether or not the candidates can realistically deliver on their promises.  
 
The result of all this is that attendance of local council meetings has been 
progressively declining. There is increased perception by local people that local 
governments are in reality mere appendages of the central government and that 
most politicians get into office principally to help themselves to public resources 
and privileges. The latter view is reinforced by the widely reported systemic 
corruption at central and local government levels, resulting in the diversion of 
meager funds away from service provision. The other unintended consequence of 
corruption is that decentralization is reinforcing the power of local elites because 
local citizens lack ‘civic competence’ in the sense that they are reluctant to exercise 
their ‘voice’ and ‘political agency’ to effect change in their favour (Golooba-
Mutebi 2008). 
 
Accountability  
In Uganda, an elaborate framework is in place to ensure upward and downward 
accountability. However, its operation is quite problematic. Indeed, according to 
Blair (Blair 2000), there are important limitations on how much participation can 
actually deliver because accountability covers a much wider range of activity and 
larger scope for democratic local governance strategy than initially appears. 
Specifically, upward accountability is administrative in nature and is based on 
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several institutions which include the Auditor-General, parliament (through its 
several committees, notably those on Public Accounts, Public Service, Social 
Services and Local Government), line ministries responsible for social services 
(education, health, water and sanitation, agricultural extension, and roads), the 
Local Government Finance Commission, local government statutory bodies 
(District Service Commission, Local Government Public Accounts Committees) 
and sectoral committees,  and Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) who 
represent the president at the district level. RDCs play a direct watchdog role and 
are empowered to advise the local government chairperson9 or the Inspector 
General of Government (IGG) to initiate an investigation into the management of a 
local government council’s affairs, if they consider the situation to warrant it.10  
This upward accountability has been effective in improving the operations of local 
government in an administrative sense. 
 
On the other hand, downward accountability has faced significant challenges. For 
downward accountability to be effective, political leaders should have benchmarks 
against which they are judged. Furthermore, the citizens should be regularly 
informed about how resources are being utilized and the impact arising therefrom. 
The citizens are supposed to be informed about this through their representatives in 
local government councils who scrutinize local plans, budgets and expenditures 
through various council committees.  However, the citizens are rarely aware of 
these measures due to limited feedback from councillors. They also have limited 
means of holding the councillors to account, except perhaps during elections when 
their only option is either to return their councillors or to vote them out. The high 
turnover of councillors at local elections is indicative of pent up citizens’ 
frustration, which could have been contained if leaders periodically provided 
feedback to the citizens on progress made in implementing their electoral 
manifestos.  The limited degree of popular participation at the local levels might be 
the single most important explanation for the current weakness of the 
accountability framework. 
 
The experience of more developed countries suggests that a vibrant civil society 
that is able to keep local governments in check is essential to enhance downward 
accountability.  Because civil society in Uganda is largely weak, strengthening it 
would go a long way to closing this major accountability gap. Accounting mainly 
to central government, however effective, is insufficient. 
 
The recent decision by government to re-centralize the appointment of local 
government accounting officers (chief administrative officers and town clerks) has 
re-ignited the debate over how the accountability issue should best be handled. 
Until 2006 local government accounting officers used to be under the control of 
local political leaders. While this was good for downward accountability, it placed 
the accounting officers under tremendous local political pressure to contravene 
established regulations and procedures, especially those relating to financial 
                                                
9
 Chairpersons are the directly elected political heads of local governments. 
10
 See the Local Government Act, 1997, Section 72 (2) (b) and (c). 
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management and resources allocation. Accounting officers who resisted this 
pressure did so at their peril because other districts would not accept them if they 
were fired. Central government addressed this by re-centralizing their appointment 
and disciplinary procedures, principally to protect them from hostile local 
politicians, but this has had the unintended effect of shifting the philosophical basis 
of decentralization away from devolution. This conflict between philosophy and 
practice (and its potential consequences) is being debated widely but no consensus 
has yet emerged over how it should be resolved. 
 
Accountability goes hand in hand with transparency. On transparency, there has 
been general improvement in the provision of information to the public on local 
government finance, including publication of central transfers in gazettes; public 
budget workshops; publication of plans, budgets and accounts; and discussion of 
related issues through the media. Local governments are required by the Ministry 
of Local Government and line ministries to publish the fiscal resources that have 
been transferred to them from the centre as well as those which are locally 
generated, and how these resources have been spent. Local government plans, 
budgets, accounts and accountability reports are also public documents which local 
people can access through their council representatives. The Freedom to 
Information Act also provides a legal basis for citizens to demand access to 
unclassified information, and local development issues are frequently covered in 
the media, particularly by local radio stations. Thus, in theory at least, the local 
government system is transparent and the citizens are expected to be well informed. 
 
In practice, however, the reality is different. First, the primary avenue through 
which the citizens are supposed to be informed about decisions and investments 
made by their local governments is through their council representatives. To do this 
the council representatives must be able to travel through their constituencies to 
provide feedback and solicit the views of their electorate. Resources for this 
facilitation should come from locally generated revenue, but this source of revenue 
has always been inadequate and has continued to dwindle in recent years following 
the abolition of graduated tax. Thus, local government councillors are immobilized 
due to lack of these resources. 
 
Secondly, even if ordinary citizens were supplied with all the available information 
on local development issues, it is doubtful if many of them would accurately 
interpret it due to the low literacy levels and lack of effective civic education. Lack 
of civic education and sensitisation on their local economies has prevented ordinary 
citizens from coming to grips with local development issues to demand 
accountability from local governments.  Finally, although local citizens have been 
involved in developing plans for their local areas through a participatory approach, 
participatory budgeting has not been widely incorporated into local development 
processes. Thus the citizens have little idea on the efficacy of the decisions that are 
made on their behalf.  
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The implication is that in addition to the urgent requirement for development of a 
national civic programme and sensitisation of citizens on the nature of their local 
economies, local governments need to develop effective strategies for 
communicating their decisions and activities to the citizens beyond those that are 
currently in use. The peoples’ representatives should also be adequately skilled and 
supported to enable them to provide regular and effective feedback to their 
constituents. Equally importantly, civil society organizations should be 
strengthened to provide effective checks on local governments to ensure 
transparency and accountability in their operations.  
 
Scrutiny of the Executive  
Elected local government officials, comprising council members and the executive 
(councillors selected by the chairperson to form a ‘cabinet’), have clearly defined 
responsibilities that provide the basis for their actions. These responsibilities 
include: initiating and formulating policy (with technical assistance from appointed 
officials) for approval by the council; overseeing the implementation of council 
policies by the technical staff; considering and evaluating the performance of the 
council at the end of each financial year against approved work plans; mobilizing 
people, materials and technical assistance to facilitate local development; 
reviewing financial reports and making appropriate recommendations to council; 
serving as a communication channel between central government, the district and 
other stakeholders; and monitoring and supervising the implementation of work 
plans, programmes and projects and other activities undertaken by central 
government, the district, local governments and NGOs in the local area. 
 
The performance of the executive and council against this tall order is scrutinized 
in several ways. First, the overall performance of the local government which they 
are in charge of, reflects to a significant extent their effectiveness as local leaders. 
This performance is evaluated through technical annual assessments that are 
carried out by the Ministry of Local Government through its Inspectorate 
Department against agreed performance indicators. Local governments that meet 
the performance indicators are rewarded with a 20% increase in their allocation the 
following year, while those that fail to meet the indicators are penalized by a 20% 
reduction in their allocations. This mechanism has been effective in spurring local 
development activity and compliance with central government regulations and 
guidelines, and in increasing the activity level of local government councils so that 
their areas do not appear on the ‘negative’ list.   
 
Second, the executive is scrutinized by Resident District Commissioners as 
explained earlier on. By monitoring the activities of local governments and 
advising the district Chairperson and central government appropriately, RDCs have 
kept many councillors on their toes. In some cases, over-enthusiasm has caused 
considerable tension between them and local government councils. The situation is 
even made worse by the apparent duplication and overlap in the roles of these 
public figures – the law empowers both RDCs and chairpersons to monitor the 
performance of local governments. 
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Third, like other central and local government officials, councillors are required to 
conform to the Leadership Code Act (2002). They are required to submit to the 
Inspector General of Government (IGG – the equivalent of an ombudsman) a 
written declaration of their income, assets and liabilities, plus the names, income, 
assets and liabilities of their spouses, children and dependants, within three months 
of assuming office, and thereafter in March every two years. Failure to comply 
with this requirement may lead to their removal from office as well as further 
action. Although these provisions have been applied with respect to a number of 
high profile leaders, there is a general feeling that the office of the IGG lacks 
adequate capacity to enforce the Leadership Code in its entirety, and with respect 
to every person who falls in the leadership category in the country. 
 
Finally, the Uganda Local Governments Association (ULGA) has developed a 
Charter on Accountability and Ethical Code of Conduct (Uganda Local 
Governments Association 2006) to enhance accountability, transparency and 
integrity within local governments. This is a major step forward for a system that 
had long been accustomed to only being regulated from the centre. Self-regulation 
is essential for curbing excesses and developing professionalism, and its 
application by local governments to themselves is an important development which 
portends well for the future of the system. 
 
Financing of Local Governments 
The financing of local governments has a significant bearing on local democracy 
and governance. If local governments raise substantial amounts of revenue from 
their local areas they are likely to be subjected to increased demands for downward 
accountability and for increased citizen participation in deciding how the resources 
will be used. On the other hand, the more reliant local governments are on central 
government for their revenue, the more likely they are to place more emphasis on 
upward accountability and to have less room in which to address local priorities. 
Given that local governments in Uganda are reliant on central government for 
nearly 90% of their revenue, it can be safely stated that the accountability flow is 
severely distorted upwards with serious implications for local level development, 
especially when combined with the other factors mentioned above. In fact, Steiner 
argues that poverty reduction through decentralization is in jeopardy in Uganda 
because of “… low levels of information about local government affairs, limited 
human capital and financial resources, restricted local autonomy, corruption and 
patronage, high administrative costs related with decentralization and low 
downward accountability” (Steiner 2007).  
   
There are three types of fiscal transfers from central to local governments for the 
implementation of Uganda’s decentralization policy: unconditional, conditional 
and equalization grants. Revenues from these sources are supplemented by locally 
raised revenues. 
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Unconditional grants, which are determined on the basis of population (85%) and 
area size (15%), are intended to permit local governments to have considerable 
discretion in resource allocation in pursuit of their respective development 
objectives. However, local governments are required to give priority in allocation 
to the five Program Priority Areas (PPAs) of government, namely primary 
education, primary health care, agricultural extension, feeder roads, and safe and 
clean water. Due to consistent under-funding, however, local governments are 
forced to assign these grants to the wage bill. 
 
Conditional grants, on the other hand, are meant for pre-determined programs 
within the PPAs, and their size, access and utilization are supposed to be the 
outcome of discussion between the central government and the relevant local 
governments.11  Conditional grants include a wage component for decentralized 
staff that previously belonged to the centre.   
Equalization grants are a subsidy, or special provision, disbursed from the central 
government to the least developed local governments to enable them to meet the 
minimum standards of social service delivery. This grant became operational in the 
1999/2000 financial year (Muduuli 1999). 
 
Although the levels of the grants have risen significantly, there have been persistent 
complaints from local governments about the mismatch between the magnitude of 
the decentralized services local governments are burdened with, and the very 
limited fiscal transfers from the centre to fund those services. Another source of 
friction springs from the fact that the central government retains nearly two-thirds 
of total national tax collections even though most services are decentralized. This 
imbalance in resource distribution is one of the major factors behind limited service 
delivery at the local level.   
 
A further source of imbalance in resource allocation springs from the allocation 
formula that was used when decentralization was conceived. The original design of 
fiscal transfers from the centre was based on the number of officers posted in each 
district rather than on the full personnel establishment in each district. 
Consequently, districts that did not have full establishments were shortchanged. 
This was supposed to be corrected when the districts were restructured in 2005. 
However, persistent under-funding has perpetuated the imbalance. This has been 
made worse by continuous creation of districts; while there were 36 in 1992, by 
2008 there were 82. In fact, the Minister of Local Government was recently quoted 
as decrying this increase in the number of districts when he stated that if this trend 
                                                
11
 Although this requirement is stipulated in Article 193(3) of the 1995 Constitution, its breach by the 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development has been a constant irritant to Local 
Governments;  see  Kiwanuka-Musisi, C.G. President , Uganda Local Authorities Association, in a 
paper he wrote entitled: ‘Emerging Issues in the Implementation of Decentralization’, a paper 
presented at the National Forum on the Implementation of Decentralization, held at the International 
Conference Centre, Kampala, Uganda, November 15 – 19, 1999:13; see also the Resolutions by the 
Uganda Local Authorities Association at the same forum (Resolution No. 7).   
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continued, sooner than later every family in Uganda would be clamoring to have its 
own district12. 
 
Central government fiscal transfers are supplemented by a range of local revenue 
sources. The 1995 Constitution empowers local governments to levy, charge, 
collect and appropriate fees and taxes for investment in infrastructure and service 
delivery. These fees and taxes include rents, rates, royalties, stamp duties, personal 
graduated tax, cess (a tax on local produce such as crops and animals), market dues 
and fees on registration and licensing.  Only funds that have been budgeted for and 
approved by the council can be spent. 
 
However, local revenue sources presently constitute less than 10% of total local 
government funding. In the rural areas, local governments used to depend mainly 
on graduated tax but, as noted earlier, this tax was abolished in 2006 and has been 
replaced by local service and hotel taxes, which local governments are yet to fully 
understand and implement. What this means is that local citizens have limited 
leverage on local governments because their contribution to local revenue is quite 
minimal. This indirectly undermines local democracy as it weakens downward 
accountability. 
 
Local governments are also permitted to borrow through bonds, debentures or 
directly from commercial banks, up to 25% of locally raised revenue.  However, 
stringent conditions are attached to discourage local governments from borrowing 
as follows: the Minister of Local Government must approve any borrowing 
exceeding 10% of what a local government may legally borrow; the local 
government’s accounts for the previous year must have been certified by the 
Auditor-General; the local government must guarantee that it will meet its 
obligations, including salary payments, while repaying the loans; and the money 
borrowed must be invested in the national PPAs. No local government has 
borrowed money on these terms, thus suggesting that the conditions are too 
stringent. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Uganda’s local government system offers prospects for enhanced local governance 
and local democracy. Local governance is about effective management of the 
totality of state and non-state activities at the local level. The involvement of civil 
society in the management of local development is crucial in influencing local and 
national government policies and promoting democracy at the local level. 
 
Improving public service delivery and reducing poverty largely depends on the 
political and economic context as well as on how decentralization is designed and 
implemented. The conditions that are indispensable for decentralization to increase 
social welfare include a functioning local democracy; adequate fiscal autonomy for 
                                                
12
 See:  ‘District Number Worries Otafiire’, The New Vision, (Kampala), Monday September 22, 
2008, p. 3. 
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local governments; and adequate technical expertise among local and national 
government officials. 13 
 
In Uganda, comprehensive and robust legislation has laid an essential foundation 
upon which local democracy and local governance have been built. Uganda’s 
decentralization policy and the manner in which it is being implemented has to a 
large extent transformed the country from what it used to be in the past where the 
state had nearly collapsed. There is ample evidence of local democracy and local 
governance in action: citizens elect their representatives in local councils; the local 
government system is forced to be transparent and accountable; local leaders are 
being made open to scrutiny; decision-making is becoming participatory and 
inclusive; and, to the extent possible, efforts are being made to provide services 
equitably.   
 
However, there are several challenges that prevent local governments from 
operating to their full potential. The key challenge is the low level of civic 
education among the population which constrains them from participating fully in 
the development of their areas. Local governments are over-loaded with 
responsibilities in contrast to their limited capacities and the inadequate resources 
assigned to them. This has significant impact on peoples’ perception of the extent 
to which local governments can solve their problems.  All the challenges are inter-
twined, implying that addressing some requires taking action on others as well. 
This is to be expected considering that Uganda is undergoing socio-economic 
transformation that requires continuous reforms on several fronts. Further 
interlocking interventions, therefore, are needed to deepen local governance and 
local democracy so that citizens can access better services and lead better lives.    
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Abstract
This paper identifies types of citizen participation in local government in Australia, 
in particular focusing on the past two decades when local government systems 
have been the focus of intense reform. The paper considers the extent to which 
contemporary views of participatory governance have taken root at local and sub-
local levels and concludes that despite reforms intended to engage local citizens 
more in local government activity, citizen participation has yet to develop 
significantly into arrangements that reach the level of participatory governance. It 
also argues that for participatory governance to be further developed, leadership 
may often have to come from organisations outside institutional local government. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The opportunity to take part in the political system is such a fundamental tenet 
of the democratic system of government that its very existence is rarely 
questioned. People must be able to have their say – to vote, to engage in 
political debate and to let those in power know their views on issues which 
concern them. This is what democracy is about (Richardson 1983:1). 
 
While there is almost universal acceptance of the principle of citizen participation 
in democratic societies, the means and extent of this participation are frequently 
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contested. Citizen participation in government has traditionally centred on 
measures to facilitate greater public access to information about government, 
enhance the rights of citizens to be ‘consulted’ on matters which directly affect 
them, and ensure that all voices can be heard equally through fair systems of 
representative democracy. Such measures typically include standardised rules, 
protocols, and enabling legislation and regulation (Bridgman and Davis 2000). 
However, there is a growing appreciation that participation in governance, or 
participatory governance, involves different principles and methods for 
engagement. These might include developing transformative partnerships; 
establishing system-wide information exchanges and knowledge transfers; 
decentralising decision making and inter-institutional dialogue; and embracing 
relationships based more on reciprocity and trust (Reddel and Woolcock 2003:93).  
 
The shift from government to governance involves the provision of means to 
engage individuals and organisations outside government through ‘structures and 
arrangements which support effective relationships across the public, private and 
community sectors as they collaborate in decision-making’ (Edwards 2005:12). 
This has been described by Putnam as ‘social connectedness’, a critical element in 
the formation of social capital (Putnam 2000). It involves an active role for 
government in enabling or capacity building in local communities, rather than the 
more passive role implied in traditional notions of citizen participation. However, 
both the traditional notion of citizen participation and this emerging idea of 
capacity and relationship building have roots in the notion that citizen participation 
is a ‘basic building block for contemporary democratic society and sustainable 
communities’ (Cuthill and Fien 2005:64). Citizen participation in governance also 
aims to devolve power and resources away from central control and towards front-
line managers, local democratic structures, and local consumers and communities 
in what Stoker terms ‘new localism’ (Stoker 2004). This has implications for 
traditional ideas of representative government with communities moving away 
from vicarious engagement in democracy towards more direct involvement in 
decision-making processes. 
 
Not only are new means of participation evolving with governance, so too are its 
goals. For example, an earlier classification developed by Arnstein (1971) has been 
immensely popular in describing traditional notions of consultation and 
participation. At the apex of Arnstein’s ladder of participation she describes 
‘citizen control’, which contrasts with current approaches to governance that focus 
on setting and achieving goals through partnerships and collaborations amongst a 
broad range of stakeholders. 
 
This paper aims to map citizen participation at the local level in Australia, in 
particular focusing on the past two decades when local government systems have 
been one of several focuses of intense public sector reform. These reforms included 
a move away from earlier notions of ‘ratepayer democracy’, with the introduction 
of provisions to strengthen universal suffrage in local government and remove or 
reduce property franchises – reforms designed to enhance citizen participation in 
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government. The paper also considers the extent to which contemporary views of 
participatory governance have taken root at the local level, as well as the capacity 
of local government to promote this agenda. It concludes that if participatory 
governance is to be advanced, it may often be necessary to look for leadership in 
organisations other than institutional local government. The author shares the view 
that citizen participation in governance is very much a work-in-progress, and 
further research is required to map and evaluate the diversity of state and local 
government policies towards participatory governance (Smyth et al. 2005:8).  
 
2. Local Government Reform: Legislating Further Citizen Participation 
Citizen involvement in Australian local government in the latter part of the 
twentieth century fell largely within the ambit of ‘indirect participation’, that is, 
‘those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at 
influencing the selection of [their representatives] and/or the actions they take’ 
(Richardson 1983:11). These activities include voting, campaigning on behalf of 
candidates or issues, and engagement in political parties or interest groups. While 
citizens were seen as capable of exerting important influence, this influence was 
typically focused on policy delivery rather than design (Sharp 1980). This form of 
citizen participation is much more congruent with Bridgman and Davis’ (1990) 
articulation above, in that it has focused on enabling protocols, regulation and 
legislation more than on those forms of participatory governance that actively 
engage communities in the formulation of policy. ‘This was typically in the context 
of citizens participating in pre-determined policy debates rather than agenda-setting 
or active two-way deliberation’ (Curtain 2003:127).  
 
With such citizen participation, the role of government is a relatively passive one, 
simply offering a degree of access to those ‘participants’ who choose to become 
involved. It is aimed broadly at developing greater transparency and engagement 
within a context of representative democracy, where primary decisions are made 
through the representative process. It may also include structural changes that 
enhance effective local autonomy. These measures reflect traditional political 
values of equity (for example, through encouraging voting systems that promote 
universal franchise and principles of one-vote-one-value), responsiveness (for 
example, in introducing provisions for referenda or protocols for community 
planning), accountability (for example, through ensuring access to information 
about decisions, programs and policies), and devolution to local communities.  
 
All three spheres of government in Australia have undergone continuous reform 
during the past two decades, representing the most significant set of changes since 
federation in 1901, with the transformation of the public sector both swift and 
dramatic. In the local government sphere, reforms have been comprehensive at the 
management, legislative and structural levels, and have focused on two primary 
agendas: first, the improved management of resources and second, governance 
issues – especially the redefinition of roles and responsibilities of the various actors 
in the local sphere (Aulich 2005; Marshall 1998). It is the second agenda that is of 
particular interest in this paper. 
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Halligan and Wettenhall identify an earlier phase of local government reform 
dating from the 1960s when ‘the combination of grass-roots participation and the 
discovery of the urban problem stimulated wide interest in [local government’s] 
potentiality’ (Halligan and Wettenhall 1989:80). Consistent with broader pressures 
for social change, the reform agendas at that time, inter alia, included moves to 
widen the franchise, eliminate multiple voting, and redraw boundaries to ensure 
greater adherence to principles of ‘one-person, one-vote, one-value’. It represented 
a shift away from the earlier notion of ‘rate-payer democracy’ in which the 
dominant considerations had been the ‘protection of one’s own interests and those 
of one’s own kind’ (Chapman and Wood 1984:27). However, the reform impetus 
appeared to dissipate in the late 1970s. 
 
More recent reforms, undertaken in the context of comprehensive reforms of the 
Australian public sector at all levels, have aimed at strengthening the accountability 
of local governments through increased transparency provisions; establishing 
greater opportunities for community referenda; and mandating reporting provisions 
to communities. In all states1 provisions have been enacted for councils to develop 
strategic or management plans (especially to be more responsive to community 
wishes); for stricter reporting regimes, both to the community and to the state 
government; for making key documentation more transparent and available; for 
continuing the electoral reforms begun in the 1960s; and for extending Freedom of 
Information coverage to local government. These provisions were designed to 
strengthen accountability both to the local community and to the state government, 
improve management capacity and make local government more democratic. In 
this context, however, being ‘more democratic’ was understood in terms of 
enhancing representative democracy and improving both transparency and 
accountability of local government management activity, rather than considering 
options for stronger, more direct community engagement. Legislative initiatives in 
most jurisdictions involved amendments to state local government Acts, or the 
introduction of new legislation, to strengthen public consultation requirements in 
relation to councils’ proposed activities, forecast expenditure, required total rate 
(property tax) revenue, and the anticipated level and distributive effects in broad 
terms of various components of the rating structure.  
 
There is significant variation between local government electoral systems in 
Australia. These variations relate to the length of council terms, the size of the 
elected council, who can vote, obligations to vote, and the voting system itself. 
Significantly, in some states voting is compulsory, aligning this obligation with 
state and national elections, while elsewhere voting is not compulsory at local 
government level. While some vestiges of a colonial past, such as multiple voting 
based on property ownership, have been removed, a majority of states retain a 
property franchise of some sort in addition to a universal franchise for residents. 
                                                
1
 The term ‘states’ is used in this paper to refer to the six states and the Northern Territory 
governments at the intermediate level of the Australian federation, all of which have local government 
systems with similar arrangements.
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Voter turnout, one measure of successful participation, is low in those states where 
voting is not compulsory (see Table 1). While the introduction of postal voting has 
increased the level of turnout (for example, in South Australia it was primarily 
responsible for a rise from 15% to 39%), rates of voter participation in those states 
where voting is not compulsory remain low. Voter turnout at local elections ranges 
from 12% to 65% with averages in the low 30s. In most rural local governments 
only a minority (about 30%) of all seats are contested at elections, although this 
figure in higher in urban elections (about 60%) (Gerritsen and Whyard 1998:42). 
 
Table 1: Voter Participation in Local Government Elections 
NSW Voting in LG elections is compulsory. Turnout for the 1999 and 2004 elections 
was 84% and 85.7% respectively.  
VIC Voting in LG elections is compulsory with an option for postal voting. Average 
turnout of 75% (range from 67-87%) for 54 councils where elections were 
conducted in 2002-2003. 
For November 2004 postal elections (22 councils) the average turnout was 
75% (range 65-84%).  
QLD Voting in LG elections is compulsory. The local government association 
estimates average voter turnout in 2004 election at 80%, with the average 
informal vote at 5%. 
SA Voting in LG elections is not compulsory. State average turnout in 2003 election 
was 33% (range from 23-68%). 
From 1997, all councils in SA were given the option of conducting their 
elections by postal voting. The councils who conducted their elections this way 
saw an increase in turnout of 150% on 1995, with an average of 39%, 
compared with 15% in councils using polling booths in 1997. 
Based on the 1997 results, exclusively postal voting was made mandatory from 
2000.  
WA Voting in LG elections is not compulsory and polling is conducted exclusively 
by post. Elections held in May 2005 showed an average turnout of 36% 
compared to an average of 22% in councils that had used polling booths in 
2003. 
TAS Voting in LG elections is not compulsory and polling is conducted exclusively by 
post. 
Elections held in 1999, 2000 and 2002 achieved turnouts of 55%, 58% and 
57% respectively. . 
NT Voting is compulsory and conducted through polling booths only. Average 
turnout in the most recent elections was 72% (including informal votes); the 
range was 66-76%. 
Sources: State departments responsible for local government 
 
While variations in electoral arrangements may reflect local preferences, what is 
significant is the limited capacity of local governments themselves to change these 
arrangements. Only in New South Wales can individual local governments change 
some aspects of electoral arrangements unilaterally, subject to citizen referenda. In 
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all others, state government or electoral commission approval is required, and in 
some cases, changes may require amendments to local government legislation.  
 
The levels of allowance or remuneration paid to councillors also vary across states, 
and in some instances, between councils in the same state. For example, in 
Queensland the allowance system has resulted in ‘large variations in allowance 
levels’ to the extent that in some councils mayors and elected members can be 
employed full-time (DoTARS 2005:14). While these variations again reflect local 
or state preferences, serving as an elected member remains largely a part-time 
occupation, and this tends to restrict the opportunity to become a councillor to 
those with other sources of income. Given that payment for members of parliament 
has been a basic feature of democratic societies for more than a century, precisely 
to give all citizens the opportunity to represent their communities on a full-time 
basis, the failure to extend a similar provision to local governments appears 
somewhat anachronistic. 
 
What is clear is that there remain some structural impediments to full and 
unencumbered access to the local government system, both for prospective elected 
representatives and for citizens wishing to vote. The local sphere of government 
has been described as the ‘Cinderella’ of Australia’s public administration, as it 
simply has not won for itself that place in our polity which a long history has given 
it in Britain (Finn 1990:49). One of the markers for this is the level of voter 
participation, especially where voting is optional, which at present suggests that the 
enfranchised are not overly enthusiastic about exercising their right to vote in local 
government elections. Perhaps there is still some remnant of the poor reputation of 
elected councils revealed in research conducted in the 1980s, which found that 
many Australians considered their local councillors ‘at best incompetent and, at 
worst, corrupt’ (Bowman 1983:180). It may also reflect a view that local 
government is not treated seriously by governments in other spheres, especially in 
relation to the allocation of functions and resources; in which case it is hardly 
surprising that local communities also may not be inclined to treat the sector 
seriously. 
 
As noted earlier, the recent revitalisation of the reform movement in local 
government coincided with a period in Australian history of intensive 
administrative change across the whole public sector. The centrepiece of local 
government reform was the reformation of state government legislation: between 
1989 and 1999, the local government Acts in each state jurisdiction were reviewed 
and wholly or largely rewritten, with the Northern Territory following in 2008. 
Common to all changes was the shift away from prescriptive provisions reinforced 
by the doctrine of ultra vires, which restricted councils to performing only those 
activities specifically nominated under the legislation. In the new Acts, forms of 
general competence powers were granted to enable councils to undertake almost 
any activities necessary for them to fulfil the functions and powers delegated to 
them (subject to other state and federal laws). Typical was the Victorian Local 
Government Act, which gave councils the power to ‘do all things necessary or 
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convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its functions 
and to enable it to achieve its purposes and objectives’ (section 3F).  
 
However, whilst these legislative changes widened the scope of local government 
activities, the nature and extent of the delegated powers did not change 
significantly in any state jurisdiction. Despite the modernisation of local 
government Acts, there is no evidence of significant changes to the state-local 
power nexus. Reserved powers remain with the state governments, typical of which 
is the provision in the New South Wales 1993 legislation which gives the Minister 
for Local Government ‘the power to issue any order that a council may issue’; and 
in Queensland, where the state government is empowered to refuse approval to by-
laws, overturn existing gazetted by-laws and overturn council resolutions. Thus 
even under the reformed local government Acts, local government remains a 
creature of state and territory governments, all of which retain strong over-rule 
powers (Aulich 1999; 2005).  
 
Any commitment to local autonomy was particularly tested in those states then 
collectively known as the ‘rust belt’ (Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania), in 
which the financial problems of state governments drove approaches to reform. In 
these states reforms focused attention more on cost reduction rather than on 
enhancing local governance (Aulich 2005). In justifying this reform effort, states 
claimed they had brought about lower local taxes, debt retirement and improved 
quality of services to residents – few mentioned the impacts on traditional local 
governance issues and values.  
 
Nevertheless, the reform processes themselves suggested a strong preference for 
consultative and participative mechanisms: discussion papers, exposure drafts of 
legislation, inquiries, seminars, community consultations, training programs for 
newly elected local members and the like were typical of the tools used. In New 
South Wales, for example, the process of review took four years: it included the 
release of a discussion paper and an extensive consultation program which 
involved over 3,000 attendees at seminars, 900 written submissions and 450 
telephone calls (NSW Government 1991:3). These reform processes could be 
described as pluralist and participative, utilising activities designed to lift the level 
of awareness of participants.  
 
While apparently consultative, the process of local government reform was not 
without its critics: there were complaints from local government associations in 
several states that their submissions were not sufficiently considered, particularly in 
relation to the preservation of state government reserve powers and the overall 
impact on local autonomy (LGSA 1991, 1992; LGAQ 1992). 
 
Moreover, a recent report by the House of Representatives Economics, Finance and 
Public Administration Committee found that local government has been short-
changed, particularly by the actions of state governments in maintaining revenue 
denial. There are increasing expectations of local government to provide services, 
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but they lack adequate revenues of their own, and/or insufficient funds are granted 
to them, to undertake additional functions delegated or prescribed by state 
governments. The report, completed in 2004, recommended a series of follow up 
activities to establish a blueprint for future intergovernmental arrangements 
(HREFPAC 2004), but at the time of writing, there have yet to be put in place any 
substantive changes to the current nexus.  
 
Martin argues that this resource deficit is precisely the reason why local 
governments have been unable to become further engaged in community building, 
and that leadership in this area has ‘been usurped by the State government’ (Martin 
2006:1). He asserts that this use of community development opportunities for state 
political purposes detracts from the effective public management of ‘what is 
regarded in other parts of the western world as important social processes at the 
core of effective local governance’ (Martin 2006:1). 
 
Thus at the end of nearly two decades of reform, there has been some devolution of 
functions to the local sphere, but the historic reality of administrative subordination 
of local government continues to be a central feature of central-local relationships 
in Australia (Gerritsen and Whyard 1998). While its counterparts in many overseas 
jurisdictions enjoy the fruits of growing acceptance of new governance principles 
such as subsidiarity and joined-up government, Australian local government 
continues to wrestle with a nineteenth century legislative stranglehold imposed on 
it by state governments. 
 
Nevertheless, the language of partnership between state and local governments and 
their communities is beginning to emerge, as participatory governance and 
community building become the new strategic focus of some state governments. 
By contrast with previous iterations of ‘citizen participation’, this emerging form of 
community engagement seeks a more active relationship between government and 
citizens, by enabling citizens to play a significant and more direct role in shaping 
the nature and priorities of their communities. 
 
3. Participatory Governance: Active Partnership with Local 
Communities 
This recent interest in more engaged, collaborative and community-focused public 
policy and service delivery finds its sources in the United Kingdom (UK), the 
European Union and to some extent the United States. In particular, ‘Third Way’ 
politics has popularised a number of reforms centred on ideas of devolution, 
stakeholders, inclusion, partnerships and community (Reddel and Woolcock 
2003:81), ideas which are generally related to community participation. 
Paradoxically, this is occurring at a time when globalisation and supra-national 
interests have also become focal points of national activity. These two apparently 
contradictory trends are complementary to the extent that participation models 
appear to enable governments to better deal with the consequences of globalisation, 
especially those regional inequalities that arise from it. Communities are being 
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challenged to develop their local capacities or social capital to cope more 
effectively with issues like social exclusion and disadvantage, which have often 
accompanied economic restructuring in response to global imperatives.  
 
This signals a shift from local government to local governance – the involvement 
of a wide range of institutions and actors drawn from within but also beyond 
government, and the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social 
and economic issues (Geddes 2005). As Stoker (1998) argues, governance implies 
that the capacity to get things done does not rest only on the power of government 
to command or use its authority. There is a growing enthusiasm for new forms of 
‘distributed local governance that draws on the skills and resources of public, 
private, and civil society sectors’ (Reddel and Woolcock 2003:81).  
 
The acceptance of tenets of the ‘New Public Management’, particularly in 
Australia, has also added impetus to the need for greater participation by 
communities, especially through policy-making processes. Governments are now 
more likely to search for alternative sources of advice to that traditionally 
monopolised by its public services, and many of those actually providing public 
services are outside government. To be effective, policy makers require more 
information about service delivery and what works, and participatory processes can 
provide essential feedback for policy making (Edwards 2003; Curtain 2003).  
 
Governments are also responding to demands for participation from a better 
educated, more articulate and more demanding citizenry, many of whom express a 
declining level of trust in political institutions and a belief that purely 
representative democracy often results in a ‘democratic deficit’ (Pharr and Putnam 
2000; Edwards 2005). This belief is expressed in demands for supplementary 
engagement of citizens beyond the traditional democratic processes of three or four 
year elections, with calls for more meaningful exchanges with government (Curtain 
2003). Further, there is recognition that today many more policy problems are 
cross-cutting and highly complex, or ‘wicked’, and seem to defy resolution by 
government alone (Stoker 2004; Geddes 2005). There is growing understanding 
that ‘governments cannot simply deliver outcomes in complex areas that rely on 
enhanced individual responsibility and behavioural change to a disengaged and 
passive public’ (APSC 2007:1). ‘Wicked’ problems may require greater 
engagement by communities to assist in their resolution. 
 
Stewart (2003) distinguishes different forms of governance and the associated 
institutional arrangements that governments use to gather information and opinion. 
These are presented as a continuum (Figure 1) in which interests external to 
government are progressively more able to influence and shape policy and its 
implementation: in this continuum, power moves downwards and outwards. 
Participatory governance is at the apex of citizen engagement both as a form of 
participatory and deliberative democracy (Caddy and Vergez 2001), and as a form 
of governance that seeks active partnerships and collaboration between civil 
society, the private sector and governments (Reddel and Woolcock 2003). Shifts 
AULICH: 
From Citizen Participation to Participatory 
Governance in Australian Local Government 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 53 
 
through the continuum reflect increased acceptance of ideas of community, social 
capital, and localism as the foundations of political activity and policy-making.  
 
Figure 1: The Governance Continuum 
Participatory governance: communities actively involved in policy making 
 
Stakeholder engagement: enabling those affected by policy to be heard, but also being 
prepared to take notice of them 
 
Community consultation: policy initiatives or proposals are ‘road tested’ by government 
encouraging communities to respond 
 
Advisory bodies: through which government seek views, especially from those with 
knowledge of policy 
Source: based on Stewart (2003) 
 
Participatory governance gives stakeholders the opportunity to engage in policy 
making directly, leading to ‘cross-boundary forms of negotiated order that involve 
government agencies and other stakeholders in both policy formulation and 
implementation’ (Stewart 2003:151). It involves a shift from technocratic 
development of policy with its programmatic or regulatory control, to situations 
where some control may be negotiated away from single government agencies. It 
marks a sharp divergence from the neo-liberal concept of reducing the role and size 
of government, to conceiving government as an active partner in ‘associational 
governance’, collaborating with a wide range of other stakeholders (Smyth et al. 
2005). 
 
Such participation is not new in Australia: local governments have (perhaps 
intermittently) long provided forums and organising capacity to facilitate 
arrangements that engage and build local capacity. A generation ago, local 
government’s singular focus on physical infrastructure, reflected in the label 
‘roads, rates and rubbish’, was supplanted by increasing concerns for the provision 
of community and human services, and for stronger community participation in 
matters such as land-use planning and community development.  
 
At state and federal government level there is a long history of facilitation of area 
improvement programs, regional initiatives and local capacity building projects. 
However, these have rarely been sustained and too often their effectiveness has not 
been evaluated. Federal governments have asserted an interest in social capital 
formation but appear unwilling to invest directly in such programs. While believing 
‘in the ability of people to generate their own solutions to their own problems’ and 
that ‘social participation helps people to grow and flourish as human beings and be 
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full members of Australian society’ (Reddel and Woolcock 2003:82), federal 
governments appear to have decided that this is best achieved if handled largely 
without government or bureaucratic support.  
 
By contrast, almost all state governments have taken a more direct role in 
facilitating community capacity building. Typically, this is formalised through 
establishing agencies or administrative units tasked to encourage ‘joined-up’ and 
community building initiatives. This activity carries an implicit view that 
traditional notions of consultation and centrally managed community input into the 
policy process are no longer sufficient to manage community expectations and the 
complexity of modern political life (Davis 2001:230). 
 
In Victoria, for example, the government has commenced work on community 
capacity building, on measures for social capital, service integration and 
community well-being, and on local learning and employment networks. It has also 
formally adopted a set of principles to underpin its engagement policy, and has 
encouraged local governments to develop four-year community plans that include 
processes of community participation (Martin 2006).  
 
However, Wiseman concludes that while the Victorian government has 
energetically explored an extensive program of consultative and community-
building strategies, it has been more cautious about opening up debate about 
participatory and deliberative decision making processes. He observes that in 
Victoria:  
 
there is mounting concern within local government and non-government 
organisations about the extent of state government commitment to back the 
language of partnership with real changes to decision-making and resource 
allocation processes (Wiseman 2005:69). 
 
At the same time, there is evidence that due to resource constraints, some local 
councils are actually withdrawing from community engagement at this time when 
state level governments are enhancing their involvement (Martin 2006).  
 
In Western Australia, the state’s Citizenship Strategy aims to actively promote the 
concepts of democracy, citizenship and sustainability (DPCWA 2004), and the 
Queensland, Tasmanian and New South Wales governments have all initiated 
engagement strategies (Reddel and Woolcock 2003). These state programs have 
tended to emphasise locality and local disadvantage, and ‘place management’ has 
emerged as a new term in spatial policy language to signal a holistic approach to 
the needs of localities (Smyth et al. 2005:39). 
 
In Queensland, the intention to utilise multi-sector partnerships was signalled by 
the Premier who declared that: 
 
There is … an emerging service delivery model involving governments working in 
partnership with communities to determine needs, devise strategies for meeting 
these needs, implementing activities consistent with these strategies and ultimately 
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monitoring results. The emphasis is on community empowerment and not on 
traditional functional program delivery (Queensland Government 2001:10). 
 
The government of Queensland has issued a package of policies and programs 
aimed at greater participation in policy development and service delivery, although 
it should be noted that these represent strategic intentions which have yet to be 
fully implemented or evaluated (Reddel and Woolcock 2003). Reddel and 
Woolcock argue that these strategic intentions are overdue in that past practices 
have failed to appreciate the critical role of local government, community 
associations and other forms of civil society; and even when recognised, their 
diversity and complexity were not always easy to accommodate because of the 
dominance of managerial policies which foster largely passive notions of 
consultation and agency coordination. More recent reports on the Queensland 
programs indicate some positive gains, notably the community renewal program 
focusing on fifteen disadvantaged areas in the state, and the Cape York initiative to 
address long-standing social problems in indigenous communities in that region. In 
both cases, the authors claim that these early successes may be due to the use of 
techniques of associational governance, whereby integrated policy responses 
involve a movement beyond the traditional social welfare constituency to engage 
communities more broadly (Smyth et al. 2005). 
 
A growing number of cases are emerging where local governments have developed 
or contributed to associational governance, often through giving prominence to the 
notion of ‘place’. For example, the City of Playford (South Australia) in its 
development of a high-performance growth hub (Genoff 2005), or the Sydney 
Harbour Manager project involving a memorandum of understanding between 14 
agencies and 19 local councils. The latter is a particularly interesting development 
as the ‘model emphatically does not seek a single vision, an ongoing consensus, or 
a grand plan. It assumes many voices, competing interests and goals, and shifts in 
interests and alliances. The model enables clusters of stakeholders and interest 
groups to develop joint positions and then enter into a dialogue with other main 
players’ (Dawkins 2003: 63). 
 
There is also growing interest in and practice of alternative means of enhancing 
community engagement. For example, deliberative democratic processes are being 
employed by governments at all levels in Australia (Carson 2007). These are robust 
consultation methods that add value to policy-making processes, especially in 
enabling governments to deal more effectively with complex policy issues such as 
stem cell research, Aboriginal reconciliation, asylum seeking and climate change. 
Techniques used also include innovative collaborative planning methods, such as 
those being used to mediate water and land-use conflicts in British Columbia (see, 
for example Frame et al. 2004); citizen panels, now established by more than three 
quarters of UK local authorities; citizens’ juries; and community dialogues, which 
are becoming more common in Canada (Curtain 2003). A significant number of 
Australian local governments are following suit. 
 
4. Some Key Issues  
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A number of important issues emerge from this discussion. First, as indicated 
earlier, the data is incomplete and anecdotal about the extent of any shift towards 
more participative forms of governance. This, of course, is not a problem specific 
to Australia. In the Canadian context, Stewart (2006:197) argues that ‘few efforts 
have been made to address [evaluation of] good governance at the local level, 
perhaps mostly because of data collection difficulties.’ Further research is required 
to map the diversity of state and local government policy interventions and to 
evaluate their effectiveness. For example, there are profound differences of 
perspective in relation to recent ‘community strengthening’ initiatives. Some report 
positively on early trends and anecdotal feedback on the results of some of these 
initiatives, especially in Victoria, whilst others suggest that: 
 
many claims about the benefits of strengthening social bonds and increasing civic 
participation are overblown, and that attempts to present local self-help, 
volunteering and social entrepreneurship as panaceas for deeply rooted structural 
inequalities and injustices are naïve and misleading (Wiseman 2006:103). 
 
A second issue relates to the endemic weaknesses of local government in Australia, 
and the burden imposed by the increasing tasks mandated for it by other spheres. In 
the UK, Geddes (2000) questions the capacity of local partnerships to create 
structural change and resolve complex economic and social problems, so given the 
stronger role of local government in that jurisdiction, it is likely to be even more 
difficult for Australian local governments. In particular, concerns have been 
expressed about local government’s capacity to assume broader roles in developing 
leadership in regional participatory governance arrangements. As Beer et al. 
conclude:  
 
it is not surprising that most economic development agencies [at local level] were 
small with very few staff and limited budgets, that they have been unstable, and 
that in many cases they did not have community and political support and in the 
perceptions of practitioners had little impact on their locality (quoted in Rainnie 
2005:132). 
 
With 560 Australian local governments, or 78% of the then total number, classified 
as ‘rural’ or ‘regional’ (DoTARS 2005:3), the urban-rural divide represents a 
critical dimension of uneven resourcing that tends to generate a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ effect and restrict the potential of the sector as a whole. This has been 
recognised by the provision of relatively large national government grants to those 
councils most in need. However, despite horizontal equalisation these local 
governments appear poorly placed to assume the type of leadership required to 
advance participatory governance. It is more likely that leadership in these resource 
challenged environments has to be assumed by regional bodies such as voluntary 
regional organisations of councils or regional development networks in concert 
with state and not-for-profit agencies – provided that these regional bodies are 
themselves able to marshal sufficient resources and leadership expertise for the 
purpose.  
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Third, and on the other hand, there are doubts that state governments would ever be 
able to effectively manage local initiatives for participatory governance. As Martin 
comments, there is a ‘question [of] how far state governments can go in brokering 
community engagement strategies across small rural towns and communities’ 
(Martin 2006:2). By contrast, it has often been acknowledged that many local 
governments in Australia have satisfactorily met their intended functions of service 
delivery, adequate representation and participation, and advocacy of constituent 
needs to higher levels of government (Marshall 1998). Self (1997:298) argues that 
the Australian local sector ‘remains genuinely local and grass roots in a way that is 
no longer true of most overseas systems’. This provides some confidence that local 
government has a significant place and skill set to be a valued partner in 
participatory governance, even if there are questions about the capacity of many 
smaller councils to lead this process. 
 
5. Conclusions 
For there to be real benefits from citizen engagement, consultation about public 
policy needs to move beyond the piecemeal and haphazard process which is 
evident in Australia today (Curtain 2003). At state and local government levels, in 
contrast with their federal counterpart, there is considerable evidence of a 
willingness to engage with citizens rather than merely consult people as users of 
public services or ‘customers’. However, while most states and many local 
governments have developed policies or protocols to facilitate this higher level of 
consultation, as well as signalling to their communities that such consultations are 
valued, there are few examples where effective engagement has been established 
and accepted as a citizen’s right. The concept of engagement appears to be valued, 
perhaps even seen as necessary, but in few instances has the practice yet been 
accepted as a fundamental right of communities to enable them to assume a formal 
place in governance. 
 
State governments are being challenged to surrender their legislative power over 
local government in order to facilitate ‘real’ partnerships with local communities 
and embrace notions of participatory governance. At this stage, it is unclear 
whether Australian local governments will be able to meet this challenge in ways 
seen in some other countries, such as the United Kingdom or Canada, where 
principles of subsidiarity, citizen empowerment and community engagement are 
more established features of the political landscape. Given current constraints on 
local government’s autonomy and resources, in many cases effective moves 
towards participatory governance may need leadership and support from outside.  
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Abstract 
In an assessment of representative democracy in Australian local government, this 
paper considers long-run changes in forms of political representation, methods of 
vote counting, franchise arrangements, numbers of local government bodies and 
elected representatives, as well as the thorny question of constitutional recognition. 
This discussion is set against the background of ongoing tensions between the drive 
for economic efficiency and the maintenance of political legitimacy, along with 
more deep-seated divisions emerging from the legal relationship between local and 
state governments and the resultant problems inherent in local government 
autonomy versus state intervention.  
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1. Introduction
The question of representative democracy in Australian local government has been 
overshadowed by the debate over the major micro-economic and managerial 
reforms carried out during the 1990s (Kiss 2003). These reforms were designed 
primarily to ensure local councils better fulfilled one of the principal roles of local 
government, namely the efficient delivery of services to local communities 
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(Dollery et al. 2006). However, the second principal role of local government is to 
provide a forum for the practical expression of democratic values, in particular the 
representation of community interests both locally and, when appropriate, in wider 
regional contexts. Thus the reforms were also intended, at least ostensibly, to shift 
a previously widespread community perception of local councils as simply 
managers of local services and local infrastructure to one where this second 
principal role, as democratically representative bodies, gained in significance 
(Wensing 1997:37; Galligan 1998:205). While the micro-economic and managerial 
aspects of this structural reform process may have seen improved efficiencies 
(Dollery et al. 2008; Sorensen et al. 2007), there nonetheless remains palpable 
disquiet over what is perceived as the ongoing failure, or even a diminished 
capacity, on the part of local government to represent and respond to the needs 
expressed by local communities (May 2003:5). Kiss (2003:104) has argued that the 
representative legitimacy of local government has been “weakened instead of 
strengthened” by these reforms. In a slightly less critical vein, Aulich (1999:19) 
claimed that the dual roles of local government:  
 
… are often in tension: for instance, in relation to the controversial question of 
municipal amalgamations, the argument for larger local government units is 
usually based on the existence of economies of scale in service delivery. The 
opponents of amalgamations generally claim that there are diseconomies of scale 
in relation to the democratic values of representativeness, with large municipal 
units less responsive to community needs and aspirations than smaller ones. 
 
If, as Aulich indicates, attempts to realise economic efficiencies have in themselves 
hindered representative democracy, and if representative democracy remains the 
bedrock of political liberty, then the autonomy of local government, and thereby 
the freedom of the community represented, appears under siege.  
 
In addition to these contemporary Australian concerns, the ongoing question of 
whether local government should be fully self-governing or subject to the 
sovereignty of the state has haunted the political theory of local government since 
its inception. As Wickwar (1970:1-2) puts it: 
 
These antithetical positions run through the whole evolution of modern local 
government theory. They may be traced back to Western Europe’s middle ages, 
when a tradition evolved of local liberties being in practice self-achieved, but … 
this tradition was soon overshadowed by a legal doctrine of local bodies being 
incorporated by the sovereign. They may also be traced back to the emergence of 
the early modern state, when a new classical political theory hesitated between 
thinking of local bodies as quasi-sovereign constituents of the state or as 
subordinate intermediary bodies between the sovereign and his subjects. 
 
During the late eighteenth century, the French administrator Turgot developed a 
plan dividing France into four geographic levels of municipality: the village, the 
region, the province and the entire nation. Those owning property would elect a 
village council to administer the allocation of tax revenues for local public works 
improvements, which would in turn elect a representative to the next level of 
municipal government. With the historical shift occurring during that time from 
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aristocratic, monarchic to bourgeois, democratic forms of government, Turgot’s 
plan soon became highly influential across Europe as well as in the United States 
and Britain. Under Napoleon’s influence, however, the elected local representative 
was replaced with a centrally appointed administrator. Yet this approach was again 
generally reversed during the 1830s and 1840s. While Bentham in Britain 
emphasized the democratic principle of both central and local governments being 
responsible to the people, J.S. Mill argued that nonetheless local government 
should be open to investigation and advice from central government agencies. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, and contrary to the utilitarian centralism of Mill, a 
group of British Fabian socialists, including Sidney and Beatrice Webb, set out five 
principles for local government. As reported by Wickwar (1970:54-5), the fifth of 
those principles holds that: 
 
[l]ocal government thus constituted and freed from judicial, statutory, and sub-
legislative restraints should enjoy as large a measure of freedom and dignity as 
possible. Even as it was, initiative and enterprise came as often from local as from 
central government. The principal historic units ought to be recognized as being 
true general-purpose authorities, exempt from the ultra vires doctrine applied to 
them by the law courts since the mid-nineteenth century … In particular they 
should be free to furnish their public with any service that they could afford, by 
way of self-financing ‘municipal socialism’ and the provision of all manner of free 
educational, cultural, and health facilities. The new invention of grants-in-aid 
could contribute to municipal liberty insofar as they were given on a ‘block’ 
instead of a ‘specific’ basis. 
 
In light of these historically-entwined perspectives on local government autonomy 
and state intervention, we turn our attention to a discussion of different forms of 
local representation and their close relation to different methods of vote counting. 
We then consider trends in the form of representation and vote counting methods in 
the context of Australian local government, before examining historical shifts in 
the franchise. A further factor shaping the representative character of Australian 
local government concerns a declining trend in the number of Australian local 
government bodies and increasing representative: population ratios. In a final 
section we consider the current lack of federal constitutional recognition of 
Australian local government and its implications for representative democracy. 
 
2. Forms of Representation and Vote counting Methods  
The case for a direct, participatory model of democracy, similar to that practiced by 
the ancient Greeks, was strongly advocated by the Swiss philosopher, J.J. 
Rousseau, during the mid-eighteenth century. However, with much larger expanses 
of territory and population now at stake than the old Athenian city-state or 
Rousseau’s Geneva, the model of representative democracy, first practiced in the 
United States at the end of the eighteenth century, has generally been accepted as 
that most suitable for preserving the democratic principle of political equality. The 
English-born Thomas Paine (1969:202), in support of the American model of 
representative democracy, observed that “[b]y ingrafting representation upon 
democracy, we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and 
confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and population.”  
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Further prominent advocates of representative democracy at this time included the 
American James Maddison and the Englishman Edmund Burke. Both argued for 
what has become known as the trusteeship or corporate form of representation; a 
form which also implicates high levels of education in elected representatives. 
Maddison claimed that with large voting constituencies there was a greater chance 
those with talents and education would be elected (Phillips 2003:20). Burke 
maintained that elected representatives should be entrusted to make informed, 
independent judgments in the best interests of their constituents (Sawer 2003:39). 
In other words, freely-elected representatives should have the requisite knowledge 
and character to make such judgments, and, by virtue of election, are authorised to 
formulate policy and establish strategic directions on behalf of the social collective.  
 
In defending this corporate, trusteeship form of representation, where the governing 
body is likened to a company board of directors, Burke and Maddison were also 
attempting to ensure that those elected would not simply be mouthpieces for 
particular interest groups or local parochial concerns. Yet those defending this 
phonographic or ‘interest’ form of representation, also known as populism, 
generally stand opposed to what they consider the educational elitism inherent in 
the idea of corporate trusteeship. They place great value on personal contact with 
the elected representative and the direct accountability of a member of parliament 
to those s/he represents rather than to any political party with which the 
representative may be aligned.  
  
A third form of representation, known as the mirror form, was later advocated by 
J.S. Mill in the second half of the nineteenth century. Mill argued that the electoral 
system should make it possible for minority interests and opinions to be 
represented or mirrored on a proportional basis according to their numbers within 
an electorate. In common with Maddison and Burke, Mill’s intention was to 
encourage a ‘politics of ideas’, where those with high intellectual capacities and 
independent modes of thinking would become elected representatives (Phillips 
2003:21). Parliament, in Mill’s view, should be a vigorous debating forum with 
various competing ideas. This is evident in Mill’s opposition to proportional 
representation on the basis of social occupation, whereby parliament would more 
likely consist of so-called uneducated representatives drawn from the working 
classes. While Mill in no way denied that working class interests may be 
represented, his concomitant defence of property ownership as a key franchise 
criterion considerably reduced the possibility of such representation. Nevertheless, 
with the introduction of universal adult suffrage in Australia during the 1890s, the 
political representatives of the working classes became delegates whose views were 
to mirror party policy, which in turn reflected the interests of workers.  
 
These forms of electoral representation are shaped to some degree by the particular 
method of vote counting used to determine successful candidates. As Burdess and 
O’Toole (2004:68) indicate, the two major means employed for this purpose are the 
majority and proportional methods. The former is a first-past-the-post, simple 
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majority, or if preferences are to be nominated, an absolute majority mode of 
selection. Since the majority method, with or without preferences, is generally 
applied when only a single successful candidate is possible, it often produces an 
‘interest’ form of representation. This has been the case particularly in local 
government elections where the ratio of population to elected representatives, 
especially in rural and regional areas, is relatively low.  
 
In the case of multi-member electorates, however, a proportional method of vote 
counting is more common. This method depends on a certain quota of votes being 
reached: a quota being calculated according to the ratio of possible votes to 
available positions, and where the votes of eliminated candidates are transferred, 
through preferences, to those remaining in the count. This method gives rise to a 
mirror form of representation, since it has the capacity to reflect or register a 
variety of different political viewpoints within electoral divisions that are more 
densely populated or perhaps more geographically extensive. Table 1 provides a 
tabulated summary of the relations between vote counting methods and the forms 
of representation to which they generally give rise.  
 
Burdess and O’Toole (2004) illustrate the manner in which local government in the 
state of Victoria has, through its voting methods, passed from a long history of 
interest representation to a period of corporate representation during the 1990s, and 
more recently to a mirror or proportional form of representation. They argue that:  
 
A corporate view of representation is not dependent on one system [of vote 
counting] or the other but the type of system can skew representation in two 
significant ways. On the one hand, proportional systems may lead to unstable 
coalitions of minor groups who are often unable to agree on substantive issues. On 
the other hand, majority systems may skew the corporate representation towards 
limited interests in the community. (Burdess and O’Toole 2004:69) 
 
Burdess and O’Toole also suggest (2004:75), as does Balmer (1982:12), that all 
three forms of representation may be embodied in the one elected representative 
and that, depending on a particular issue and its circumstances, a greater weighting 
may be attributed to the one or another. 
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Table 1: Vote counting and Representation in Australian Local Government. 
 Majority Majority 
Preferential 
Proportional 
Method of Vote 
Counting 
Simple majority or 
first-past-the-post 
with no preferences 
counted 
Absolute majority 
with preferences 
counted 
Quota of necessary 
votes calculated 
according to ratio of 
possible votes to 
available positions and 
where votes of 
eliminated candidates 
are transferred, through 
preferences, to those 
remaining  
States and 
Territory  
Queensland, 
Western Australia 
Northern Territory. 
New South Wales 
and Victoria when 
only one or two 
positions are to be 
decided. 
Queensland when 
only one position is 
to be decided. 
New South Wales, 
Victoria, 
South Australia, 
Tasmania  
Application Both single and 
multi-member 
electorates  
Both single and 
multi-member 
electorates 
Multi-member 
electorates 
Form of 
Representation 
Often produces a 
‘phonographic’ or 
‘interest’ form of 
representation, also 
known as populism 
Less prone to 
populism since 
preferential votes 
are counted 
Generally gives rise to a 
‘mirror’ form of 
representation where 
the views of different 
social groups are 
proportionally reflected 
 
3. Trends in Vote counting Methods and Forms of Representation 
No definitive answer to the question of which form of representation is most 
democratic appears possible. However, in recent years a general trend towards the 
proportional method of vote counting is evident. The Association for Good 
Government carried out a study of the 1971 New South Wales local government 
elections to determine whether those council areas using a majority-preferential 
(MP) method of vote counting achieved a better or worse representative outcome 
than where proportional representation (PR) had been employed. As cited in a 1981 
ACIR discussion paper (No.5:16), the key finding of the Association was that: 
 
In every aspect of performance, examined in the survey, PR is superior to MP, 
generally by a very significant amount … In general, … the results of the survey 
show that … proportional representation (PR) consistently gives results that are 
far more satisfactory to the voters and far more just to the candidates than those 
with the majority-preferential method (MP). 
 
Majority-preferential voting in multi-member electorates can lead to candidates 
with a small primary vote nonetheless being elected on second and third 
preferences, although, as Hughes and Costar (2006:69) indicate, this is usually rare. 
Burdess and O’Toole (2004:74-5) outline the support given to the proportional 
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method in Victoria by Labor Party ministers for local government in the late 1980s 
and again in 2002. They further indicate that the National Party has in recent years 
also lent support to the proportional or mirror form of representation, since some 
rural voters were said to be disenfranchised due to the overwhelming success of 
candidates from major regional centres in their electorate. Criticism of the 
proportional method is generally couched in terms of increased administrative 
complexities and opening the door to party political groupings in local government. 
Yet as the ACIR paper (1981:17) argued, candidates need to be aligned with 
particular or associated groups in their community, since without such support they 
stand little chance of election.  
 
While each Australian state has made changes to its method of local government 
vote counting over the past century, four now use the proportional method for 
determining elected representatives in multi-member electorates. Two of these, 
Victoria and New South Wales, revert to the majority preferential method when 
only one or two positions are to be decided. South Australia and Tasmania, which 
once used the first-past-the-post and majority-preferential methods respectively, 
now employ the proportional method exclusively. Queensland and Western 
Australia use the simple majority or first-past-the-post method; however 
Queensland turns to majority- preferential voting when only one vacancy is to be 
decided. In the Northern Territory majority preferential voting is the norm 
(DOTARS 2006:12-13). Of the four states that employ the proportional method of 
vote counting and so appear to favour the mirror form of representation, only 
Tasmania has fully abolished the otherwise prevalent division of local government 
areas (electorates) into wards or ridings. In South Australia, according to figures 
from 2002, 85% of local government electorates still maintain such divisions. 
Victoria is recorded as having 81% of local electorates divided this way, and New 
South Wales 45% (Burdess and O’Toole 2004:68). Because any local government 
area may have a variety of combinations of single and multi-member wards or 
ridings, it remains difficult to gauge more precisely the overall extent of 
proportional representation in the three states that also use the majority-preferential 
method. However, data from Victoria in 2002 (Burdess and O’Toole 2004:72), 
indicated that over half the number of local council bodies had single member 
wards.  
 
The move to ‘whole-of-council’ elections in certain states would also appear to 
strengthen the proportional, mirror form of representation. While ACIR (1981:13) 
indicated over twenty years ago that New South Wales, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory then held whole-of-council elections every three years, three of 
the other states were still committed to annual elections at which one-third of 
representatives would retire or stand for re-election each year after their three-year 
term. In South Australia, half the representatives relinquished their post annually 
after a two-year term. The 2004 Local Government National Report (DOTARS 
2004:8) indicates that New South Wales had moved to a four-year cycle, 
Queensland remained unchanged on a three-year cycle, while Victoria and South 
Australia had moved to whole-of-council elections every three years. Western 
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Australia and Tasmania now held a half council election every two years, while in 
the Northern Territory elections could vary between one and four years. Two years 
later, in the 2006 Local Government National Report (DOTARS 2006:12-13), four 
of the six states as well as the Northern Territory are reported as holding whole-of-
council elections every four years. Western Australia and Tasmania remained 
unchanged with half-council elections every two years. The shift to whole-of-
council elections every four years in Victoria and South Australia counters to some 
degree the interest form of representation otherwise prevalent in a ward system, 
where generally only one representative could be elected at any one time. For what 
is often at stake in that situation is not so much the exercise of good government by 
council as a whole, but simply the social standing and personal demeanor of 
individual candidates.  
 
5. Historical Shifts in the Local Government Franchise  
The franchise criteria evident at the time of federation, namely being a British 
subject of at least 21 years of age and being an owner of property, have been 
gradually modified during the course of the twentieth century. The age requirement 
for all tiers of government was reduced to 18 years across all states and territories 
during the early 1970s. At roughly the same time Victoria and South Australia both 
extended the local government franchise entitlement to include non-British subjects 
resident in the state. Western Australia followed suit with the proviso that non-
British residents be nonetheless owners of property. The other three states, along 
with the Northern Territory, maintained being a British subject as a factor in 
determining any right to vote. Since 1984, however, being a British subject 
translates (except for those on a British or Commonwealth of Australia electoral 
roll prior to that year) as being on an Australian state or territory electoral roll; in 
other words, as being or having become an Australian citizen. 
 
Property ownership as a criterion of franchise has a history stretching back to the 
pre-emergent condition of local governing bodies as road boards, which levied 
taxes on landholders for the construction and maintenance of local roads. With 
their transition to local governing bodies, taxes were extended to cover the 
provision of further services such as sewerage and waste disposal. Only genuine 
stakeholders in a local community, it was argued, namely those who paid such 
taxes or rates according to the value of their property or properties, should be 
entitled to vote and so have their interests represented in local council forums. This 
property-based franchise criterion also included those occupiers of land who 
directly paid rates, and the nominees of companies or corporations present in the 
electorate.  
 
In most States the maximum number of votes able to be exercised by an elector 
in any one capacity was twelve. However any property-owner who was 
registered as the nominee of a company or as a ratepaying lessee could also cast 
votes in these capacities. Further, where the local authority was subdivided into 
wards and property was held in a number of wards, then voting rights were 
extended to each ward (ACIR 1981:5). 
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The right to multiple votes based on the total value of property owned was first 
removed in New South Wales in 1906 (Power et al. 1981:31). Nevertheless, if 
properties were owned in more than one ward or riding within a local government 
area then the owner was still entitled to one vote in each of those wards. Also, 
additional votes could be cast if a property owner was also named as a corporate 
nominee. This modified form of plural voting was adopted in Western Australia in 
1960, Victoria in 1968, South Australia in 1976, and Tasmania in 1978 (Power et 
al. 1981:31, 664, 724). Today, plural voting persists in Victoria and to a lesser 
extent Tasmania. New Local Government Acts passed during the 1990s by the 
New South Wales, South Australian and Western Australian governments retained 
a property franchise but applied the principle of one vote per voter across the 
entirety of any one local government area (Kiss 2003:113). 
 
Queensland, however, abolished property ownership altogether as a franchise 
criterion and replaced it with that of residency and state electoral enrolment as 
early as 1920 (DOTARS 2006:13). Similarly in the Northern Territory, residency 
and territorial electoral enrolment are the sole criteria of franchise. Residency as a 
criterion of franchise was subsequently introduced in New South Wales in 1941, 
and while the other four States eventually followed, this did not occur in South 
Australia until as late as 1976 (Power et al. 1981:30-31), and in Victoria until 1982 
(Kiss 2003:113). From an economic perspective, a key argument supporting 
residency as a criterion of franchise is that any rent paid to a property owner in 
return for lodgings effectively includes a proportion attributable to rates. A further 
argument is that the general-purpose grants allocated to local government by the 
Commonwealth are derived from personal income tax paid by all working 
residents.  
 
While residency, age and citizenship have now become the dominant criteria of 
franchise in local government elections, property ownership remains a criterion in 
all States bar Queensland. In Western Australia and New South Wales, any non-
resident property owner or occupier must nevertheless also meet the age and 
citizenship criteria. In Tasmania a voter satisfying these conditions may exercise 
the right to a proxy vote on behalf of a non-resident owner or occupier.  
 
Overall, there was thus a marked decrease in the voting power of property owners 
during the second half of the twentieth century, and over the same period there was 
an increase in the number of eligible voters made possible through the introduction 
of the citizenship and residency criteria now applied in every state and the Northern 
Territory 
 
6. Declining Numbers of Local Government Bodies and Councillors1 
                                                
1
 The term ‘alderman’ was previously used for elected representatives of some city and municipal 
councils.  We also note that our focus in this paper concerns representative democracy generally and 
so does not engage in any specific consideration of women or indigenous representatives.  
Nevertheless it is evident over the last two decades that there has been a marked increase in the 
numbers of both.
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During the late nineteenth century, prior to federation, local government bodies 
were established through both the voluntary petition of resident stakeholder groups 
to their respective state governments, and mandatory decree. Soon after federation, 
in the very early twentieth century, five of the six states, with the exception of 
South Australia, had introduced exclusive mandatory requirements. At this time, 
the number of local government bodies had reached a zenith. Since then, due to 
ongoing boundary alterations and amalgamations promoted by state and territory 
governments, numbers of councils have generally declined. In New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia this decline has been in the order of 50% or more, 
while in Tasmania it is close to 40%. Most recently, Queensland and the Northern 
Territory have undergone major reforms that have reduced the number of local 
governments by around 50% and 75% respectively. The changes in the Northern 
Territory, involving the amalgamation of small Indigenous community councils 
into new ‘shires’ covering vast areas of largely unpopulated land, could fairly be 
described as the most radical structural reform in Australian local government 
history. In Western Australia, by contrast, the number of local governing bodies 
has remained relatively steady since the time of federation with only a slight drop 
in numbers.  
 
Table 2:  Number of Local Councils in Australia 1910-2008. 
 1910 1967 1982 1990 1995 2008 
NSW 
VIC 
QLD 
SA 
WA 
TAS 
NT 
324 
206 
164 
175 
147 
51 
0 
224 
210 
131 
142 
144 
49 
1 
175 
211 
134 
127 
138 
49 
6 
176 
210 
134 
 122* 
138 
46 
22 
177 
184 
125 
119 
144 
29 
63 
152 
79 
73 
68 
142 
29 
16 
* Figure for 1991 
Sources: Chapman (1997:4), May (2003:83), state local government department websites 
 
This decline in the number of local government bodies has been accompanied by a 
corresponding reduction in the number of councillors. In Tasmania, South 
Australia and Victoria, the number of elected representatives has dropped by 37%, 
31% and 73% respectively – that is, from 460 to 288, from 1100 to 760, and from 
2196 to 589 (Kiss 2003:109). A further contributing factor in this decline, albeit 
with lesser impact, has been the sharp fall in the maximum limit of councillors for 
each council in all states except Queensland since the late 1970s. For 1981, Power 
et al. (1981:30) record limits for cities in New South Wales and South Australia of 
around 20 elected representatives, 15 in Tasmania, and 11 in Queensland. Without 
no limits for cities in Victoria and Western Australia, Melbourne City Council is 
then reported as having 33 councillors, while the councils of Perth and Fremantle 
comprised 28 and 19 councillors respectively. However, according to the 2006 
Local Government National Report (DOTARS 2006:12), the maximum limit in 
New South Wales and Western Australia had been reduced to 15, and in Victoria 
12, while the other states had no specified limit. Nevertheless, with the exception 
of Brisbane City Council, which currently consists of 27 councillors, all the other 
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capital city councils across the country currently have no more than twelve and in 
some instances only nine representatives. For smaller municipal and shire councils 
it would appear that the maximum limit has not varied significantly, except in 
Victoria where it has dropped from 18 to 12. Furthermore, over the past 35 years, 
the minimum number of councillors for all categories of councils has fallen from 
six to five in most states. 
 
Thus the overall number of local government representatives across the country is 
far lower than in previous decades. More significantly, and in view of national 
population growth, this indicates that each elected member now represents a much 
larger number of voters than ever before. That varies considerably from state to 
state with those more heavily populated having a far greater ratio of population per 
elected representative. Figures again taken from the 2006 Local Government 
National Report (DOTARS 2006:14) show that in Victoria, which has experienced 
the greatest fall in the number of local government representatives, this ratio 
recently stood at 1:8053. In New South Wales, where the population is almost 40 
per cent higher, but where there has been a less dramatic drop in the number of 
councillors, the ratio was 1:4432. For Queensland (before the recent halving of the 
number of councils), South Australia and Tasmania, these ratios came in at 1:3079, 
1:2046, and 1:1710 respectively. In Western Australia, with only a very slight 
decline in the numbers of councils and representatives, the ratio stood at 1:1475.  It 
is also evident, in view of the still relatively large number of small municipal and 
shire councils in non-metropolitan areas, and the recent decline in the number of 
councillors in many larger urban councils, that the more densely populated 
metropolitan areas have a significantly larger number of people being represented 
by each elected representative than in rural and regional Australia. 
 
The question which emerges here is: does this declining trend in the numbers of 
local government bodies and councillors actually decreases the representative and 
thereby democratic character of local government? An immediate affirmative 
response, however, would seem far too simplistic. For with the franchise having 
now been extended to all resident adult citizens, and with the trend towards 
proportional, mirror representation, where different and various viewpoints have a 
better chance of being represented in local government, it may well be argued that 
the representative, democratic character of local government is in fact increasing. 
This is an issue requiring further investigation. 
 
7. Constitutional Recognition and Local Government Autonomy 
With ever-expanding strategic responsibilities over recent decades in the areas of 
economic, social and environmental planning, the significance of local councils in 
shaping the future well-being of their respective communities has been 
dramatically heightened. Not only has the managerial role of councils with regard 
to the efficient provision of services become more professionalised, but also 
councils have been actively encouraged to engage more fully with their 
community, to be more responsive to community needs, and so better fulfil their 
second major role of providing effective democratic representation. Certainly, since 
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the extension of the franchise to all residents, local government has come to see 
itself as increasingly responsible for the whole community and not just property 
owners. This widening social responsibility is also substantiated on economic 
grounds; namely local government’s expanded revenue base due to the provision of 
Commonwealth general-purpose grants derived in part from personal income tax 
(ACIR 1981:6). The significance of local councils as governing democratic bodies 
has also been recognized, at least to some extent, through the current emphasis on 
inter-government partnership arrangements with both state and Commonwealth 
governments. The major political manifestation of this partnership arrangement is 
the participation of the peak local government body, the Australian Local 
Government Association (ALGA), in the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG).  
 
The steps leading to this still informal recognition of local government as a third 
tier of government have been long and arduous. Perhaps the first sign of 
recognition came with the Whitlam government’s 1974 referendum on whether the 
Commonwealth should have the right to provide direct grants to local councils. 
Despite overwhelming rejection, the referendum nonetheless brought increased 
attention to the role of local government. This is nowhere more evident than in the 
Fraser government’s establishment in 1976 of the Advisory Council for Inter-
government Relations (ACIR). An indirect effect of the information and discussion 
papers thereafter published by ACIR was the formal recognition of local 
government in four state constitutions: Victoria and Western Australia in 1979, 
South Australia in 1980, and New South Wales in 1986 (Chapman 1997:6). 
However, while enhancing the status of local government in the four states, none of 
those constitutional amendments, achieved simply through an Act of parliament, 
guarantees local government any basic powers (ACIR 1985:9).  
 
With this in mind, and despite potential challenges in the High Court over the 
interpretation of any reference to local government that might be inserted in the 
Commonwealth constitution, ACIR went on to recommend that recognition of local 
government be entrenched therein on the grounds that this would “explicitly draw 
attention to the complementary nature of the three spheres of government and 
implicitly point to their status as partners in the Australian governmental system” 
(1985:15). Just such a proposition was put to the Australian people in the 
referendum of 1988, only to be soundly rebuffed. Indeed the 1987 Constitutional 
Commission had already made the point that such a proposal would institute a third 
sphere of government leading to counter-productive competition with the states 
(Chapman 1997:6). In view of previous displays of opportunistic behaviour on the 
part of all levels of government, Chapman similarly throws doubt on their capacity 
to engage in any genuine collaborative effort to achieve effective local policy 
outcomes. For this reason, he argues that “the rational allocation of responsibilities, 
optimistically espoused by the ACIR publications, is not really viable” (Chapman 
1997:12). Nonetheless the failure to recognize the autonomy of local government in 
the Commonwealth constitution severely undermines its democratic legitimacy. 
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Whilst the legislative reforms of the 1990s conferred some degree of ‘general 
competence’ power on local councils, that is, allowed councils a modicum of 
autonomy with respect to planning for and managing their local populace, their 
activities are still strictly controlled within the limits of state government 
legislation. Under these conditions, those elected to local government are often 
viewed as nothing more than the political and economic executors of policies 
emerging from their respective state governments. Moreover, local councils remain 
subject to the possibility of summary dismissal through ministerial fiat or a 
legislative act of state parliament, which further reinforces the public perception of 
local government as nothing more than a subsidiary, administrative arm of state 
government. This perception is largely borne out by the relatively small numbers 
voting at local government elections and is a significant factor undermining the 
democratic legitimacy of local government. While voting is compulsory in New 
South Wales, Queensland and more recently Victoria, available data (ACIR 
1981:9) suggest that this still only results in somewhere between 65 and 85% of all 
eligible voters turning out to vote. In those other states where voting remains 
voluntary, the corresponding numbers range from as low as 5 to 40% (ACIR 
1981:9). With higher numbers of voters in those states where voting is compulsory, 
there is less risk of minority interest groups gaining control of a council and some 
confidence that the results reflect the views of the electorate. Formal recognition of 
local government autonomy in the Commonwealth constitution could go a long 
way to changing the current public perception of local government and might thus 
encourage greater electoral participation.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
The trend away from a property-based franchise and plural voting to one based on 
residency and one person-one vote has enhanced the representative legitimacy of 
local government. In addition, shifts towards a proportional method of vote 
counting in whole-of-council elections have brought about greater representation of 
different community views. Further, the division of local government areas into 
wards or ridings may ensure that different geographical areas are well represented, 
although this system may tend to favour the phonographic or direct interest form of 
representation with its inherent parochialism, especially when only one candidate is 
to be elected and the majority method of vote counting is employed. On the other 
hand, there has been a marked decline in the number of councils and councillors in 
many states due to local government reforms initiated by state governments and 
ongoing boundary adjustments. This has resulted in increased representative : 
population ratios, particularly in densely populated metropolitan areas, and may 
have decreased the representative, democratic capacity of local governing bodies, 
although the proportional, mirror form of representation may obviate this problem 
to some degree.  
 
Alongside these ongoing difficulties in determining the best form of representative 
democracy for Australian local government, a serious flaw in current arrangements 
is the lack of Commonwealth constitutional recognition of local government as a 
third and autonomous sphere of government. As May (2003:85) puts it in reference 
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to an observation made by Stephen Soul (2000): “[w]ithout constitutional backing, 
Australian local government institutions cannot be truly regarded as legitimate 
democratic entities.” 
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Abstract
While the notion that communities require resources in the form of financial 
capital for their development and wellbeing has long been recognised, it has 
become increasingly apparent that economic resources alone do not lead to 
community sustainability and wellbeing. The building and supporting of strong, 
safe, socially cohesive communities that embrace social connections and 
commitment, has become an important goal of policy and initiatives at all levels of 
government. The aims of this study were to identify a common understanding of the 
concept of ‘community cohesion’, and to develop a set of indicators based on both 
the experiences of residents in a rural community and the relevant contemporary 
academic literature. Because community cohesion is an intangible concept subject 
to multiple meanings, qualitative research methods were used. We identified four 
main themes which could be translated into the key indicators. The most significant 
finding is that neighbourliness was identified by participants as the key aspect of 
community cohesion. Yet, whilst it is central, this does not mean excessive 
familiarity or the taking of liberties. Indeed, part of neighbourliness involves 
respecting each other’s boundaries and respect for diversity.  
 
Key words: Indicators, community cohesion, social exclusion/inclusion, social 
capital. 
 
HOLDSWORTH & HARTMAN: 
Indicators of Community Cohesion  
in an Australian Country Town 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 77 
 
1. Introduction 
While the notion that communities require resources in the form of financial capital 
for their development and wellbeing has long been recognised, it has become 
increasingly apparent that economic resources alone do not lead to community 
sustainability and wellbeing. This re-evaluation has led to the recognition that 
combinations of resources are needed to foster community wellbeing, including 
natural capital, economic capital, institutional capital, human capital and social 
capital. Of these various capitals, social capital is the least concrete but can be 
understood to mean the social networks that link people to form a cohesive 
community (Stone and Hughes 2002a).  
 
In Australia concerns about social capital and community cohesion have emerged 
as an area of key interest to a large number of government agencies aiming to 
combine community building and a whole of government approach to policy 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] 2002). Indeed, the building and supporting 
of strong, safe, socially cohesive communities which embrace social connections 
and community life, has become an important goal of policy and initiatives at all 
levels of government, including local government. But how are strong, safe, 
socially cohesive communities measured? What are the indicators of such 
communities? As noted in the 2004 report Indicators of Community Strength in 
Victoria (Strategic Policy and Research Unit 2004), although there is useful 
information regarding tools for measuring such concepts, few indicators for 
determining community cohesion have been institutionalised in Australia. 
 
The authors were approached by a small inland local council in Northern New 
South Wales to develop a set of indicators of community cohesion for a particular 
locality in the local government area, which could then be used by the council’s 
social planners in order to develop strategies aimed at increasing safety and 
cohesiveness. The population of this locality is approximately 12,000 persons with 
a median age of 35, and a median weekly household income of $600 - $699 (ABS 
2001). Research has identified this area as being in the top 30 most disadvantaged 
areas in New South Wales and Victoria (Baum et al. 2002; Vinson 2004). 
 
Community cohesion is an intangible concept subject to multiple meanings. Thus 
its definition can pose problems for quantitative (statistical) approaches, though 
these are useful for measurement once meanings and definitions have been decided 
upon. Important inroads have been made in this respect in the UK (Coutts et al. 
2007; Home Office Community Cohesion Unit 2003). However, qualitative 
research methods are more appropriate when the aim is to tap into people’s 
perceptions, experiences and understandings. Quantitative methods have made a 
valuable contribution to the field in the UK by operationalising and developing 
measures of community cohesion as expressed through a national target – Public 
Service Agreement 21 (Cabinet Office Third Sector 2007). Qualitative methods can 
complement this work by eliciting and interpreting meanings which can then be 
translated into indicators.  
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Of initial importance to this research project was defining and determining what is 
commonly meant by the concepts of ‘community’ and ‘community cohesion’. This 
was done through reviewing relevant contemporary academic literature and 
consulting with the targeted community. Subsequently, key questions were 
developed in an attempt to determine social issues that currently impact on local 
residents. These were then put to the participants in the project, and from this data, 
indicators of community cohesion identified. There is a paucity of research using 
this approach, particularly in the Australian setting. This study, then. lends a new 
dimension to the existing body of work. 
 
The theoretical framework for this qualitative research project is underpinned by 
the conviction that consulting with the community is the most effective method of 
arriving at sound conclusions that reflect the understandings and wishes of the 
public. This in turn is based on an epistemological position derived from feminist 
methodology, which holds that knowledge gained from the standpoint of the 
individual’s experience is valid and must be taken into account (Haraway 1991). 
This aligns well with Giddens’ (whose views have had considerable influence on 
social policy in the UK) notion of individuals as ‘knowledgeable agents’ (Giddens 
1984). That is, individuals are imbued with a great deal of knowledge about their 
social world and are capable of exercising meaningful choices (Bilton et al. 1996). 
Data was collected using a three-pronged strategy, using structured questionnaires, 
focus groups and interviews. Each of these methods has a particular strength, and 
using more than one method allows a more valid outcome as it produces additional 
information as well as the opportunity to check and confirm data.  
 
2. Background 
The areas of concern to this study relate to four closely linked concepts: 
community, social capital, community cohesion and social inclusion/exclusion. 
Issues relating to all four concepts play a key role in addressing social concerns 
within communities (Bridge et al. 2003; Harkness and Newman 2003; Nevile 
2003; Vinson 2004; Waters 2001).  
 
The concept of community as an aspect of group life has been defined by Hunt and 
Colander (1996:129) as “a group of people who live in a local area and who 
therefore have certain interests and problems in common.” The ABS (2002:5) notes 
that the concept of community can “refer to either place-based or non-place-based 
communities.” Place based communities are considered to exist at geographic 
levels such as in neighbourhoods, workplaces, suburbs, towns, districts and 
regions, states and countries and even globally. Non-place communities are 
considered to consist of groups with common interests such as sports clubs and 
issue-based action groups (ABS 2002). This study used a place-based definition, 
which was regarded as more appropriate given that the community being studied 
was defined geographically, with its own set of particularities and characteristics.   
 
Although the notion of ‘community’ is often associated with connotations that 
involve caring and cooperation between neighbours, this is not always the case. For 
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example, the German sociologist Frederick Toennies identified two forms of 
community: gemeinschaft in which a common set of values involving caring and 
cooperation are shared between community members; and gesellschaft in which 
relationships between community members are uncaring and distant. Nevertheless, 
the notion of community is more often ascribed to a largely ‘traditional’ and 
cohesive way of life in which people know one another and hold common values in 
relation to their local area (Hunt and Colander 1996). 
 
Community cohesion involves interdependence and shared loyalties between 
members of a community (Stone and Hughes 2002a). As noted by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2004), the closely linked terms ‘social cohesion’ and 
‘community cohesion’ refer to the social ties and community commitments that 
bind people together. The concept of community cohesion can be defined as the 
interdependence and solidarity between members of a society (Berger-Schmitt 
2000). The broad definition of a cohesive community set out by the United 
Kingdom Local Government Association (UK LGA) is one that includes: a 
common vision and a sense of belonging; appreciation of diversity of backgrounds 
and circumstances; similar life opportunities for all people not dependent on 
background; and a community where strong relationships can be developed 
between people from diverse backgrounds within workplaces and schools, as well 
as within the broader community (UK LGA 2003). Stone and Hughes (2002a) note 
that social cohesion is concerned with the connections and relationships between 
individuals, groups and organizations within a community. A lack of community 
cohesion occurs when there are divisions between social groups, individuals and 
systems within it, with social exclusion seen as a threat to a cohesive society (Stone 
and Hughes 2002a). 
 
Closely related to the concept of community cohesion is the notion of social 
capital. According to the ABS, social capital “consists of networks, together with 
shared norms, values and understandings which facilitate cooperation within and 
among groups”. It is a contributor to community strength and wellbeing, and can be 
accumulated when people interact with one another formally and informally; for 
example informal interaction with family and friends and formal interaction in 
groups and organisations in the wider community (ABS 2004). Bridge et al. 
(2003:97) state that “social capital is a concept of current enquiry, research and 
debate…and has been defined as social connectedness from which arise norms of 
trust and reciprocity.” Putnam (2000:19) claims that the “core idea of social capital 
theory is that social networks have value.” Similarly, Bullen and Onyx (1998) note 
that social capital originates through the social connections and networks that 
people form that are based on trust, mutual interests, participation and reciprocity 
within the wider community thus fostering a sense of belonging. Hawtin and Kettle 
(2000) argue that the concept of social capital is based on the notion that societies 
and individuals can only achieve their potential when living and working together. 
An important aspect of this is the extent to which citizens can take an active part in 
shaping their own lives and engaging in their community.  
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Successful inclusionary policies, therefore, are not possible unless residents not 
only feel safe, secure and comfortable but also feel they belong, have ownership of 
what is going on, feel proud of where they live, do not feel oppressed and feel able 
to control their living environment (Hawtin and Kettle, 2000:122). 
 
Although the concept of social capital is not new – it was first used by Coleman 
(1988) and later by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) – there is renewed concern 
regarding it as a key contributor to both the social and economic well-being of a 
community (Bridge et al. 2003).  In Australia, Eva Cox (1995:3) highlighted the 
concept of social capital in the 1995 Boyer lectures where she noted: 
 
Social capital should be the pre-eminent and most valued form of any capital as it 
provides the basis on which we build a truly civil society. Without our social basis 
we cannot be fully human. Social capital is as vital as language for human society. 
 
Table 1: Community Cohesion and Social Capital Compared 
Community Cohesion Social Capital 
 
A state of integration based on: 
• interdependence 
• solidarity 
 
A trust resource: 
• developed through social connectedness 
• contributes to the building of community cohesion 
 
 
Where there is a lack of social capital some researchers believe there is also little 
social and community cohesion, which in turn can lead to social exclusion. For 
example, the Affordable Housing National Research Consortium (AHNRC) 
(2001:19) notes that where there is limited community cohesion due to a lack of 
social capital, “segments of the community will experience social exclusion; in 
effect they will be prevented from full participation in the life of the community.” 
Social exclusion provides a framework for understanding the process of being shut 
out fully or partially from any of the social, economic, political or cultural systems 
that determine the social integration and inclusion of a person in society (Byrne 
1999). The concept of social exclusion focuses on the individual, and the extent to 
which an individual’s experiences are exclusionary in regard to their relationships 
with other individuals, institutions and systems that make up communities (Stone 
and Hughes 2002b). Social exclusion may therefore be seen as the denial (or non-
realisation) of social engagement within one’s community.  
 
Arthurson and Jacobs (2003:i) note that in general terms “social exclusion is 
understood to denote a set of factors and processes that accentuate material and 
social deprivation”, and can be used in relation to communities as well as 
individuals. Nornen (cited in Vinson 2004:4) argues that the social exclusion of 
some communities in Australia has implications for all Australians. Social 
exclusion is seen to breed social alienation, and unless this is addressed in policy 
some Australians, along with some neighbourhoods, will continue to experience 
social disadvantage and exclusion. Marsh (2004) links the two concepts of social 
exclusion and community cohesion, claiming that exploring and addressing issues 
of exclusion will lead to an increase in stability within communities.  
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The need to develop and use community indicators to improve community 
cohesion and wellbeing has been identified in recent research: 
 
Collecting indicators that measure whether people get on well together, share a 
common vision and sense of belonging, appreciate diversity and have strong, 
positive relationships are critical to understanding community cohesion (UK LGA 
2003:4).  
 
Community cohesion indicators are tools for governments and communities to use 
to translate broad goals into clear, tangible and commonly understood outcomes; 
and to assess and communicate progress in achieving these goals and outcomes 
(Wiseman et al. 2005). The Discussion Paper: Measuring Wellbeing, Engaging 
Communities (Wiseman et al. 2005:3) for example, states that “we need an 
integrated, long term strategy for local communities to use community indicators to 
improve wellbeing outcomes.” This view is reiterated in the Indicators of 
Community Strength in Victoria report (Strategic Policy and Research Unit 
2004:7), where it is noted that “the absence of indicators can mean that important 
issues drop off the radar.” 
 
Local councils in Australia are increasingly interested in indicators of community 
cohesion. For example, in New South Wales, Camden Council (2006) has 
developed five broad sustainability indicators which encompass various elements 
of community wellbeing.  Marrickville Council, also in NSW, covers aspects of 
community cohesion in its ‘Belonging’ Social Plan (2004). For example, this 
council’s vision for the community is one where people feel safe and valued, feel a 
sense of pride in the cultural diversity of the area, and have a feeling of trust, 
cooperation and involvement in contributing to broader community affairs.  
 
This reflects an important indicator of social wellbeing identified by Burke and 
Hulse (2002), namely the degree to which people see their local area as having a 
sense of community in terms of feeling safe and secure and feeling a part of it. 
Other indicators identified by Burke and Hulse include: having close friends/family 
living locally, having children at local schools, keeping informed of local issues, 
and using local parks and other services (Burke and Hulse 2002). According to 
Hirschfield and Bowers (1997) direct indicators of a lack of community cohesion 
include the inability to supervise and control teenage peer groups, the absence of 
local friendship and acquaintance networks, and the absence of local participation 
in formal and voluntary organisations; while indirect indicators include a high 
population turnover, social heterogeneity and low socio-economic status.  
 
3. Methodology 
As noted in the Introduction, this research project adopted a qualitative approach 
which is interpretive in nature and utilises data in the form of text and phrases 
(Neuman 2000). As the aim of the project was to identify a common understanding 
of the concept of ‘community cohesion’, and to develop a set of indicators based on 
both the experience of residents in the targeted community and the relevant 
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contemporary academic literature, the researchers utilised the following methods: 
documentary searches to review the current literature; administering questionnaires 
to residents; conducting focus groups with residents; and conducting interviews 
with key service providers. 
 
A convergent approach was utilised in relation to the research process (Dick 2006). 
This process began with asking an open-ended question that had been decided 
previously to generate initial discussion. In all methods of data gathering, this 
initial question was: What do you think makes a community good to live in? This 
allowed respondents to answer spontaneously without any kind of prior cue. A list 
of probing questions was also developed so that further information could be 
obtained and clarified. Focus groups and interviews were then conducted, building 
on the earlier consultations, after the researchers had identified and reviewed key 
areas that needed further clarification and discussion. The results of the initial 
research provided insights about the central concerns of respondents, which further 
assisted with the direction of subsequent focus groups and interviews.  
 
Sampling and data gathering  
Non-probability convenience sampling was utilised to access participants for the 
research (Neuman 2000). Sampling took place in three ways. For the questionnaire, 
the researchers on three occasions and at different times of day attended a local 
shopping centre that could be reasonably expected to be frequented by most 
residents, and invited shoppers who were residents over the age of 18 to complete 
the questionnaires. The researchers were assisted by two Indigenous trainee staff 
members of the relevant local council. The trainees were part of the targeted 
community and their presence was designed to ensure indigenous people were 
included in the research. Ethical clearance for the trainees to assist was sought and 
given. Potential participants for the focus groups were recruited by informing the 
leaders of established community groups, representing a range of ages and 
interests, about the project. Participants for the interviews with service providers 
were identified through contact by the local council’s community services team.  
 
Data was collected from December 2006 to February 2007. The study sample 
covered a broad cross-section of the population and included representatives from 
seniors and retired people, families raising children and teenagers, community 
organisations and clubs, and indigenous people. Specific groups are not named in 
order to ensure confidentiality. Other measures central to ethical research included 
giving a clear explanation of the research, ensuring negotiated access, and 
respecting human dignity and privacy (Mauthner 1998).  
 
Questionnaires were used as they can easily be administered to a cross section of 
the community (Bryman 2004; Dick 2006). The questionnaires were presented 
face-to-face in a structured manner, thus ensuring that each respondent was asked 
the same questions in the same order. This is important because it ensures 
consistency (Bryman 2004). The questionnaires took around 15 minutes to 
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complete. In all, 52 questionnaires were completed. A copy of the questionnaire is 
included as Appendix 1.  
 
Focus groups were similarly selected for their usefulness in research exploring the 
experiences of a particular group or community, as they provide insights into 
specific areas and are an effective method of gaining a deep understanding of a 
situation relatively quickly (Neuman 2000). Numbers participating in the focus 
groups varied between 5 and 14, with a total of three focus groups held and 29 
participants in all. The focus groups included a diverse sample of the target 
population. The groups were guided by a schedule (see Appendix 2). Answers were 
recorded on audiotape and notes taken to ensure accuracy (Puchta and Potter 2004). 
Each focus group ran for around one hour. 
 
Three in-depth interviews were conducted with key service providers who have 
intimate knowledge of the targeted community. The in-depth interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and guided by a schedule. They each took no longer than 
one hour to complete. The interviews were taped and then transcribed verbatim to 
provide an accurate account of each interview (Minichiello et al. 1996). Consistent 
with approved methods of handling qualitative data (Ashton-Shaeffer 2001; Rubin 
and Rubin 1995), transcripts from the interviews and focus groups, along with the 
responses to the questionnaires, were analysed and coded with key themes 
identified. 
 
This was a small study, covering just one part of a local government area. The 
sample size was also relatively small and not strictly representative. Further 
research needs to be conducted across a range of localities and local government 
areas to take forward the findings of this study and develop robust indicators of 
community cohesion. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches should be 
applied.  
 
4. Findings: Key Themes and Indicators 
We identified four main themes woven through all types of data collected. These 
themes subsequently became the key indicators of community cohesion. They are: 
a sense of belonging; engagement; perception of safety; and access. The research 
further identified the conditions that are necessary in order for community cohesion 
to exist. These are reflected in the figure below. It can be seen that the necessary 
conditions feed into more than one indicator, whilst the indicators themselves are 
related to each other. Further research is needed to develop ways of measuring each 
indicator, perhaps using some of the questions from our questionnaire as a starting 
point. 
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While the study is primarily qualitative in nature, descriptive statistics can be 
applied to the questionnaire results, as summarised below.  
 
• 40% of respondents had no family members living close by, 21% had only 
one family member nearby, and 40% had two or more relatives nearby  
• Nearly 82% answered that they had friends living in the local area 
• Almost 50% of respondents spoke with their neighbours frequently, while 
only 5% had almost no contact. Yet all felt they could ask their neighbours 
for help if they needed to 
• 94% of respondents were aware of the services that are available in the 
local area. 
• About half belonged to groups or clubs, and about half had attended a 
community event 
• Approximately one third of respondents undertook voluntary work 
• 86% stated that they felt like they are a part of the community.  
 
The discussion which follows is organized according to the four themes, which are 
analysed in further detail and related to the literature. Some of the conditions 
necessary for community cohesion contribute to more than one indicator, and this 
overlap needs to be borne in mind. We attempt to flag where this occurs without 
repeating previous discussion. However, we begin our discussion with defining the 
concept of community cohesion as identified through participants’ responses across 
all three research methods.
 
 
Defining community cohesion 
As noted, all participants in each method were asked the same initial question: 
What do you think makes a community good to live in? Answers included: 
 
• A sense of belonging, a sense of community 
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• Good services – including shops, schools, sports fields and parks  
• Community centres/activities centres/meeting places, gatherings of people 
• Supportive neighbours, knowing people 
• Perception of safety 
• Acceptance of, and respect for, people from diverse backgrounds 
• Engaging with others in the community (both formally and informally) 
• Common goals, mutual respect 
• A sense of pride in the community 
• Help and community support that is available in times of need. 
 
It can be seen that these answers align closely with the literature discussed earlier. 
Therefore, common understandings of community cohesion appeared to reflect and 
confirm earlier research and could be translated into indicators. These are listed in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  List of indicators 
 
A sense of belonging - indicated by: 
• Neighbourliness 
o High level of interaction with neighbours, friends and family 
o An ethic of care (offering support and help) 
o Mutual respect: observing boundaries, acceptance of diversity, community 
consultation 
• Ownership 
• Sense of pride 
 
Community engagement - indicated by: 
• Volunteering 
• Use of services 
• Attendance at community events 
 
A perception of safety – indicated by: 
• Low official crime rate 
• Residents’ expression of feeling safe 
 
Access to resources – indicated by: 
• Adequate service provision 
• Built environment that promotes ease of physical mobility 
• Provision for socially disadvantaged residents 
 
 
A sense of belonging 
The feeling of having a sense of belonging was a very important factor identified in 
relation to what makes a community good to live in. Nearly all respondents 
expressed some level of a sense of belonging to at least some part of the 
community in which they live. One of the influencing factors of a sense of 
belonging as noted in this study, and confirmed in other research into people’s 
attachment to community, is the level of integration and involvement in the local 
area (Cuba and Hummon 1993; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Soloman 
and Steinitz 1986). For example, Cuba and Hummon (1993) note that local social 
involvements, particularly those with friends and neighbours, but also those that 
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involve family, membership of organisations and local shopping facilities and 
services, are evident as being the most consistent and significant sources of ties to a 
community. Many of these factors are discussed further in relation to community 
connection and engagement. The data from our research confirms this, revealing 
three primary factors as contributing to a sense of belonging. They are (in order of 
importance): neighbourliness (including the presence of family and friends), 
ownership, and a sense of pride.  
 
Neighbourliness 
Residents overwhelmingly cited neighbours and neighbourliness as the foundation 
of a strong community. This was perhaps the most striking aspect of the research. 
We saw that most respondents to the questionnaire had some interaction with their 
immediate neighbours and most could ask for some kind of help: ‘helping in times 
of trouble’ arose a significant number of times in the data. The research showed 
neighbourliness as comprising three aspects: interaction, a sense of care (offering 
support and help), and an ethic of mutual respect, which includes an acceptance of 
diversity. 
 
Interaction can occur in formal settings, as when a person is a member of a club or 
committee, or it can occur informally, as in contact with family, friends and 
neighbours. Such contacts can range from simple greetings to more complex 
interactions and have been cited in the literature as important to community 
cohesion (Cuba and Hummon 1993; Putnam 1998). Nearly all participants knew 
their neighbours and most had some kind of interaction with them. Furthermore, 
the vast majority of respondents had friends living nearby, whilst over half had at 
least one family member living nearby. The fact that many participants believed 
they could ask their neighbours for help points to the caring aspect of 
neighbourliness. Keeping an eye on neighbours’ houses whilst they were away, 
minding children, making loans of equipment and assisting in emergencies are 
demonstrations of a sense of care, and these are practices that also occur between 
friends and family members. 
 
However, interaction and care are not sufficient by themselves to maintain good 
relations between neighbours, family or friends. If there is an absence of mutual 
respect, relations may suffer. Respect is shown by observing certain boundaries, for 
example, in standards of civility and public behaviour. Negative incidents of 
vandalism, petty crime and violence were reported during the course of the 
research. It appears that in some parts of the community where we conducted our 
research, it is common for fences to be broken to gain access to another street. This 
may have something to do with the way public spaces are physically organized (see 
Access indicator), but it also constitutes a transgression of physical boundaries. 
There is also a symbolic transgression of boundaries in instances of rudeness, and it 
is self-evident that without mutual respect, a sense of belonging cannot flourish. 
 
Respect is also manifested in an acceptance of diversity. The degree of diversity 
within the targeted locality was noted by participants in all research methods and 
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was seen by some residents as having a negative impact on the cohesiveness of the 
community. Many participants identified the diversity of socio-economic status 
within the area, noting as one resident did: “You have the wealthy and the 
disadvantaged living here which can cause problems.” Another participant also 
spoke about disadvantage observing: “the obvious social disadvantage of some 
members of the community.” The UK LGA (2003) concluded that the more socio-
economically diverse a community, the more likely it is to experience inter-
community and inter-neighbourhood tension. Some reasons for this may be 
attitudinal, as in a lack of acceptance of difference, or there may be a lack of 
opportunity for integrating diverse groups. For example, diversity in relation to age 
groups was identified as an issue for some residents. One older resident mentioned 
being isolated within their immediate community, which comprises only older 
people. This means that people of diverse ages have limited opportunity and 
occasion to interact. Another resident was similarly concerned about prospects for 
interaction between different age groups, and also brought up the issue of cost, 
asserting: “We need to initiate contact between the kids and older residents – in the 
schools too. Have Grandma and Grandpa Days where the elderly come and visit 
the kids in school…and it doesn’t cost money.”  
 
Diversity between generations can also impact on perceptions of safety. For 
example, some older people feel threatened by “groups of young people who can 
be quite destructive at times.” This can limit older people’s level of having a sense 
of belonging because they can be fearful about engaging in activities within their 
community (Kawachi and Kennedy 1997). Kawachi and Kennedy (1997) argue 
that social ties and trust within the community are weakened through social 
exclusion and disadvantage, which can become one factor in committing crime. 
This concern is addressed further in the discussion related to perception of safety 
with the community. However, at this point we have attempted to establish that 
intolerance as shown by a lack of acceptance of diversity is a form of disrespect 
which mitigates against neighbourliness. 
  
Ownership and pride 
A sense of ownership emerged as crucial to sense of belonging to a given 
community. This was cited by many of the participants as being a key factor in 
promoting community cohesion: “The community needs to have a sense of 
ownership.” 
 
One service provider pointed out that for that section of the population who live in 
public housing, there is little choice in where they live and very little chance of 
ever acquiring their own homes. Ownership gives one a stake in a locality and 
provides a motivation for establishing good relationships (Bridge et al. 2003). The 
research showed that a sense of ownership is not necessarily contingent upon 
private property rights, but can also be fostered by having a choice about where one 
lives, and by being consulted about issues that directly affect residents. Members in 
each of the focus groups commented on the need for the local council to involve 
residents more in decision-making.  By being consulted, people are given a sense 
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of ownership of a project and in turn feel pride in what they have accomplished. 
This pride then flows over into the community. 
 
Indeed, a feeling of pride was named by respondents in all research methods as part 
of what defines a good community. Pride can only be felt in relation to something 
one feels a part of, and therefore it is an important ingredient of a sense of 
belonging. An example of how ownership and pride can enhance community 
cohesion was found at one of the sporting clubs, where young people were 
involved in the refurbishing and painting of the toilet facilities, which had been 
consistently vandalized for a long period. One participant said: “They painted it all 
up – put a mural on it and it hasn’t been touched since. It’s given them a sense of 
ownership.” 
 
Community engagement 
We found that most participants cited involvement in community life as essential to 
community cohesion. Engagement can include three distinct factors: volunteering, 
using services and attending events. We found that volunteering was most 
commonly seen as promoting social bonds through service and membership of 
groups such as clubs. Although not all residents who participated in this study were 
involved formally in clubs and groups, they were engaged in the community in 
informal ways. This is particularly evident in the responses to the questionnaires, 
which asked whether residents know their neighbours. The majority not only knew 
their neighbours, they also had close and frequent contact with at least one of them. 
This data would therefore signify that even if residents were not members of a 
formal sporting club or group (about half were), or not involved in official 
voluntary work (around one third volunteer in an official capacity), they are still 
connected to, and involved in supporting their community at an informal level. 
This aligns well with the literature.  For instance, Putnam (1998) distinguishes 
between formal and informal social networks with formal ties including those with 
voluntary organisations and informal ones being those of family, friends and 
neighbours. These informal networks can be identified and measured by how often 
friends and neighbours are visited, as well as through belonging and participating 
in groups and clubs (Baum et al. 2000).  
 
Volunteering 
As noted above, many residents do engage in formal activities such as volunteering 
which can contribute to engagement with one’s community. One resident pointed 
out: “People who contribute to their community through volunteering tend to be the 
ones who are most engaged.” As noted by ABS (2002, p.13): “volunteering may be 
seen as an expression of reciprocity or potentially as a direct outcome of social 
capital. The act of volunteering demonstrates a balance between individuals’ self 
interest and public interest.” Volunteering can also assist in breaking down barriers 
between diverse groups within a community, which in turn can contribute to 
community cohesion in terms of belonging and mutual respect. One resident 
identified this issue when explaining why they like to volunteer: “You get to meet a 
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cross section of the community.” Indeed, in this study volunteering was seen as a 
key determinant in indicating a strong community. For example, one participant 
pointed out: “Maybe that’s actually a barometer of how healthy the community is 
or how it engages – in how people feel about giving up their time to volunteer.” 
Another said: “When people volunteer they often find out that it’s a good way to 
engage – through their kids – and they get to know more about their community.”  
 
Some participants had concerns about the concept of volunteerism with one noting: 
“I don’t think that volunteerism should take the place of a paid position”; further 
commenting that: “volunteers need to be well supported.” This signals an element 
of cynicism in the community. Some participants are aware that the discourse of 
community cohesion can be used by central governments to legitimise cost cutting 
in the name of handing back control to the grass roots level. 
 
Use of services and attendance at community events 
The uptake of services and attendance at community events feeds into both 
belonging and engagement by providing residents with opportunities to come 
together, interact and participate. The shopping centres were the most widely used 
service, but other services that were significant included health services 
(community health, early childhood, dental and medical services), sporting 
facilities, clubs, parks, schools, the library, walking paths and transport. Services 
which were not available but identified as needed were a youth centre, a swimming 
pool, better transport, policing, meeting places and services for young children.  
 
Half of the respondents to the questionnaire had attended a community event in the 
last year. The events cited were a community BBQ, a residents’ Christmas party, 
sports events and events for seniors. Those who did not attend gave reasons such as 
being too busy, being unaware of the event, or that the event was not relevant to 
their interests or age group. It would thus seem that a range of well-publicised 
events that appeal to the various social groups could help to promote engagement.  
 
Perception of Safety 
Importantly, the research confirmed that having a level of community connection 
was a major factor in of perceptions of safety (Haigh 2006).   
 
Residents’ sense of feeling safe 
For the older residents in this study, especially, a sense of safety was of particular 
significance. Some older people spoke about not feeling safe in their homes, with 
several telling of their experiences of intruders and incidents of burglaries and 
theft. One older resident believed that: “Thieving and vandalism are the biggest 
problems in our community.” Another older resident asserted: “Whatever’s not 
bolted to the ground gets stolen.” 
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However, it was not only older residents who were concerned with safety. This was 
a key issue identified in all of the focus groups and raised by many of the residents 
in the questionnaires, as well as in the in-depth interviews. For example, one 
resident in a focus group said: “I wouldn’t go out walking after dark.” This 
comment led to all-round agreement from the other participants: “Yes, safety of a 
night is an issue.” More lighting was one solution identified as being needed to 
help address issues of safety.  
 
If people do not feel safe in their home, this has consequences on a larger scale. For 
example, this can impact on the level of a person’s engagement with their 
community because, as explained by one participant: “If you’re sitting in your 
house and you’re really fearful it’s unlikely that you’re going to engage with the 
community.” Another participant explained the connection between their 
immediate living environment and the wider community this way: “Some people 
are fearful about where they are living and that impacts upon their perceptions of 
the community.”  
  
Crime rates 
It seems clear that a low rate of crime might be a partial measure of a sense of 
safety. Many residents were concerned that crime was on the increase, with some 
suggesting ways to address crime. These focused chiefly on a greater police 
presence in the area. Apart from official policing, suggestions included installing 
security cameras in key areas such as shopping centres and sporting clubs, or 
community-based projects such as Neighbourhood Watch. This is consistent with 
other research into crime reduction within communities. For example, according to 
Graycar (1999) two key features of crime prevention are: involving community 
members in projects and committees (engagement), and the creation of 
opportunities to enable all members to live, work and socialise – to participate – 
without feeling threatened or being harassed (mutual respect). 
 
Access to Resources 
Community connection not only needs to include reducing perceptions of fear of 
crime through community involvement, but also overcoming the isolation of some 
individuals. To this end, accessible neighbourhoods and communities have been 
identified as important for a cohesive community (Haigh 2006). In this project, 
residents identified access as being of key importance, particularly in relation to the 
provision of services, but also in terms of having the material means to access these 
services.   
 
Provision of services 
Most residents are aware of services that are currently available in the targeted 
community. However, as noted by some participants, accessing these services can 
be problematic if they do not have their own transport, especially at night and on 
weekends. One participant said: “I think there’s enough in the way of services, but 
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accessibility is another story. There’s not enough buses for one thing.”  This in turn 
impacts on people’s sense of engagement within the community and can add to 
feelings of isolation. Transport impacts on people’s quality of life by allowing 
people to access employment and education opportunities, services, recreational 
facilities and other social networks (Haigh 2006). For example, one participant 
noted: “Transport is a big issue. A lot of people have a feeling of being stuck and 
confined.” This has particular relevance to certain groups such as young people, 
older people and socially disadvantaged people, many of whom are without private 
transport.  
 
Built environment 
Other issues can also impact on people’s ability to access services and activities in 
the community. For example, good footpaths were identified in relation to access to 
parks, services and facilities. This was seen as being important especially for 
parents of young children using prams and strollers, and for older residents. One 
resident suggested a bicycle path would be “useful for all ages.”  
 
The built environment is also relevant to issues of respect for boundaries and safety 
(Haigh 2006). One example raised in the research was the design of housing 
estates. In this study, residents identified one particular area where the ‘poor 
design’ was seen as leading to “the attitude where some people would just walk 
through other people’s places when they feel like it to get somewhere and it’s 
contributed to people feeling unsafe.” A participant explained: “People have to 
walk through backyards to get to another property and they were taking fence posts 
out. And that was leading to major vandalism and crime issues for people who 
lived in an adjoining street.” Another participant spoke about “pulling palings from 
fences” when talking about problems with people walking through property as a 
short cut.  This has led to a feeling of being unsafe: “You have to keep the doors 
and windows locked because people just walk through.”    
 
Issues that relate to the built environment can thus draw together concerns in 
relation to access, mobility, respect for boundaries and perceptions of safety within 
a community. The design of the built environment can also add to people feeling 
closed in and isolated from other members of the community. As one resident 
explained: “There’s only one road in and out…[and] to some extent it’s felt that 
because there’s only one way in that it’s sort of closed in.”  
  
Green space was another aspect of the built environment that was considered 
important for a cohesive community, with design being identified as central. As 
one participant said: “…it has to be ‘good’ green space.”  One specific local park 
was identified as being well used. A resident commented: “I think one of the things 
that is used well in the community is the Park.” Another said: “The Park is a 
meeting place. My teenagers walk up there to play basketball and they’re always 
safe.” Once again the recognition of the importance of meeting places to a 
community in fostering a sense of belonging is evident. It is clear that much 
informal engagement is taking place within the community’s green spaces. 
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Social disadvantage and access 
People in receipt of lower than average median weekly household incomes said 
that participation in some activities was problematic. For example, one resident 
noted: “With sport it can cost between $65 and $150 to join up and then there’s all 
the equipment and some people can’t afford it.” Issues of social inequality 
concerned residents. This was particularly evident when discussing costs of 
accessing activities and services. Another resident when commenting on the cost of 
participating in sport and other activities said: “We need free things to do – free 
things are important.” More broadly, the following comment tied socio-economic 
diversity to ‘free things’: “Free things to do goes back to the broad difference of the 
socio-economic difference of people living here. The ones that use the free 
facilities are the ones that can’t afford to have their own pool, for instance. Or the 
ones that can’t go down town because they don’t have transport.”.  
 
One resident, when speaking about social disadvantage, identified the lack of 
choice that some residents face: “Some people have made the choice to live here 
but there are those who don’t have a choice. A lot of people who are socially 
disadvantaged haven’t got the choices - they didn’t choose to live here. So we need 
to provide financial assistance so they can participate in sport and these sorts of 
things.”  
 
Clearly, accessibility of services in terms of cost and choice is particularly 
important for socio-economically disadvantaged people. Being able to take part in 
activities can impact on the level of community involvement (or engagement) in 
general, which in turn has been identified as key to sense of belonging (Byrne 
1999).  
 
5. Conclusions 
The indicators of community cohesion that we identified highlight a number of 
factors, namely, neighbourliness, the provision of services, and a good physical 
environment, and these are deeply interdependent. For example, access is important 
in its own right, but it also contributes to a perception of safety (particularly in 
terms of the built environment and urban design) and assists in promoting 
engagement. This is an area that needs further research to elicit the specific links 
between access factors and cohesion. A sense of belonging has a reciprocal 
relationship with engagement: engagement helps to foster a sense of belonging, 
whilst belonging motivates engagement behaviours. These findings were broadly 
consistent with the established literature on community cohesion, which lends a 
dimension of validity to the research. Local government authorities and service 
providers are doubtless already aware of many of these issues. However, there is a 
need to formalise and conceptually map the relationships between the various 
elements which together comprise social cohesion. This, it is hoped, will assist 
such bodies in the design and implementation of policies and initiatives which can 
strengthen the ‘social glue’ that binds potentially fragile communities together.  
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We have seen that there are both formal and informal elements that make for social 
cohesion. Though local councils and services providers can address the more 
formal components, they cannot control informal social processes. This is 
particularly relevant to the indicator of neighbourliness. There is, for example, a 
degree of randomness in who becomes one’s neighbours – mostly they cannot be 
chosen. The way that such relationships are formed and the manner in which they 
develop is informal and organic in nature, and therefore largely beyond the 
influence of other parties.  
 
The most significant finding was that participants overwhelmingly named 
neighbourliness as the most important aspect of a strong community. Yet, whilst it 
is central, neighbourliness does not mean excessive familiarity or the taking of 
liberties. A key part of neighbourliness involves respecting each other’s boundaries 
and this includes a respect for diversity. The promotion of an environment 
conducive to achieving this sort of balance must be the primary object of strategies 
aimed at promoting community cohesion.  
 
Acknowledgements 
We wish to express our grateful thanks and appreciation to our reviewers who gave 
invaluable feedback and suggestions which strengthened this paper.  
 
References 
ABS [Australian Bureau of Statistics], 2001. Census of Population and Housing, Census 
Data, Canberra. 
ABS [Australian Bureau of Statistics], 2002. Social Capital and Social Wellbeing, 
Discussion Paper, August.  
ABS [Australian Bureau of Statistics], 2004. Measuring Social Capital, Canberra, Cat. No. 
1378.0. 
AHNRC [Affordable Housing National Research Consortium], 2001. Affordable Housing 
in Australia: Pressing Need, Effective Solution, Working Paper, pp.1-38. 
Arthurson, K. and K. Jacobs, 2003. Social Exclusion and Housing, Final Report, AHURI 
[Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute], pp. 1-32. 
Ashton-Shaeffer, C. 2001. ‘Thematic Networks: An analytic Tool for Qualitative 
Research’, Qualitative Research, vol. 1(3), pp. 385-405. 
Baum, F., Palmer, C., Modra, C., Murray, C. and R. Bush, 2000. ‘Families, Social Capital 
and Health’, in I. Winter (ed.), Social Capital and Public Policy in Australia, 
Australian Institute of Family Studies, Melbourne, pp. 250-275. 
Berger-Schmitt, R. 2000. Social Cohesion as an Aspect of the Quality of Societies, 
EuReporting Working Paper No. 14, Centre for Survey Research and Methodology, 
Mannheim. 
Bilton, T., Bonnett, K., Jones, P., Skinner, D., Stanworth, M. and A. Webster, 1997. 
Introductory Sociology, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills. 
Bourdieu, P. and L. Wacquant, 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
HOLDSWORTH & HARTMAN: 
Indicators of Community Cohesion  
in an Australian Country Town 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 94 
 
Bridge, C., Flatau, P., Whelan, S., Wood, G. and J. Yates, 2003. Housing Assistance and 
Non-Shelter Outcomes, Final Report, AHURI [Australian Housing and Urban Research 
Institute], pp. 1-184. 
Bryman, A. 2004. Social Research Methods, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Bullen, P. and J. Onyx, 1998. Measuring Social Capital in Five Communities in NSW, 
CACOM, University of Sydney. 
Burke, T. and K. Hulse, 2002. Sole Parents, Social Wellbeing and Housing Assistance, 
Final Report, AHURI [Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute], pp. 1-45. 
Byrne, D.S. 1999. Social Exclusion, Open Press University, Philadelphia.  
Cabinet Office Third Sector, 2008. Public Service Agreement Framework, viewed 24 
October 2008, 
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/third_sector/Partnership_working/public_service 
.aspx>. 
Camden Council, 2006. Sustainability Indicators, Camden, NSW. 
Coleman, J. 1988. ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’, American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 94, pp. 95-120. 
Coutts, A., Pinto, P.R., Cave, B. and I. Kawachi, 2007. Social Capital Indicators in the UK, 
Commission for Racial Equality, London. 
Cox, E. 1995. A Truly Civil Society, 1995 Boyer Lectures, Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, Sydney. 
Cuba, L. and D. Hummon, 1993. ‘A Place to Call Home: Identification with Dwelling, 
Community and Region’, The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 34(1), pp. 111-131. 
Dick, B. 2006. Action Research Resources: Community Consultation, University of 
Queensland. 
Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Graycar, A. 1999. ‘Crime and Social Capital’, 19th Biennial International Conference on 
Preventing Crime, Melbourne. 
Haigh, Y. 2006. Promoting Safer Communities through Physical Design, Social Inclusion 
and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design: A Developmental Study, Centre 
for Social and Community Research, Perth. 
Haraway, D.J. 1991. ‘Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the 
privilege of partial perspective’, in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: the Reinvention of 
Nature, Routledge, New York. 
Harkness, J. and S. Newman, 2003. ‘Effects of Home Ownership on Children: The Role of 
Neighbourhood Characteristics and Family Income’, Economic Policy Review, vol. 
9(2), pp. 87-107. 
Hawtin, M. and J. Kettle, 2000 ‘Housing and Social Exclusion’, in J. Percy-Smith (ed.), 
Policy Responses to Social Exclusion: Towards Inclusion?, Open University Press, 
Buckingham. 
Hirschfield, A. and K. Bowers, 1997. ‘The Effect of Social Cohesion on Levels of 
Recorded Crime in Disadvantaged Areas’, Urban Studies, vol. 34(8), pp. 1275-1295. 
Home Office Community Cohesion Unit, 2003. Building a Picture of Community Cohesion, 
London. 
Hunt, E. and D. Colander, 1996. Social Science: An Introduction to the Study of Society, 9th 
edn., Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
HOLDSWORTH & HARTMAN: 
Indicators of Community Cohesion  
in an Australian Country Town 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 95 
 
Kawachi, I. and B. Kennedy, 1997. ‘Health and Social Cohesion: Why Care about Income 
Inequality?’, British Medical Journal, vol. 314, pp. 1037-1040. 
Marrickville Council, 2004. Belonging in Marrickville, Marrickville, NSW. 
Marsh, A. 2004. ‘Housing and the Social Exclusion Agenda in England’, Australian 
Journal of Social Issues, vol. 39(1), pp. 7-22. 
Mauthner, M. 1998. ‘Bringing Silent Voices into a Public Discourse: Researching Accounts 
of Sister Relationships’, in J. Ribbens and R. Edwards (eds), Feminist Dilemmas in 
Qualitative Research: Public Knowledge and Private Lives, Sage Publications, 
London. 
Minichiello, V., Aroni, R., Timewell, E. and L. Alexander, 1996. In-depth Interviewing, 
Macmillan, Melbourne. 
Neuman, W. 2000. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 3rd 
edn., Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
Nevile, A. 2003. State of the Family 2003, Anglicare Discussion Paper, pp.1-54. 
Puchta, C. and J. Potter, 2004. Focus Group Practice, Sage Publications, London. 
Putnam, R. 1998. ‘Foreword’, in Housing Policy Debate, vol. 9(1), pp. v-viii. 
Putnam, R. 2000. Bowling Alone, Simon and Schuster, New York. 
Rubin, H. and I. Rubin, 1995. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.  
Sampson, R., Raudenbush, S. and F. Earls, 1997. ‘Neighbourhoods and Violent Crime: A 
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy’, Science, vol. 277, pp. 918-923. 
Solomon, E. and V. Steinitz, 1986. Starting Out: Class and Community in the Lives of 
Working-class Youth, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. 
Stone, W. and J. Hughes, 2002a. ‘Understanding Community Strengths’, Family Matters, 
vol. 61, pp. 62-68. 
Stone, W. and J. Hughes, 2002b. Social Capital: Empirical Meaning and Measurement 
Validity, Research Paper No. 27, Australian Institute of Family Studies, pp. 1-70. 
Strategic Policy and Research Unit, 2004. Indicators of Community Strength in Victoria, 
Department for Victorian Services.  
UKLGA [United Kingdom Local Government Association], 2003. Guidance on 
Community Cohesion for Local Authorities. 
Vinson, T. 2004. Unequal in Life, Jesuit Social Services, Richmond, Victoria. 
Waters, A. 2001. Do Housing Conditions Impact on Health Inequalities Between 
Australia’s Rich and Poor?, Final Report, AHURI [Australian Housing and Urban 
Research Institute]. 
Wiseman, J., Langworthy, A., Salvaris, M., Heine, W., McLean, N. and J. Pyke, 2006. 
Measuring Wellbeing, Engaging Communities, Institute of Community Engagement 
and Policy Alternatives (ICEPA), Victoria University, the VicHealth Centre for the 
Promotion of Mental Health and Social Well Being, School of Population Health, 
University of Melbourne and the Centre for Regional Development, Swinburne 
University of Technology. 
 
HOLDSWORTH & HARTMAN: 
Indicators of Community Cohesion  
in an Australian Country Town 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 96 
 
Appendix 1 
Community Cohesion Questionnaire 
1) What do you think makes a community good to live in?  
 
2) What sorts of things make you feel safe in your community?  
 
3) How many of your family members not living with you live in (this 
suburb)? 
 
4) Do many of your friends live in (this suburb)?  
 
5) Do you know your neighbours        
5a) If yes, how often would you talk to your neighbours?  
 
6) Can you ask your neighbours for help?  
6a) If yes, what kind of help?  
6b) If not, why not?  
 
7) Do you know what services are available in (this suburb)?  
eg: education; transport; facilities such as parks, playing fields, meeting 
places; health services such as baby health centres; shops; support services 
such as community visiting schemes etc.  
 
8) Which services do you use? 
8a) What services do you think are most needed in (this suburb)?  
 
9) Do you belong to any community groups or clubs?    
9a) If yes, which ones? 
 
10) Have you attended a community event in (this suburb) in the last year?  
10a) If yes, which ones?  
 10 b) If not, why not?  
 
11) Do you do any voluntary work in (this suburb)?  
11a) If yes, what kind?  
 
12) Do you feel like you are a part of the community?  
12a) Why?  
12b) Why not? 
 
13) How long have you lived in (this suburb)?    
      
14) How many people live in your household? 
 
15) Any other comments? 
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Appendix 2 
Interview Guide (Focus groups and in-depth interviews) 
• What do you think the word ‘community’ means?  
 
• What do you think makes a community good to live in? 
 
• How important is a sense of safety to community cohesion? 
 
• How important is the built environment? 
 
• What do you think makes a community feel like home? 
 
• How important do you think services and programmes are in fostering a 
sense of community cohesion? Why? 
 
• What services do you think are most needed in (this suburb)? 
 
• How important do you think membership of community groups or clubs is 
to community cohesion? 
 
• How important do you think voluntary work to a sense of community 
cohesion? 
 
• Any other comments? 
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1. Introduction
This paper provides an overview of the efforts of successive Zambian governments 
to transform and institutionalise democratic local governance, and to come to grips 
with the socio-economic development challenges facing the country. It assesses the 
progress and challenges that governments are facing in their efforts to transform 
local government into democratic, developmental local governance. 
 
Local governance reform has been transforming the structure of governance in 
Zambia. Since the country attained political independence from Britain in 1964, a 
commitment to decentralisation and popular participation has been an important 
component of local governance reform strategies. The problem that confronted the 
government at independence was one of transforming the inherited provincial and 
district government structures into a dynamic local governance framework that 
could facilitate sustainable public participation in the socio-economic development 
strategies envisaged by the new regime. The officially stated policy has been one of 
“taking power to the people” (Zambia, 1972:33), and a critical objective of the 
local governance reforms has been to strengthen local authorities by the 
decentralisation of power. Consequently, over the years governments have sought 
to design and implement decentralised democratic local governance to facilitate 
wider participation by the citizenry and facilitate effective service delivery. 
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2. Local Governance Reforms 
This section provides an overview of the reforms implemented in four phases 
between 1964 and 2008. 
 
Phase I: 1964-1970 
The initial phase entailed the new government’s attempts to establish political 
control and transform the inherited provincial and district government structures 
into cohesive, dynamic organisations of local development management, which 
could facilitate sustainable socio-economic development (Chikulo, 1981, 1985a). 
 
 
On gaining independence in October 1964, Zambia inherited a dual system of 
administration. This comprised central government field administration and elected 
local government. Zambia was divided into eight provinces consisting of 44 
districts. At the sub-district level there were Native Authorities in the rural areas. 
1965 saw the abolition of Native Authorities, which were viewed as symbols of 
colonial repression and manipulation, and the introduction of new local 
governments under the Local Government Act (No.30) of 1965. Under this Act, 67 
local authorities were established: 24 were urban authorities, and 43 were rural 
councils. The Act gave local authorities wide-ranging powers to discharge over 
sixty functions in their areas of jurisdiction. 
 
In November 1968, the government announced reforms which entailed 
‘decentralization in centralism’. As the then President Kaunda (1968:19) 
elaborated: 
 
“I define this decentralization in centralism as a measure whereby through the 
Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize most of your Party and 
Government activities. While retaining effective control of the party and 
Government machinery at the centre in the interests of unity.” 
 
At the district level, these reforms involved the appointment of a District Governor 
(DG) to head each of the 53 districts. The DG became the politico-administrative 
head of the district. He was the personal representative – alter ego – of the 
President, and performed this role through the various committees he chaired in the 
district. Thus during this phase the government sought to institute political control 
over field administration, hence the emphasis on cohesion and the need to build a 
centralized polity (Chikulo, 1981). 
 
Phase II: 1971-1979 
The second phase involved efforts by the government to create a network of 
‘grassroots participatory’ structures between the local authorities and the sub-
district level in order to facilitate public participation (Zambia, 1971). The abolition 
of Native Authorities had created an institutional gap between the local authorities 
and the sub-district level. In order to plug this gap village productivity committees, 
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ward councils and ward development committees were established under the 
Village Registration and Development Act (No. 30) of 1971. This made the village 
the primary focus at district level. Under the provisions of the Act, a village 
productivity committee (VPC) was established in each village, sitting under the 
chairmanship of the village headman. The VPC was responsible for considering the 
administrative and development needs of the community and sending 
representatives to the ward development committees (WDCs). A WDC was 
established in every local government ward – a ward being an area within a local 
authority from which a councillor is elected under the provisions of the 1965 Local 
Government Act. The functions of WDCs were to consider development needs, get 
ideas from VPCs, and pass these on to the local authority. This network of 
committees was supposed to provide the basis for decentralized local governance. 
 
Phase III:  1980-1990 
On 13th December 1972 Zambia was formally proclaimed a ‘One-Party 
Participatory Democracy’, thereby granting the ruling party constitutional 
paramountcy over the entire state administrative apparatus. As then President 
Kaunda (1973) aptly put it:  
 
“The Party is supreme in our One-Party Participatory Democracy. It is the source 
of national policy. The Party will not only be interested in working out broad 
policies and objectives, it will be directly involved in the planning, organization, 
control and management of the entire administrative machinery of our nation”. 
 
This phase witnessed increased politicisation and the imposition of the supremacy 
of the party over local governance (Chikulo, 1985b, 1989). Consequently, the 
central and local government administration was merged with the ruling party 
(UNIP) structures, to create an integrated district administration, under the 1980 
Local Administration Act (No.15). The major objective of the 1980 Act was to 
“…ensure the effective integration of the primary organs of the party and other 
local administration units in the district.”  
 
The most significant structural change entailed in the 1980 Act was the abolition of 
the distinction between party, central and local governments. This involved the 
establishment of an administrative structure composed of party, central and local 
government officials. The stated goal of the reforms was to integrate local 
administrative departments of the central government, local councils, and the party 
structure in order to improve coordination and eliminate duplication among them. 
Consequently, a single integrated politico-administrative structure was created in 
each of the fifty-five districts, to which was assigned the totality of party, central 
and local government activity. A single administrative agency called the district 
council was established in each district under the chairmanship of a centrally-
appointed political appointee – the District Governor. The council was a statutory, 
deliberative, and consultative body, concerned with the determination of broad 
policy objectives and critical assessment of development programmes. 
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The new councils went beyond what Leemans (1970:53) called ‘a single hierarchy 
model’ of government at district level, since they replaced the former tripartite 
local government framework, including the incorporation of the party organization 
into the new structure. As a consequence, the new structure of local government 
not only brought the decision-making process closer to the public at district level, 
but also ensured closer party control over the mechanism of field administration. 
Thus political control was considered crucial for the effective functioning of the 
new system of local administration. 
At the sub-district level, the 1980 reforms were designed to reinvigorate the 
administrative structures by eliminating the duplication of work between party 
committees and local government committees. Consequently, the party 
organizations from constituency to section level were merged with ward 
development committees and village productivity committees into a single set of 
structures vertically integrated with the district council. These performed both the 
functions assigned to the party committees by the UNIP Constitution, and the 
functions assigned by the 1971 Village Registration and Development Act. The 
single hierarchy of committees consisted of ward, branch and section committees. 
Local government elections were abolished and replaced with party elections. Party 
officials elected as ward chairmen, represented the ward on the council. The 1980 
Act increased the representation of local party members and excluded the majority 
of local residents who were not members. As a consequence, democratic local 
governance was undermined at the local level, as the party representatives were not 
elected by universal adult suffrage, yet they were expected to represent and take 
decisions on behalf of local communities. 
 
The system of local governance established by the 1980 reforms was, therefore, 
basically an attempt to create an institutional synthesis between local government, 
central government, and the party. It thus approximated what Coleman and 
Rosberg (1964) called a ‘party-state’, in which, in order to achieve higher levels of 
mobilization for socio-economic development, the distinction between civil servant 
and politician was blurred and the relationship between them transformed. 
 
Phase IV: 1991- 2008 
A clamour for multi-party democracy led to the scrapping of the de jure one-party 
state in December 1990, and the introduction of political pluralism (Chikulo, 
1996). Consequently, the transition to a multi-party system demanded a 
restructuring of local government. Firstly, local government had to be ‘de-linked’ 
from the ruling party; and secondly, measures were introduced to strengthen 
democratic control over administration, and increase its accountability to 
democratically elected bodies. The promulgation in August 1991 of the 
Constitution of Zambia Act (No.1) and the Local Government Act (No.22), ‘de-
linked’ the ruling party from all civil service and state apparatus, repealed the 1980 
Local Administration Act (No.15), and re-introduced the distinction between the 
ruling party, the central government, and local government. 
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In addition, the 1991 Local Government Elections Act (No.26) re-introduced 
universal adult suffrage at the local government level. This democratised local 
government by affording every citizen who is a registered voter an opportunity to 
stand for election, or vote for the candidate of his choice, irrespective of political 
affiliation. The Act provides for the demarcation of the council’s area of 
jurisdiction into wards from which councillors are elected for a five-year term.  
 
3. Current Structure of Local Governance 
The current system of local government in Zambia flows from the fourth phase of 
reforms. The Constitution of Zambia provides for the establishment of a 
democratically elected local government system based on universal suffrage, whilst 
the 1991 Local Government Act provides for a single-tier system of local 
government comprising three types of councils: city, municipal and district. 
  
There are 72 local authorities countrywide:  
 
• 4 are designated as City Councils 
• 12 are Municipal Councils  
• 56 are District Councils (comprised of smaller rural-based local 
authorities). 
 
The composition of councils is as follows: 
 
• All elected councillors in the district 
• All members of parliament in the district 
• Two representatives appointed by all chiefs in the district – as a means of 
involving traditional rulers in local governance.  
 
The 1991 Local Government Act provides for the establishment of a Local 
Government Electoral Commission to administer local government elections. 
Councillors are elected every five years. Initially, this was only three years, but the 
Local Government (Amendment) Act (No.8) of 2004 provided for a change of 
tenure to five years, in order to align it with presidential and parliamentary 
elections.  
 
Councillors elect mayors and deputy mayors every year in the city and municipal 
councils, and chairmen and deputy chairmen in district councils, from amongst 
themselves. Members of parliament and chiefs’ representatives are not eligible for 
these positions. The mayor/chairperson is the political head of the council and 
performs ceremonial functions, but lacks executive powers. The town clerk or 
district secretary is the executive head of the council.  
 
The Local Government Act of 1991 (as amended several times) empowers all 
categories of local authorities to undertake wide-ranging functions. The councils 
are recognised as the primary bodies responsible for development at district level. 
They are the statutory deliberative and consultative bodies concerned with the 
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determination of broad policy objectives and critical assessment of development 
programmes, as well as the efficient and effective management of their areas. 
Consequently, the Act gives sixty-three scheduled functions to the councils, which 
include among others the provision of services such as water supply, sewerage, 
health, feeder and district roads, education and housing. Thus the 1991 Act has 
strengthened the role of councils as focal points for wider participation and 
delivery of social services to the local communities. 
 
With regard to finance, the Act gave councils powers to raise and utilize revenue 
from their own local sources at their discretion. In addition, councils receive 
transfers of funds from central government, which are supposed to be their major 
source of revenue. The transfers are firstly, the means by which the central 
government shares taxes with councils; and secondly, provide a conduit through 
which various grants from sector ministries are disbursed to enable councils to 
undertake delegated functions on their behalf. These grants take various forms 
consisting of general, special and capital grants. Special grants are meant for 
financing projects which are prior-earmarked by central government. Capital grants 
are meant to be used for financing capital projects, while general grants are 
additional financial resources extended to district councils.  
 
4. Key Challenges to Effective Local Governance 
Legal, policy and institutional frameworks have been put in place to establish and 
democratise local governments, with the objective of deepening democracy and 
improving service delivery. However, there are three key challenges affecting the 
effectiveness of local governance (Chikulo, 2000; Zambia, 2002a and b). 
 
Financial Crisis  
Raising sufficient revenue is one of the most intractable problems facing most local 
authorities, and the majority of councils are unable to meet their statutory functions 
and obligations. Although the 1991 Local Government Act has given councils vast 
powers to raise and generate their own revenues, few are able to take advantage of 
this provision due the fact that their resource base is too small to sustain their 
operations. As a result, local authorities have accumulated crushing burdens of debt 
or arrears and are now faced with financial crises (Crook and Manor, 2001). Few 
can stand on their own feet.  
 
In addition, government actions and policies have exacerbated the financial 
problems of councils, which face severe resource constraints due to the following: 
 
• Declining and erratic disbursements of grants from central government 
• Erosion of asset base through various actions and policies of the central 
government such as the 1992 directive to councils to disinvest in 
commercial ventures and sell rental housing stock at uneconomical prices 
• Unfunded mandates – local authorities given increasing responsibilities 
without corresponding capacity in resource mobilization 
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• Redirection of funds intended for local authorities to the control of local 
politicians, for example constituency development funds and youth 
projects funds controlled by MPs, or to semi-autonomous local institutions 
such as the Health and Education Management Boards created to perform 
specific functions on behalf of sector ministries. 
 
This lack of resources has left significant gaps in service delivery capacity and 
placed limitations on the extent of to which stakeholders can participate in 
development management. Without financial sustainability, local authorities are 
unable to effectively provide services to their communities, and their 
developmental capacity and autonomy are thereby undermined.   
 
Lack of Integrated District Development Management and Planning 
There is a lack of holistic, integrated planning and management at district level. 
Effective integrated planning and management is undermined by the absence of an 
effective coordinating mechanism under the direct control of the council. District 
Development Coordination Committees (DDCCs) were established in 1993 as 
forums for planning and implementation of development activities, as well as 
community participation. They are technical committees mandated to coordinate 
development activities in the district and prepare development plans for submission 
to the district council. The DDCC is composed of heads of central government 
departments and other development agencies represented in the district, as well as 
the executives of the district councils. Thus, the majority of the members are 
bureaucrats representing central government departments, and are answerable to 
their parent ministry, not the local authority. The council has no legal 
administrative authority over central government line ministries. The 
deconcentrated sector ministries which provide services within the council’s area 
of jurisdiction, report direct to their parent ministries in the capital city of Lusaka. 
Thus they remain primarily responsible to their ministerial chain of command. The 
DDCC is thus rendered ineffective because it has no legal authority to back up its 
operations, and the council has no control over its operations. 
 
The Extent of Meaningful Citizen Participation in Local Governance 
The major weakness in the current local governance system is the lack of legally 
constituted local government institutions at the local, ward or area level. There is 
no forum for community participation in decision-making on local development 
activities and affairs. Under the 1991 Local Government Act, each council’s area of 
jurisdiction is demarcated into wards. However, these wards at the sub-district level 
are only recognized for purposes of local government elections. As noted earlier, 
under the previous system of local government, a network of village productivity 
committees, ward councils and ward development committees had been established 
to facilitate development and induce participation. These ‘grassroots participatory 
structures’ made the local council the primary focus of development at district 
level. However, under the 1991 Act ward development committees and village 
productivity committees are not formally linked to local authorities and are thus no 
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longer functional in most instances. The result has been the creation of an 
‘institutional vacuum’, with no effective forum for community participation in 
decision-making on local development activities and issues at sub-district level. 
Thus although local authorities are accountable to the ratepayers, opinion polls 
indicate that most people feel councillors do not reflect their views in the council 
and are not accountable to residents (Moomba, 2002:29; Lolojih, 2003:16). Studies 
have also shown that the public have little trust in local government and there is a 
low level of participation in local government elections (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 
2003). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although local governance reforms have brought about significant changes in 
policy frameworks and institutional structures, in order to facilitate and anchor 
effective delivery of socio-economic development services, local authorities are 
faced with difficult constraints and challenges. The strength of decentralised local 
governance remains limited. For it to be effective, not only should local 
governance be downwardly accountable, but other central government agencies and 
bodies at district level should also be accountable to local government. The 
argument that democratic decentralised local governance can deliver services more 
efficiently and more responsively depends on the adequate provision of resources. 
Yet lack of financial resources continues to constrain the effectiveness of local 
authorities. The failure to fully empower local authorities undermines their 
effectiveness and legitimacy.  
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1. Introduction 
The chairperson of the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on local government 
recently described local government in South Africa as “a chicken whose legs have 
been tied for too long”. In other words, even when the fetters that bind the 
chicken’s legs are loosed, it remains at a loss for what to do with its newfound 
freedom (Tsenoli 2007). This descriptive analogy ostensibly refers to the failure of 
local government to harness its newfound power in post-apartheid South Africa and 
to claim its rightful position as the driver of development at the local level, and 
instigator of bottom-up growth and progress, which is meant to shape and 
transform society in the new South Africa.  
 
Of all the spheres of government, local government arguably has the most 
immediate developmental mandate to realise the ideal physical environment for the 
communities it serves (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, ss.152, 
                                                
1
 This practice note is based largely on a research paper authored by De Visser and Christmas for 
the Community Law Centre: Developmental Local Government: Determining Appropriate 
Functions and Powers. The full paper is available at <http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za>. 
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153).21 The 1998 White Paper on Local Government,32 echoing the developmental 
mandate entrenched in the Constitution, instructs municipalities to: 
• Exercise their powers in a manner that maximises economic growth and 
social development  
• Coordinate development activities of state and non-state agents in the 
municipal area 
• Deepen democratic development through community participation  
• Build social capital for increased sustainability.  
 
This exacting developmental mandate is in keeping with the established principle 
of subsidiarity, which advocates that “public responsibilities should be exercised by 
those elected authorities who are closest to the people” (Governing Council of the 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2007). In other words, the impact 
of the collective efforts of national, provincial and local government in fulfilling 
their constitutional obligations to citizens must be tangibly seen and felt at the local 
level. The Constitution, together with the White Paper on Local Government, 
therefore entrenches the role of local government as the driver and guardian of such 
development. 
 
The upcoming 2009 elections provide South Africans with the opportunity to 
reflect on how far we have come in the first 13 years of democracy, and on the 
extent to which constitutional ideals have been translated into reality. As part and 
parcel of this broader process, the then Minister for Provincial and Local 
Government, Sydney Mufamadi, launched a national review of provincial and local 
government on 31 July 2007.43 This process invites everyone, from civil servants to 
the private sector, tertiary education institutions and most importantly, ordinary 
South African citizens, to review the successes and failures of government in post-
apartheid South Africa. For local government in particular, the review process 
provides an opportunity to reflect on the experience of the new local government 
dispensation just eight years after it was first established. Importantly, this 
evaluation probes the extent to which the functions and powers delineated for local 
government have enabled it to meet its developmental mandate. It is the purpose of 
this practice note to evaluate the current allocation of functions and powers in the 
Constitution, and furthermore to propose a set of criteria to guide decisions on 
where powers and functions are best situated.  
 
 
                                                
2
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter the Constitution) obliges a 
municipality to “structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to 
give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic 
development of the community”. 
3
 
The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 is a policy document which consolidates and 
elucidates the developmental mandate of local government entrenched in the Constitution. Local 
government legislation enacted in the wake of the White Paper is based on the policy directives 
contained therein. 
 
4
 Following the resignation of former President Thabo Mbeki, there was a reshuffling of the 
Cabinet. Mr. Sicelo Shiceka MP, replaced Mr. Sydney Mufamadi as the Minister for Provincial 
and Local Government.  
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2. Balancing the Scales: Achievements vs. Challenges 
The transformation of South African local government from racialised, fragmented 
administrative centres under the apartheid government, to a constitutionally 
recognised, autonomous sphere of government, is described by many as 
phenomenal. In the face of seemingly insurmountable service delivery and 
infrastructure backlogs, the progress made by local government in extending basic 
services such as water, electricity and sanitation to the millions of citizens who 
were previously excluded from accessing these services, is significant.54 However, 
the varying levels of success achieved by municipalities in fulfilling these duties 
reflects the diversity which characterises local government.  
 
Local government in South Africa is comprised of 283 municipalities, which range 
in population, size and resources from severely under-resourced rural 
municipalities to first class metropolitan giants (‘metros’). The six metros currently 
house one third of South Africa’s 48.7 million population. They are also considered 
to be the economic powerhouses of South Africa, collectively contributing 59% of 
South Africa’s GDP (South African Cities Network 2005). Despite these hubs of 
intense development and economic growth, South Africa on the whole remains one 
of the most unequal societies in the world in respect of wealth disparity. With the 
rapid rate of urbanisation most visible in the metros and cities, unprecedented 
levels of development often co-exist alongside conditions of abject poverty. While 
levels of service delivery have been attained at the local level, the developmental 
mandate of local government as set out in the White Paper extends much further 
than basic service delivery. This mandate, however, can only be achieved if 
municipalities are equipped with the appropriate functions and powers to fulfil 
these roles.  
 
3. Stumbling Blocks to Development 
There are a number of inherent challenges that present stumbling blocks to local 
government achieving its full developmental potential. 
 
Autonomy 
The decentralised governance model adopted in the Constitution designates 
specific powers and functions to each sphere of government, which are enjoined to 
work together “to secure the well-being of the people of the Republic” 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s.41(1)(b)). 
 
As appropriate as such a vehicle for co-operative governance may seem within a 
democratic context, having three spheres of government operating each with a 
degree of autonomy makes for complex relationships, which also impact on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government. As a relatively new sphere, local 
                                                
5
 For elaboration on the roll-out of services by local government, see budget speech by the then 
Minister for Provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi, on 2 June 2008. Accessed on 
10 October 2008 at <http://www.polity.org.za>.
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government is faced with the challenge of establishing its autonomy. National and 
provincial government have therefore had to re-conceptualise their political 
attitudes towards local government in line with the new constitutionally entrenched 
ideal of developmental local government. In practice, however, different 
approaches are evident across sector departments. These approaches range from 
being respectful of local government autonomy to clearly patronising.65 
 
Service Delivery and Infrastructural Backlogs 
As stated above, municipalities inherited huge service delivery and infrastructural 
backlogs from the apartheid system of governance. They also faced a lack of 
capacity and skills to deliver at the local level. In the restructuring of local 
municipalities in 2000, much of the institutional memory of local government was 
lost. A major concern often voiced is that appointment of municipal staff is at times 
made on the basis of political patronage and not necessarily skills and expertise. 
While government has attempted to address capacity deficits through Project 
Consolidate (a program that deploys skilled workers to particularly weak 
municipalities to assist in capacity building – see 
<http://www.projectconsolidate.gov.za>), there are concerns that this initiative is 
not enough. Deficits in scarce, specialised skills such as engineering, are fast 
becoming critical. 
 
Pervasive Poverty 
The World Bank report for 2006 ranks South Africa as one of the most unequal 
societies in the world (World Bank 2008). The saturated labour market and 
growing unemployment rate, coupled with the effects of the worldwide recession, 
have made it increasingly hard for the poor in South Africa to attain basic 
minimum living standards (Triegaardt 2008). Local government, while 
developmental in nature, cannot be held solely responsible for making in-roads into 
the pervasive poverty which permeates South Africa. 
 
Poorly Defined Functions and Powers 
One of the most pressing challenges facing developmental local government, and 
which comprises the subject matter of this paper, is poorly defined functions and 
powers. Poorly defined powers and functions have been a source of great concern 
and confusion for municipalities since the creation of the new local government 
dispensation. This lack of clarity has often resulted in duplication of duties, 
confusion, inefficiencies and arguably even deterioration in the delivery of services 
to communities. In worst case scenarios it has led to intense animosity between 
provincial governments and municipalities, who reach an impasse in respect of 
                                                
6
 De Visser (2008:6) describes two very different attitudes expressed by the respective national 
departments of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Minerals and Energy (DME) pertaining to municipal 
powers to prescribe the installation of solar water heaters in new buildings erected within the 
municipal jurisdiction. The DTI makes such powers subject to national approval, while the DME 
correctly assumes that municipalities have the inherent power to make their own by-laws on the 
matter.  
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which sphere should perform a particular function. This has even led to situations 
where neither sphere wishes to take responsibility for a contested function. 
 
The impact of poorly defined powers and functions can have far-reaching 
consequences. There is, therefore, growing concern about the manner in which the 
Constitution currently distributes functions and powers.76
 
In addition, the 
mechanisms employed by national and provincial governments to allocate 
additional functions to local government do not comply with the legislative 
framework enacted to regulate such transfers. At times, these transfers of functions 
and powers only serve to perpetuate the gap between the functional and fiscal 
resources of municipalities, and the vision of developmental local government 
which South Africa is seeking to attain. 
 
4. Sources of Local Government Functions and Powers 
‘Original’ Powers of Local Government 
Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution list the functional areas that are the 
responsibility of local government. The Constitution provides municipalities with 
the necessary legislative and executive powers to administer and fulfil these 
functions (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996:ss.156(a), 156(2)). 
These are the most significant of local government’s powers, and are referred to as 
‘original’ powers because they are sourced directly from the Constitution. As such, 
these powers are safeguarded and may not be removed or amended by ordinary 
statutes or provincial Acts. Any change would therefore have to be effected by 
amending the Constitution itself. 
 
The ‘original’ powers, however, do not correspond to the prescription of 
developmental local government. A cursory evaluation of the listed functions and 
powers reveals a mixed bag of competencies which do not necessarily relate to 
each other or to a strategic, over-arching developmental mandate.87 Municipalities, 
for example, lack the policy-making and financial authority to achieve 
developmental objectives in critical ‘high impact areas’ such as housing and local 
economic development. This creates an untenable situation where municipalities 
must rely on external actors to initiate and drive development initiatives that 
pertain to these functions.  
 
                                                
7
 Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, when addressing the National Council of Province’s 
Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) Summit in 2007 made an appeal for an ‘objective look’ at 
whether the current configuration of powers and functions, including the constitutional aspects, is 
appropriate. See: Trevor Manuel, MP, ‘Co-operative governance and intergovernmental fiscal 
relations’ Address at the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) Summit (Cape Town: 3 May 
2007). 
8
 For example Schedules 4B and 5B include functions which range from building regulations and 
municipal public transport to licensing of dogs, cleansing, and traffic and parking, to mention just a 
few.  
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Have the Schedules Kept Pace with Reality? 
Another key question relates to whether the Schedules of the Constitution have 
remained relevant in the aftermath of the comprehensive demarcation of new 
municipalities for post-apartheid South Africa that took effect in 2000. It seems 
evident that the powers listed in the 1996 Constitution have not ‘caught up’ with 
that demarcation process. The approach taken in the Schedules to management of 
the built environment at the local level is a case in point. 98 
  
Municipalities in South Africa perform a myriad of functions that centre around the 
management of space. Land use planning, delivery of potable water, electricity and 
sanitation are key examples of this, Furthermore, municipalities are instrumental in 
the extension of water, sanitation, electricity and road infrastructure. Even a 
municipality’s prime income source, property rates, has a significant spatial 
component to it. 
 
The demarcation of municipal boundaries in 2000 was primarily concerned with 
reconfiguring municipal space as a result of the exigencies inherited from the 
apartheid system of local government. Rationalising the numerous municipalities 
that served the different racial groups constituted the crux of this exercise. The 
demarcation process therefore saw the creation of contiguous municipal space in 
the form of large municipal areas. A logical consequence of this demarcation 
should have been the allocation of concomitant powers to drive development 
within this space.  
 
The allocation of functions as it appears in the Schedules however, does not reflect 
this change. Management of the built environment is disaggregated. In the 
Schedules, the functions of planning, housing and transport are treated as distinct 
from each other. Housing is not a local government function but is a concurrent 
national and provincial function that is implemented with municipal assistance. 
This disaggregation applies not only to the way the function is defined, but the 
manner in which it is allocated across spheres. The Schedules for example, separate 
provincial transport and planning from municipal transport and planning. 
Confusion thus exists with regard to a municipality’s power with regard to land use 
management and public transport. 
 
Management of the built environment should logically be comprised of an 
integrated set of functions which have an immediate impact on municipal space, 
including: 
 
• Planning 
• Urban areas 
                                                
9
 
The points discussed under this heading emanate from a Roundtable meeting hosted by the 
Community Law Centre on 5-7 March 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town. The Roundtable was 
based on the initial outcomes of the review process of provincial and local government which is 
currently underway. These discussion points are extracted from the report on the Roundtable which 
was authored by Annette Christmas and is accessible at: 
<http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za>. 
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• Management of space and movement across space 
• Transport 
• Housing 
• Infrastructure that supports transport and housing. 
 
In order to foster development in an integrated and coherent fashion, cities should 
be empowered to drive these key processes without depending on external agencies 
and institutions. While it is true that national and provincial governments can 
allocate additional powers to local government by means of assignment, delegation 
or agency, these sources of power do not enjoy the same level of protection as the 
‘original’ powers of local government. Because developmental local government is 
a concept which is based in the Constitution itself, Schedules 4B and 5B should not 
contradict this intention and limit a municipality’s ability to fulfil this mandate.  
 
Additional Powers and Functions 
The Constitution together with the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (32 
of 2000) outlines the appropriate procedures for transferring functions to 
municipalities. These procedures seek to ensure that the assignment of powers 
outside the constitutional competencies of municipalities is well placed, that 
legislative and executive capacity is transferred, and that municipalities are 
safeguarded against unfunded mandates. However, while virtually all national and 
provincial sectors acknowledge the importance of municipalities and engage them 
in service delivery, they almost never do so by using the appropriate means of 
transferring functions. In practice, delegation and agency are the most commonly 
used means of transferring powers to local government, which reduces the role of 
local government to that of service deliverers or implementing agents of national 
and/or provincial governments. Other mechanisms for transferring functions 
include sector-specific instruments similar to delegation. The housing accreditation 
process is an apt example of how the transfer of a function and the terms of 
implementation thereof is strictly regulated by another sphere of government. 
Housing is currently a Schedule A function, which means that it is a concurrent 
function shared by national and provincial government. As such, municipalities 
have to apply to provincial government to become entities accredited to administer 
national housing programmes or to become housing developers. If accredited, there 
is no permanency in respect of the transfer of powers and municipalities are bound 
by the terms of the agreement concluded with the provincial government, once 
again reducing them to implementers rather than the drivers of development.  
 
The requirements for accreditation are outlined in the National Housing Code 
(National Housing Code 1997, Part 2, Chapter 2). Accreditation is not a suitable 
mechanism for the devolution of the housing function to local government. 
Notwithstanding the fact that in practice very few, if any, municipalities have been 
accredited (South African Local Government Association 2007), the exclusionary 
nature of the process means that certain municipalities are enabled to perform the 
housing function in a manner that facilitates their developmental mandate, while 
others are completely excluded from the opportunity until they are able to meet the 
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requirements of accreditation. There is, therefore, a disproportionate benefit for 
citizens who are the beneficiaries of housing initiatives within the jurisdiction of 
municipalities which have been accredited.  
 
The difficulties encountered in the accreditation process represent the first hurdle 
that municipalities have to overcome even before leaving the starting blocks. One 
challenge relates to a lack of understanding of the application process (Department 
of Housing KwaZulu-Natal 2005), and the arguably high threshold requirements 
for accreditation. For example the ‘proven track record’ requirement stipulates that: 
“the Council’s proven track record of initiatives and involvement in housing 
provision and/or community development in its area of jurisdiction will be a 
recommendation” (Ibid 2005). In respect of capacity, it is a pre-requisite that the 
municipality should have “financial, administrative, professional and technological 
capacity to fulfil its housing responsibilities and to administer the National Housing 
Programmes.” It is difficult to conceive of many municipalities who currently have 
that level of infrastructure, as the appropriate kind of capacity is unlikely to emerge 
without the existence of authority.  
 
The consequence of this mechanism for transferring a function is aptly 
demonstrated in the Western Cape. The Western Cape provincial government has 
consistently denied the City of Cape Town’s application to be accredited to 
perform the housing function, prompting the metro to declare an intergovernmental 
dispute with the province. The mayor of the City of Cape Town, Helen Zille, cited 
“red tape delays with the municipality’s own projects, especially when it comes to 
housing” as a key impediment to delivery (Zille 2007). Even the smallest metro, 
Nelson Mandela Bay, has categorically stated that it is “more than capable and is in 
fact already fulfilling this function.” Despite this, housing remains a provincial 
function and local government, as the sphere of government which is most 
accessible to the people, often has to bear the brunt of community dissatisfaction in 
the face of delivery failures. 
 
Another significant consequence of fragmented sector-based efforts to involve 
local government is that municipalities often end up bearing the hidden overhead 
costs associated with the function. This is because the protection against unfunded 
mandates offered by the Municipal Systems Act is not applicable to the instruments 
used. 
 
5. Enhancing the Governance Role of Local Government 
What, then, is the appropriate way to equip local government with the necessary 
authority to play a developmental role? First, there is a strong case for re-defining 
the existing competences listed in the Schedules. Apart from concerns about the 
content of the Schedules not providing appropriate authority to achieve 
developmental goals, there are also concerns about the manner in which 
competencies are defined in the Schedules. While broadly defined competencies 
are appropriate for national and provincial government, they are inappropriate for 
local government. They create overlap and confusion about the role of local 
CHRISTMAS & DE VISSER: 
Reviewing the Functions and Powers  
of Local Government in South Africa 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 115 
 
government, which is often interpreted very narrowly. Local government 
competencies therefore need to be defined as precisely as possible. 
 
Second, additional functions, where an authoritative policy role is envisaged for 
local government, must be transferred within the parameters of the legal framework 
established for assignment. In South Africa, in addition to the Constitution and 
Municipal Systems Act, ‘Guidelines on Allocation of Additional Powers and 
Functions to Municipalities’ were recently promulgated by the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (2007). These guidelines attempt to infuse the 
assignment process with the necessary safeguards that would protect the interests 
of all parties to the assignment. Importantly, they assert that functions can be 
assigned either to individual municipalities or to local government as a sphere. A 
differentiated approach to assignment is therefore possible and appropriate, given 
the variety in capacity and economic and spatial realities present in municipalities.  
 
6. Indicators for Local Government Powers and Functions 
Having described the developmental mandate, the mismatch between mandate and 
powers, as well as the instruments available for intervention, the question is then: 
What powers and functions are best performed at local government level? A 
number of indicators emerge from national and international literature on 
decentralisation. These indicators are useful to determine at what level a particular 
function should be performed. They must be complemented by consideration of 
generic aspects such as the history and context of local government. In the South 
African case, this refers specifically to the special developmental role of local 
government, the need to redress the legacy of apartheid, and the political culture 
within which local government operates. In addition, any application of these 
indicators must take place against the backdrop of the principle of subsidiarity, 
which as stated above, advocates that governance should be located as close to 
citizens as possible.  
 
Six indicators are proposed that could assist this assessment, using the housing 
function as an example. 
 
• The degree to which economies of scale can be obtained at a higher 
level: if it is more efficient and cost-effective to perform a function at a 
supra-municipal level, this is an argument against allocating the function to 
local government. 
 
• The degree of spill-over effects of a function: spill-over effects occur 
when residents from outside the municipal area make extensive use of, or 
benefit from the service. Examples of this include ‘network’ services, such 
as highways and telecommunications. 
 
• The necessary capacity: the existence of capacity is key to the ability of 
local governments to perform their functions. However, it should not 
always be the decisive factor: it is important to avoid a ‘Catch 22’ dilemma 
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whereby authority is withheld because of a lack of capacity, but capacity 
cannot emerge without the granting of authority. If authority and resources 
(both financial and human) are transferred jointly, capacity should develop 
as communities are entitled to, and expect, the delivery of services. As 
described above, an apt example of how the capacity argument is applied 
to slow down the transfer of authority to local government can be seen in 
the housing sector.  
 
• The degree of intersectoral coordination: all government service 
delivery comes together in the municipal area, making local government 
the ideal coordinating agency. Multi-sectoral and multi-sphere integration 
should be achieved mainly through the Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP).109 Multi-sectoral coordination is vital in respect to housing which, 
by its very nature, is an integrating activity as it includes planning, land 
administration, housing recipient identification, delivery of a package of 
services, development facilitation and the provision of the house itself.  
 
• The degree of grass roots community participation required: a strong 
indicator is the extent to which community participation is an essential part of 
the function. It can be argued that all government functions require public 
input, which could render the indicator meaningless. However, the type of 
engagement required may differ: public participation for the development of 
national social welfare policies is different from engaging the public on 
renaming municipal streets or establishing a housing development project. As 
the intensity of the required engagement increases, municipalities become best 
placed to perform the function. Housing is a function that requires high-
intensity, grassroots community participation. It is perhaps one of the most 
‘vulnerable’ functions in this respect: if community participation is inadequate, 
successful implementation is easily hampered by disgruntled residents.  
 
• The degree of policy control over the built environment: it is often 
argued that municipal responsibility centres on controlling the built 
environment, that is, the spatial and physical aspects of public service 
delivery and government regulation. This is supported by the White Paper 
vision of municipalities as facilitators of local economic growth. 
Municipalities facilitate economic growth primarily through the provision 
of the infrastructure, necessary for economic activity. Key elements of 
infrastructure for economic growth include –  
 
a. people infrastructure (proximity to personnel) 
b. skills infrastructure (availability of skills) 
c. financial infrastructure (currency, banking) 
                                                
10
 An IDP is essentially a participatory process of planning through which the municipality 
assesses needs, prioritizes them and then formulates objectives and strategies to address them. The 
IDP should consolidate all municipal planning into a comprehensive strategy that is linked to the 
municipal budget. 
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d. telecommunications infrastructure 
e. roads (and ports) infrastructure 
f. energy infrastructure 
g. regulatory environment (tax, labour law) 
h. location (land, building, sanitation). 
 
Local government is the prime actor in establishing people infrastructure and 
controlling location (a and h). It plays an important, but not primary role in roads, 
energy and the regulatory environment (through property taxes). Its role in 
financial, skills and telecommunications infrastructure is limited. This sliding scale 
coincides with the relationship with the built environment: the more the function 
has to do with the built environment, the more intense local government’s 
involvement should be. This indicator demonstrates that it is essential for 
municipalities to have authority over the housing function in order for them to 
discharge their responsibilities for the built environment.  
 
7. Need for a New Approach 
Application of the above six indicators suggests that in the South African context, 
consideration should be given to transferring further functions to local government. 
Many of the arguments used against changing the content of Schedules 4B and 5B 
of the Constitution (the ‘original’ powers of local government) relate to fears of 
fragmentation and deterioration of services as a result. However, these arguments 
often overlook the reality that in South Africa, the fact that a power or competence 
is an ‘original’ local government function does not minimise oversight powers of 
national and/or provincial government. A municipality’s authority over its 
‘original’ functions is anything but unfettered. National and provincial government 
oversees municipal performance of ‘original’ functions through the legislative 
framework within which municipalities must operate.1110  
 
Any review of local government powers and functions therefore requires a nuanced 
approach which focuses on specific functions and assesses whether there is a need 
for greater local government involvement. In the South African context this 
approach should be guided by the following two questions. First, does the absence 
of the function from Schedules 4B or 5B make the Schedules an inadequate 
reflection of developmental local government? If so, there is an argument to revisit 
the Schedules on this matter. Second, should (certain) municipalities be afforded 
policy-making authority over a function that is not currently allocated to local 
government? If so, the assignment of the function to local government may be 
considered.  
 
                                                
11
 s155(7) of the Constitution confers the power on national government to ‘regulate’ the exercise 
by municipalities of their executive authority. The term ‘regulating’ in the context of section 
155(7) of the Constitution was interpreted by the Constitutional Court to mean ‘a broad managing 
or controlling rather than direct authorisation function’. This relates to the framework within which 
local government must exercise these powers. In other words, the regulatory power enables 
national government (and also provincial government) to set essential national standards, minimum 
requirements, monitoring procedures etc.
 
CHRISTMAS & DE VISSER: 
Reviewing the Functions and Powers  
of Local Government in South Africa 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 118 
 
There are two key aspects here. First, the transfer of functions to local government 
must be consistent with the procedures in the Constitution and the Municipal 
Systems Act. Second, the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to municipal functions needs 
to give way to a nuanced and differentiated approach that takes into account spatial 
and economic realities, as well as capacity constraints currently facing 
municipalities. 
 
The challenge of creating integrated sustainable cities, with the marginalised in our 
society sharing in the benefits of developmental local government, is immense. The 
metros, by and large the success stories of local government in South Africa, need 
to be the drivers of developmental processes within their jurisdiction with minimal 
provincial and national government interference. An asymmetrical approach must 
be taken to local government to allow for the development of capacity where 
lacking. Capacity must, however, be developed in a manner that would sustain 
local government delivery. In the budget speech delivered by the then Minister for 
Provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi, he emphasised that “priority 
attention must be paid to ensuring that improved local government performance 
becomes a self-sustaining dynamic” (Mufamadi 2008). 
 
In view of the upcoming 2009 elections, the outcomes of the review of provincial 
and local government will not only impact the shape and form that local 
government will take in the future, but importantly, the political attitude manifested 
towards local government. The review process poses key questions which ask 
whether the current configuration of provincial and local government has improved 
the delivery of basic social services and deepened democracy in the new South 
Africa. It is hoped that the answers to these questions would fundamentally change 
the face of local government in a manner that will result in better service delivery 
and, ultimately, better lives for all South African citizens. 
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1. Introduction
For over a decade the governments of Kiribati and Tuvalu have adopted 
decentralisation policies to strengthen the role of local-level authorities in 
development. This can be seen as a response to both domestic policy drivers and 
global trends. However, while Kiribati and Tuvalu share a common past and many 
of the same development issues, the decentralisation process has taken distinct 
paths in the two countries. This paper takes stock of the Kiribati and Tuvalu 
experience, drawing on research, country-specific project evaluations and 
practitioner perspectives. It focuses on local governance at the outer island level 
and examines three dimensions of the decentralisation process: policy drivers; 
central-local relations; and integration of traditional and modern institutions of 
governance.1  
 
2. Drivers of decentralisation policy 
Similar factors have driven decentralisation policy in Kiribati and Tuvalu. This is 
unsurprising, given that the countries share common histories and developmental 
challenges. Until independence in 1971, the two island groups were part of one 
British protectorate, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. By 1979, they had split to 
become two nations. Since then, Kiribati and Tuvalu have faced similar constraints 
                                                
1
 Hassall and Tipu have recently published a valuable stock take of local government across the 
region, including Kiribati and Tuvalu, focussing mainly on institutional characteristics (Hassall and 
Tipu 2008). 
RICHARDSON: 
Governing the Outer Islands:  
Decentralisation in Kiribati and Tuvalu 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 121 
 
to development, such as limited natural resources, low economic growth, widely 
dispersed geography and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Migration 
from the outer islands to urban centres has also increased sharply since the 1990s, 
driven by the lure of the cash economy (Asian Development Bank 2003; 2007). 
These factors have made effective outer island governance extremely difficult. 
However, while the confluence of these concerns continues to threaten the future of 
outer island communities, there remains an enduring attachment to the island 
lifestyle, which has proved a powerful policy driver. This author noted the 
fondness with which residents of urban areas describe life on the islands, especially 
the plenteousness of traditional foods and persistence of cultural norms of sharing 
and reciprocity. It is thus apparent that the desire to maintain a way of life under 
threat, as much as any economic consideration, has shaped decentralisation. As the 
current Tuvalu national development plan laments: “the outer islands have always 
been regarded as the heart of the nation, however in the last decade the heart has 
become weaker” (Government of Tuvalu 2004).  
 
The prioritization of local governance and local development has also had a 
political dimension, given that the majority of members of national parliaments in 
both Kiribati and Tuvalu come from outer island constituencies. This is despite the 
fact that half the population is now concentrated on the respective capital islands, 
Tarawa and Funafuti. It is in this context that the three aims of outer island 
development, the reversal of urbanization, and development of the capacity of local 
authorities, have been a prominent part of national development plans (Government 
of Kiribati 2003; Government of Tuvalu 2004), and perhaps partly explains why 
limited attention has been given to urban governance until recently. 
 
In addition, the particular ‘logic’ of decentralization that has influenced 
international trends since the late 1980s has impacted on policy in both Kiribati and 
Tuvalu (Turner 2003). Most international financial institutions and donors 
(including those working in the Pacific) have orientated their development 
assistance on the basis that decentralisation strengthens local democracy, 
governance and ultimately, development. As small countries reliant on 
development assistance, this ‘supply side’ consideration has created an additional 
incentive for Kiribati and Tuvalu to pursue decentralisation policies.  
 
3. Central-local relations 
The evolution of stable and cooperative central-local relations is recognised as a 
building block of successful decentralisation (Turner 2003). The role of central 
governments is critical in setting the legislative parameters for decentralisation, 
assisting local governments with financial and technical support, and linking local 
planning and budgeting with national development priorities. While newly created 
local governments may initially be reliant on central government grants, the ideal 
reform outcome is generally seen as one where democratically elected local 
authorities can generate enough revenue to finance the delivery of services that are 
responsive to local needs. As this section will elaborate, however, the reform 
trajectories of Kiribati and Tuvalu have tended to diverge from this ideal type. 
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In Tuvalu, the Falekaupule Act (FA) provides for the election of six councillors to 
each island Kaupule (council), which also has an administrative arm. The Kaupule 
is in turn accountable in various respects to the island Falekaupule – a body of 
traditional leaders who hold ultimate decision-making powers over local affairs. 
The FA also requires Falekaupules to facilitate community participation in local 
governance processes such as planning and budgeting. The Falekaupule Trust Fund 
(FTF) was established in 1999 based on contributions from the islands, central 
government and donors. It is administered independently of central government 
and is designed to provide greater self-reliance for island communities. 
 
The FTF has provided Tuvalu’s local governments with an enviable mechanism for 
establishing fiscal autonomy from central government. Investment in local 
governance in Tuvalu averages more than AU$400 per capita (Hassall and Tipu 
2008). As Hassall and Tipu point out:  
 
per capita expenditure by local government in Tuvalu is higher than in Kiribati, 
the closest neighbouring state with a somewhat comparable economic 
environment…it could be surmised that Tuvalu’s trust fund is contributing 
significantly to the wellbeing of communities at the local level. (Hassall and 
Tipu 2008: 18-19)  
 
However, the full potential of the FTF has yet to be realised, in part due to 
unfavourable incentives. Falekaupules and Kaupules have an incentive to direct 
their requests for funding for specific development projects to national ministries 
and members of Parliament, rather than the FTF, which is based on their own 
contributions.  
 
In Kiribati, the legislative basis for decentralisation is the Local Government Act 
(LGA), which was introduced in 1984 and last amended in 2006. The LGA 
provides for the devolution of political power to elected island councils, and 
transfers extensive service delivery responsibilities to the local level, including 
primary education, public health and provision of utilities. In theory, island 
councils are fiscally empowered to perform these functions through a combination 
of recurrent grants from central government and revenues generated locally. 
 
In practice, however, island councils have a small revenue base and little control 
over service delivery, with the bulk of funding and key staff positions coming from 
central government ministries (Ortega 2008a). The reluctance of the central 
government to devolve fiscal and administrative powers appears to be based on 
both fiscal constraints and concerns about the capacity and competency of island 
councils to manage local affairs. This catch-22 situation, and the disconnect 
between legislation and practice, has prevented island councils from maturing into 
effective institutions for local governance and development. One observer in 
Kiribati captured the situation by describing the island councils as ‘children’ who 
were not yet ready to become independent from their ‘parent’. This combination of 
factors has contributed to a situation where investment in local governance in 
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Kiribati is well under AU$100 per capita, a low figure even by regional standards 
(Hassall and Tipu 2008).  
 
The central government, with the support of development partners such as the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has sought to address these 
issues by amending the LGA to increase the terms of island councillors to 4 years, 
and by intensifying capacity building efforts on the outer islands. It remains to be 
seen what impact these efforts will have on long term central-local relations and 
how the significant challenge of financing local governance will be addressed. 
 
This brief overview highlights the challenges of matching finance with function, 
especially in the context of a limited revenue base and economies of scale. The 
Falekaupule Trust Fund, while yet to be fully utilised, has provided Tuvalu with an 
innovative solution that is sustainable and encourages local autonomy in 
governance and development. Kiribati, with ten times the population of Tuvalu, has 
yet to identify a mechanism for lifting investment in local governance without 
heavy reliance on central government grants.  
 
 
Image courtesy of NZAID 
 
4. Integration of traditional governance institutions 
The presence of a formal state in local affairs is a relatively new phenomenon in 
the Pacific (Hassall and Tipu 2008). In many parts of the region, local communities 
view traditional leaders and mechanisms as the most legitimate and effective 
institutions for representing their interests and meeting their needs. In most Pacific 
Island countries, modern local governance institutions were established during or 
directly after the colonial era, with little regard for how they would integrate with 
pre-existing institutions. Kiribati and Tuvalu, with their distinctive Micronesian 
and Polynesian cultures, have both experienced challenges in this area.21 
                                                
2
 
Tuvalu is Polynesian, retaining features of the chiefly system such as respect for rank, while 
Kiribati is Melanesian, with greater emphasis on egalitarianism in structuring social affairs. 
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In Kiribati’s outer islands, the Unimwane, or council of elders, continues to 
exercise considerable influence despite not being recognised under the Local 
Government Act. The Unimwane is a key pillar of an egalitarian culture that helps 
ensure that absolute poverty is virtually unknown in Kiribati (Asian Development 
Bank 2007). However, Ortega (2008a) describes “long-standing tensions between 
the traditional leadership and the island councils who are viewed as a central 
government agency, a tax collector, and a conduit for island development funds” 
(Ortega 2008a:v). Tensions between the Unimwane and elected island councils also 
leave little room for participation by marginalised groups such as women and 
youth. The realities of governance processes at the island level are therefore far 
more complex and contested than is envisaged under the Local Government Act.  
 
Tuvalu is a rarity in the Pacific, with its traditional and modern governance 
institutions formally harmonised through the Falekaupule Act. Its success in 
enabling stronger island autonomy has attracted interest from other countries and 
experts in the field. However, the contradictions inherent in vesting many local 
decision-making power in the hands of traditional, unelected leaders are apparent. 
This is demonstrated by recent events on Nanumaga Island where the Falekaupule, 
in a variation on traditional sanctions, sacked two Kaupule employees over an issue 
of religious affiliation (Ortega 2008b). The case highlights the tension between 
traditional and modern norms and practices, and the caution needed when blending 
them in formal institutions. 
 
In the case of Tuvalu and Kiribati, traditional leaders and institutions are strongest 
at the local level and are likely to have an enduring relevance for local governance. 
The experience of both countries illustrates the need to harmonise the two systems, 
but the enormous complexities involved mean that the mechanisms for doing so are 
not easily replicable. Local leaders’ dialogues, supported by the Commonwealth 
Local Government Forum, which bring together traditional and elected leaders, are 
a useful forum for progressing this agenda. 
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5. Conclusion 
This brief overview of decentralisation in Kiribati and Tuvalu suggests that there 
are significant items on the international decentralisation ‘menu’ that have been 
inappropriate for both countries. Foremost among these is that full administrative 
devolution has been unrealistic, as it has been for many other countries in the 
Pacific region (see Duncan 2004). Responsibilities have not been matched with 
sufficient finances and this has resulted in poor service delivery and diminished 
confidence by local communities in the ability of local governments to deliver. As 
Schoeffel points out: “cutting the pie into smaller pieces doesn’t make the pie any 
bigger” (Schoeffel 2003:4). In the case of Tuvalu, this has been partly resolved by 
the Falekaupule Trust Fund, but in Kiribati financing remains arguably the biggest 
constraint to improved local governance.  
 
A second area of divergence is the relationship between traditional and modern 
governance systems. The lesson from the Kiribati and Tuvalu experience would 
seem to be that while ignoring traditional institutions and leaders is a recipe for 
weakening local governance, giving them widespread powers may also be 
problematic. It is also apparent that the country-specific complexities of this issue 
make generic international models (which generally focus on modern institutions) 
less relevant. Having said this, given the similar challenges they face, there is 
significant potential for Pacific Island countries to learn from each other with 
regard to the harmonisation of traditional and modern systems. 
 
Kiribati and Tuvalu share common histories and similar natural endowments and 
development challenges, yet their approaches to outer island governance have been 
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markedly different. The institutional, political and cultural factors discussed in this 
paper appear to have been pivotal in setting the two countries on different paths of 
decentralisation. Of the two approaches, Tuvalu’s has been more successful in 
financial terms, but it is unclear whether the Tuvalu approach would have been (in 
the past or present) technically or politically feasible in Kiribati. What is clear is 
that despite threats such as urbanisation and climate change, economic and political 
necessity will continue to drive demands for stronger local governance on the outer 
islands. 
 
Relevant resources 
UNDP Decentralisation and Local Governance practice area  
<http://www.undp.org/governance/sl-dlgud.htm> and Practice Note 
<http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/DLGUD_PN_English.pdf> 
ADB 2006, Evaluation of the Tuvalu Islands Development Program, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/PPERs/TUV/PPER-TIDP.asp> 
NZAID, Tuvalu, <http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/programmes/c-tuvalu.html> 
NZAID, Kiribati, <http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/programmes/c-kiribati.html> 
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1. Introduction 
During the past decade the Indian state of Kerala has been successfully carrying out 
democratic decentralization, and has substantially transformed the functions of 
local governments in line with the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, 
which institutionalised the local government system in India. In particular, 
formulation and implementation of micro plans with community participation has 
produced remarkable changes in the dynamics of local development and in the 
public management of local governments. This initiative for participatory planning 
at the local level taken by the government of Kerala enormously empowered local 
communities and the different actors in the local political system.  
 
In promoting democratic decentralization, Kerala adopted a ‘Big Bang’ approach.  
The government launched a ‘People’s Planning Campaign’ and undertook massive 
capacity building efforts to empower local governments. It also devolved massive 
financial resources to local governments to exercise the powers and responsibilities 
vested in them by the Constitutional Act and the State laws. Associations of local 
governments were placed at the centre of this strategy and became part of an 
institutional framework for regular consultation on policy issues related to 
decentralization and local governance. 
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From 1996 to 2001 these capacity building activities were carried out by the 
‘Campaign Cell’ of the State Planning Board. Since then responsibility has been 
transferred to the Kerala Institute of Local Administration (KILA), and today 
KILA is recognized as the nodal institution for capacity building of local 
governments and their associations in Kerala. The sustainability of democratic 
decentralization is seen to rest in large part on building the capacity, continuous 
support and ownership of the associations of local governments.  
   
2. ‘Big Bang’ Approach 
Typically, it would be argued that capacity building is the precondition for any 
successful decentralization. Traditional wisdom calls for firstly, capacity building 
of local governments, and then giving power to them by degrees as their capacity 
improves. In Kerala, this theoretical sequence of decentralization was reversed. 
Instead of waiting while the capacity of elected representatives and officials of 
local governments and their associations was enhanced, the government took the 
revolutionary decision to devolve 35 to 40 percent of the Ninth Five Year Plan 
outlay to local governments at the same time as building capacity. This transfer of 
responsibilities and funds to local governments generated considerable pressure on 
the state government from various quarters to build competence, and to ensure that 
new responsibilities are carried out effectively and funds properly utilized. Thus to 
operationalise decentralization it was decided that capacity building had to coincide 
with formulation of local plans and a strategy of ‘learning while doing’ was applied 
to the local planning process.  
 
A distinctive feature of the decentralization experiment in Kerala was the central 
role allotted to developing capacity in participatory planning and empowerment of 
associations of local governments in policy advocacy. The task of formulating and 
implementing local plans was quite new to local governments and their 
associations, and they had never experimented with such a responsibility.  Thus 
capacity building focused on local plans based on local choices and preferences, 
and supporting people-centered development processes at the local level.  
 
Apart from the comprehensive nature of the local plans and the maximum 
autonomy given to local governments in their plan formulation, the micro-level 
planning methodology adopted in Kerala is distinguished from similar experiments 
in other states by an insistence of mass participation and transparency. Capacity 
building was designed to promote empowerment and social mobilization of the 
people for social and economic transformation. It was realized that capacity 
building initiatives on a massive scale were essential for any people-centered 
development process. Capacity building for democratic decentralization is seen as a 
long term investment in people and their organizations. It was also realized that 
building social capital and an enlightened citizenry would be useful for fostering 
strong and effective institutions of local governments and promoting deliberative 
democracy. 
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Therefore attempts have been made to ensure the participation of mass 
organizations and associations of local governments along with elected 
representatives and officials in capacity building programs. These programs 
covered tens of thousands of elected representatives, officials, experts and 
representatives of numerous mass organizations. It became a massive awareness 
building activity for the ordinary people as well as competence building for elected 
representatives and the leaders of associations of local governments. 
 
Another aspect of capacity building in Kerala is its focus on marginalized social 
groups such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, to reduce the gap 
with the rest of the society. Concerted efforts have been made to empower and 
mainstream these groups through capacity building. Emphasis has been given to 
empowering them to take actions and decisions in governance.  
 
3. Leadership by the Campaign Cell and Associations of Local 
Governments 
The Campaign Cell of the State Planning Board and associations of local 
governments were involved in all aspects of the training cycle, right from designing 
the training policy to assessment of the training for local government functionaries. 
The Campaign Cell sought the support of experts in different subject areas and 
training methodologies and made use of all available resources in the state for this 
purpose. It also opened up new and exciting arenas in local governance and 
development and innovated diverse new methodologies for training delivery on a 
massive scale. Training programmes were designed in tune with different phases of 
local plan formulation and to suit the training needs of local governments to carry 
out particular planning tasks. The Campaign Cell undertook regular consultation 
with leaders of local government associations regarding the practical and 
operational training needs of different local government functionaries, and ensured 
that methods of delivery were suited to the different needs of officials, elected 
representatives and representatives of voluntary organizations. District Training 
Advisory Councils were formed with the active involvement of leaders of 
associations of local governments to steer programme implementation.  
 
4. Capacity Building to Empower Local Governments and their 
Associations 
The democratic decentralization process in Kerala realized the complexities 
involved in political decentralization and restructuring of powers in favour of local 
governments. One of the most important assumptions of democratic 
decentralization was that empowerment of local governments would lead to 
fostering political decentralization and broadening the mass base of local 
governments, accelerating the process of democratisation. However, there was an 
evident lack of capacity on the part of elected representatives to materialize the 
objectives of the Constitution Acts, 1992 (73rd and 74th Amendments), and to 
realize the meaning of self-governance. Experience suggested that the Panchayati 
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Raj1 and municipalities had so far worked as bureaucratically controlled, state 
funded delivery arms of government with only a semblance of local democracy. 
The elected representatives had no real control in the decision making process and 
in its implementation. The greatest challenge before democratic decentralization 
was, therefore, to build the required level of capacity among the elected 
representatives to carry forward the process of political decentralization and to 
exercise the powers mandated by the Constitution and state laws.  
 
Capacity building is the key to transforming local governments in this direction. 
Attempts were made to generate a clear understanding of the importance of training 
and the value of people’s participation. Local governments and their associations 
realized that coping with the rapid political and social transformation generated by 
decentralization also requires a great deal of administrative competence. Hence, 
local governments and their associations responded positively to the capacity 
building programmes, and have shown high degree of motivation and enthusiasm 
in the learning process.  
 
5. Training Strategy  
Capacity building for democratic decentralization was to move away from 
traditional forms of training and development. The approach taken was a practical 
one to equip the different functionaries and resource persons quickly and 
effectively to formulate local plans through a democratic and participatory process. 
Increased involvement of learners was ensured through a ‘learning by doing’ 
approach. Learners were given every opportunity to give their feedback and 
transfer the learning into their real work situations.  
 
The strategy was as follows: 
 
• Leadership by the Campaign Cell and associations of local governments in 
all aspects of the training cycle 
• A modular training structure with well defined objectives and a clear plan 
of action 
• A more focused and needs-based approach to training design and 
implementation 
• Regular and ongoing monitoring and assessment of learning and transfer of 
learning 
• Periodic updating of the capacity of trainers and regular interaction with 
policy support groups like associations of local governments 
• Efforts for reinforcement and follow up of learning. 
 
A cascading training-of-trainers strategy was applied. Resource persons were 
identified at all levels. The 800 Key Resource Persons who attended state level 
training programmes trained 10,000 District Resource Persons who in turn trained 
more than 100,000 Local Resource Persons during different phases of the Peoples’ 
                                                
1
 Rural local governments at village and district levels. 
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Planning Campaign. The success of democratic decentralization was largely due to 
the selection of appropriate persons with proven credentials as trainers and resource 
persons, and the support extended by associations of local governments.   
 
Democratic decentralization and the capacity building efforts also focused on 
creating a responsive system of administration at the local level and making 
departmental officials accountable to the elected representatives.  
 
There is no parallel for the training programmes organized as apart of the capacity 
building process of decentralization in Kerala in terms of its scale: the number of 
participants, extent of coverage and diversity of topics that were covered within a 
stipulated time frame. The number of participants who attended at different levels 
of training programmes during the six phases of People’s Planning Campaign are 
given below. 
 
Phase State Level District Level Block Level Panchayat/  Municipal Level 
I 375(5) 11,716(3)  100,000 (1) 
II 660(3) 11,808(2)  100,000 (1) 
III 300(4) 1,146(3) 150,000(2)  
IV 3,014(3)  10,000(2)  
V 1,186(3)    
 304(2)    
VI 150(2) 6,000(2)   
 300(3)  6,000(1)  
VII 2,890(2)  6,000(1)  
 3,360(2)  25,000(2)  
Numbers in parentheses represent days of training. Figures do not include one day 
conferences like state level conferences of Presidents and Chairpersons, consultation 
meetings etc. 
Source: Economic Review: 2000, State Planning Board, Government of Kerala 
 
Target groups for training programmes included the following categories: 
 
• Elected representatives of local governments 
• Ministerial staff  
• Officers of transferred institutions 
• Voluntary experts of different organizations 
• Members of expert committees 
• Experts from different scientific and academic institutions. 
 
The composition and coverage of target group(s) varied in different phases of the 
training based on the objectives and the agenda of the Peoples’ Planning 
Campaign, as did the design, content and coverage of the training programmes 
themselves. Core subject areas of training programmes consisted of: 
 
Democratic Decentralization and Participatory Planning  
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• Changing paradigm of development planning  
• Concept and importance of decentralised planning 
• Basic principles and methodology of local planning 
• Peoples’ participation and democratic decentralization 
• Role of Grama Sabha2 in local governance 
• Gender in development  
• Development of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
• Panchayati Raj and its Constitutional mandate 
• Preparation of the Development Report 
• Formulation of development plans and projects  
• Appraisal and vetting of plans 
• Implementation and monitoring of plans. 
 
Local Governance and Financial Management 
• Panchayati Raj Act and Municipal Act 
• Powers and responsibilities of local governments in the changing context 
• Roles and responsibilities of the President, Secretary and committees 
• Conduct of meetings 
• Preparation of budget and integration of budget and plan 
• Utilization of funds and accounts keeping 
• Store purchase rules 
• Pubic works management. 
 
6. Institutionalising the Capacity Building Process 
The establishment of a systematic ongoing approach to capacity development and 
training is the key to making the decentralization process sustainable and 
transforming local governments into more accountable, democratic, transparent and 
responsive institutions. Therefore since completing the initial task of formulating 
and implementing local plans and achieving the requisite competency in 
participatory planning, attempts have been made by the State Planning Board to 
institutionalise the capacity building process. A project known as Capacity 
Development of Decentralization in Kerala (CapDecK) was launched with the 
support of Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). In this phase 
the SPB collaborated with a number of local learning and academic institutions to 
conduct further training:  
 
• Kerala Institute of Local Administration  
• State Institute of Rural Development  
• Institute of Management in Government  
• Kerala Agriculture University  
• Medical Colleges  
• State Council of Education Research and Training  
• Centre of Science and Technology for Rural Development  
• Integrated Rural Technology Centre  
                                                
2
 Village meetings open to all adults over 18 years of age. 
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• Centre for the Development of Imaging Technology. 
 
Nearly 30,000 participants attended training courses offered by these institutions 
during 1999-2000.   
 
Subsequently the Committee on Decentralization of Powers recommended that the 
Kerala Institute of Local Administration (KILA) be designated as the lead 
institution for capacity building of local governments. In order to fulfil this task, 
KILA has been involved in designing and implementing a large number of training 
programmes with the objective of strengthening local governments and 
empowering community level organizations. The focus is on assisting local 
governments to strengthen their internal systems in tune with the spirit of 
decentralization. Core subject areas of capacity building by KILA are therefore: 
 
• Good local governance 
• Empowerment of standing committees 
• Natural resource management 
• Project management  
• Gender mainstreaming and women empowerment 
• Development of marginalized social groups 
• Public works management 
• Financial management and accounting systems. 
 
Details of training programmes organised by KILA during the institutionalisation 
phase of decentralization are given in the table below. 
 
Year Programmes Participants 
1999-2000 103 7,623 
2000-01 75 8,607 
2001-02 83 10,256 
2002-03 58 4,200 
2003-04 245 64,160 
2004-05 249 29,009 
Total 813 123,855 
 
7. Fresh Approach and New Strategy for Capacity Building 
The capacity building efforts carried out as part of democratic decentralization 
have produced a transformation in the functioning of local governments in Kerala. 
Local governments are now capable of formulating and implementing local plans 
and are competent enough to carry forward the political decentralization process in 
the right direction. Key results of capacity building include: 
 
• The development of the desired level of capacity on the part of elected 
representatives to exercise political powers vested with them and to take 
part in the decision making process 
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• Improved performance of local governments in exercising the powers 
mandated with them by the Constitutional Amendment Acts 
• Increased level of competence of the staff and officials of local 
governments and of   institutions transferred to local governments to 
provide better delivery of services to the people 
• Increased capacity on the part of civil society organizations and enrichment 
of social capital to facilitate effective public management 
• Enlightenment of citizens to take part in the public management of local 
governments and to participate effectively in the decision making process 
at the local level 
• Improved level of performance in accountability, transparency, 
democratisation and responsiveness of local governments, and in 
responding positively to local needs and demands.  
 
However, a fresh look into capacity building efforts for local government is now 
needed in light of the experience of the last decade. Many local governments are 
still unable to make full use of the powers vested in them. An ongoing capacity 
building process should be designed and implemented on the basis of following 
principles: 
 
• Training to be organised in sufficient quantity and quality within the 
stipulated time frame 
• Better coordination, integration and networking of training organizations 
within the state 
• Effective collaboration and policy dialogue between associations of local 
governments and training organizations 
• Greater ownership of local governments and their associations in the 
capacity building process 
• Training-supportive studies and research for policy advocacy and 
transforming local governments.  
 
Training will have to be learner-centred and new methods of training delivery will 
be required. The strategy should involve development of the capacity of training 
professionals, increased involvement of learners in their own learning process, 
development of a modular structure of training, and a more focused approach to 
training evaluation.  
 
Training will also need to keep pace with changing needs. Elections are held every 
five years. Changes in elected representatives also result from the rotation system 
of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and women. This will create a 
demand for continuous capacity building of elected representatives. Periodic 
reinforcement of capacity building is also needed for the effective performance of 
local government functionaries. Capacity building cannot be a one-time affair, it 
will be continuous and regular efforts should be made to build competence 
according to needs. 
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At the same time steps have to be taken to measure performance after training 
events to see what level of improvement has taken place. Measuring performance 
in this way is also important to ensure effectiveness in using training resources and 
to make capacity building efforts sustainable. Generally, very few attempts have 
been made to collect data on performance in the workplace after the training. It is 
of utmost importance to conduct training-related studies to assess the validity, 
currency, authenticity and sufficiency of training.   
 
Alongside training there is a need for a common platform for stakeholders in 
decentralization to come together and discuss the day-to-day affairs of local 
governance and policy issues related to decentralization. The associations of local 
governments should provide the lead to establish these platforms at both state and 
district levels. Activities would include: 
 
• Experience-sharing and networking of local government functionaries 
• Policy advocacy for strengthening decentralization and good governance 
• Documentation of innovative practices in local governance and their 
dissemination 
• Promoting capacity building of different functionaries of local 
governments 
• Promoting research and studies on local level development issues 
• Strengthening associations of local governments and their capacity to 
deepen decentralization and grass-roots democracy. 
 
References 
CSES [Centre for Socio-Economic and Environment Studies], CRM [Centre for Rural 
Management] and SDC-CapDecK, 2003. Emerging Issues in Panchayati Raj in 
Kerala, SDC-CapDecK, Thiruvananthapuram. 
KILA [Kerala Institute of Local Administration], 2003. Local Governments in Kerala: 
Reforms, Decentralised Development and Local Government Finances, Trissur. 
KILA [Kerala Institute of Local Administration], 2004. Platforms for Strengthening 
Democratic Decentralization and Local Governance: Approach Paper, Trissur. 
Serban, D. 2002. A Practical Guide for Local Government Training in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Budapest. 
Sreedharan, E.M., Prasad, M.K. and V.G. Manamohan (eds), 2000. Janakeeyasoothranam 
Oru Vilayiruthal (Malayalam), State Planning Board, Trivandrum. 
Thomas, I. and W.R. Frnake, 2000. Local Democracy and Development: People’s 
Campaign for Decentralised Planning in Kerala, Leftword, New Delhi. 
PRACTICE 
 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 137 
 
 
 
Inclusive Growth through Inclusive 
Governance in India’s North East 
 
 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 2: January 2009 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
 
 
Mani Shankar Aiyar and Nupur 
Tiwari 
Ministry of Panchayati Raj and 
DoNER,1 Government of India 
   
 
1. Introduction 
‘Inclusive Growth’ is both the title and the overarching goal of the Eleventh Five 
Year Plan of India.2 Economic reforms have led, especially over the last five years 
or so, not only to accelerated growth but to sustained accelerated growth. Yet, 
notwithstanding the considerable space given to Panchayati Raj3 in the Eleventh 
Plan, there still seems to be some reluctance to accept inclusive governance as the 
quintessential and unique path to inclusive growth.  
 
There is no doubt that the acceleration of growth on a sustained basis combined 
with major tax reforms has resulted in a miraculous augmentation of government 
revenues, particularly over the last four years. This has resulted in buoyant 
spending on the social sector. In his recent address to the National Convention, the 
Prime Minister estimated the increased spending on poverty alleviation and rural 
development at four times that of the last year of the previous government. In 
                                                
1
 Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region. 
2
  Editors note: India's five years plans are framed, executed and monitored by the Planning 
Commission. See <http://planningcommission.nic.in>. 
3
  Editors note: Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) are units of local self-government. There are three 
levels of panchayat - village, intermediate, and district.  See ‘Decentralization and Strengthening 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs)’ in Chapter X: Governance, Eleventh Five- Year Plan 2007-12. 
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absolute numbers, this represents an increase (in nominal terms) from around 
Rs.34,000 crore41 in fiscal 2003-04 to about Rs.120,000 crore in the current 
financial year. Moreover, this increase comes on top of growth in such spending 
between 1993-94 and 2003-04, in nominal terms, from about Rs.7600 crore to 
about Rs.34,000 crore.  
 
Why, then, is there such a mismatch between growth in the booming sectors of our 
economy and the income of the entrepreneurial classes, in contrast to the uncertain, 
sporadic and un-sustained condition of the vast majority of Indians? Why is India 
prospering when most Indians are not?  
 
 
 
“To ensure inclusive and equitable growth, we need 
to integrate our rural areas into the modern 
economic processes that are rapidly transforming 
our country” 
 
In August 2007, the Arjun Sengupta Committee (http://nceus.gov.in) reported the 
deeply disturbing yet widely accepted figure of 836 million Indians – over 75% of 
our people – as being ‘poor and vulnerable’, surviving on an average expenditure 
of under Rs.20 per day. This is the equivalent of what a family of four earns per 
capita as the daily wage in Tamil Nadu under the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Programme.52 
 
Although over the last four years India has witnessed a sustained GDP growth rate of 
8.8 per cent per annum, which is set to rise even higher, poverty levels remain 
unacceptably high. More than 300 million people in India still live in deep poverty at 
less than a dollar a day, while another 350 million live on less than two dollars a day. In 
this sense, the rich-poor divide has increased and poverty reduction figures for India are 
                                                
4
 
An Indian crore equals 10 million.
 
5
 Incidentally, the NREGP wage rate in Tamil Nadu is just about the highest in the country. For more 
information, visit: <http://nrega.nic.in>.
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now lower than those of Bangladesh. There are also disparities among regions, states, 
sectors and communities. Among the states, the North Eastern Region as a whole and 
the Central regions, which have large tribal populations, are lagging behind. Among 
sectors, agriculture has fallen behind industry and the service sector. 
 
The key component of our ‘strategy of inclusive growth’ must be inclusive 
governance as the means of empowering the disadvantaged, with the aim of 
enabling them to overcome their poverty. It is the effective empowerment of the 
disadvantaged through the effective devolution of functions, finances and 
functionaries to the representative institutions of local self-government on the 
principle of subsidiarity (which states that anything which can be done at a lower 
level should be done at that level and no higher level), that will pave the way to the 
effective implementation of other measures of inclusive growth. These include:  
  
• Stepping up investment in rural areas, in rural infrastructure and agriculture 
• Increased credit availability, particularly to farmers and others, and 
offering them remunerative prices for their crops  
• Increased rural employment, including the provision of a unique social 
safety net in the shape of the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Programme 
• Increased public spending on education and health care, including 
strengthening the midday meal programme and offering scholarships to the 
needy 
• Investment in urban renewal, improving the quality of life for the urban 
poor   
• Empowering the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other backward 
classes, minorities, women and children, socially, economically and 
educationally 
• Ensuring that, through public investment, the growth process spreads to 
backward regions and districts of our country.63 
 
Local self-government, as elaborated in our Constitution, provides the essential 
means of reconciling ‘accelerated growth’ with ‘inclusive growth’, and we cannot 
secure inclusive growth without inclusive governance. The virtually three-fold 
increase in annual allocations to rural development and welfare, and the launching 
of new schemes like NREGA, BRGF and RTI,74 are not inadequately impacting on 
the concept of inclusive growth because governance at the grassroots is still far 
from inclusive. In addition, too large a proportion of the central government’s 
annual expenditure of Rs.81,000 crore on rural development and welfare reaches 
the people – if at all – through government-run or officially managed silos, whilst 
too small a proportion of it is actually planned and implemented with the 
participation, involvement and supervision of village communities and their elected 
                                                
6
 Based on the foreword by the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, in Report to the People 2004 -
2008, UPA Government. See: http://pib.nic.in/archieve/upareport/report2008.pdf [7.39MB] 
7 Respectively, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (http://nrega.nic.in); the Backward 
Regions Grant Fund (http://brgf.gov.in), and the Right to Information Act (http://rti.gov.in). 
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representatives. Frustration can emerge if Gram Sabhas85 are largely non-
functional, and if most elected representatives (other than Panchayat presidents) are 
left uninvolved, particularly when they see more and more money being poured 
into rural areas with much of it beyond their control or responsibility.  This can 
undermine the overarching components of governance such as policy formulation, 
implementation and monitoring and evaluation.  
 
    
  
“Rural prosperity and poverty 
eradication is possible through 
Panchayati Raj” 
 
This lack of involvement is incongruous considering that the Constitutional 
amendments have so firmly rooted Panchayati Raj in our system of governance. 
Today, 3.2 million elected representatives, including 1.2 million women and well 
over 22% from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (their estimated share in the 
rural population), serve in these grassroots local bodies of our vibrantly democratic 
society. There are two reasons for this anomaly: firstly, a lack of effective 
devolution of functions, finances and functions by state legislatures/governments to 
the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs); and secondly, inadequate provisions for 
planning and implementation through PRIs in the guidelines issued by central 
ministries for centrally sponsored and central sector schemes. Both directly 
impinge on inclusive growth. To reinforce economic reform and secure inclusive 
growth it is important that Panchayati Raj be brought centre-stage as the principal 
governance reform. Also, parallel measures for empowering the grassroots are 
required in those areas that the Constitution exempts from the Panchayati Raj 
system, such as the Sixth Schedule areas and much of the North Eastern Region.  
 
                                                
8
 A bi-annual village meeting of all persons aged 18 years or more, which considers development 
schemes and reviews the work of the Panchayat. 
AIYAR & TIWARI: 
Inclusive Growth through Inclusive  
Governance in India’s North East 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 141 
 
Activating and strengthening institutions of local self-government requires 
adherence to certain broad and generally well-accepted principles of institutional 
design. Some of the features of a good design for local self-government include:  
 
• Conducting regular elections for local bodies  
• Clarity in the functional assignments to different levels of local bodies in 
rural and urban areas  
• Matching the devolution of functions with the concomitant devolution of 
funds and functionaries so that the devolved functions might be effectively 
performed  
• Ensuring that elected representatives of local bodies effectively wield 
powers  
• Building capacity in local bodies to undertake planning  
• Ensuring a healthy, constructive and mutually fruitful relationship between 
officials appointed by the state government and elected local bodies  
• Providing for collective decision-making through Gram and Ward Sabhas 
and holding the local body to account for its performance.   
 
In addition, it is important to create appropriate systems and institutions for 
planning and delivery of public services, including information systems, as well as 
for monitoring and evaluation and ensuring accountability. 
 
Inclusive Governance in the North Eastern Region 
Systems of decentralised governance in the North Eastern Region show a wide 
diversity due to ethnic, linguistic and religious variance unparalleled in any other 
region of the country. While the Panchayati Raj system (Part IX of the 
Constitution) fully covers two of the eight states of the region – Sikkim and 
Arunachal Pradesh, three other states (Mizoram, Meghalaya and Nagaland) are 
entirely exempted and have their own local systems. The remaining three (Assam, 
Tripura and Manipur) have both Panchayati Raj and non-Panchayati Raj areas 
existing side by side. Furthermore, although Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and parts 
of Assam, Tripura and Manipur are covered under the provisions of Part IX of the 
Constitution, the extent of powers devolved upon Panchayats in these states is 
uneven. Such diversity is healthy and to be encouraged even though it makes local 
governance exceedingly complex, since it reflects the immense ethnic, linguistic 
and religious diversity seen in the region.  
 
Some positive outcomes are as follows:  
 
• Sikkim has been adjudged the third best state in the country in the 
implementation of Panchayati Raj 
• Assam has been judged the best for activity mapping96 
                                                
9
 Activity mapping is a process required under the Constitution as part of devolving powers to PRIs. It 
is undertaken by central government departments in order to allocate functional responsibilities 
among the three tiers of Panchayati Raj. 
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• Tripura and Manipur are among the better states for their pattern of 
devolution  
• Arunachal Pradesh has been commended for recent steps taken to move 
towards effective devolution.  
 
In all five states there is considerable scope for advancing the cause of devolution. 
Happily, all five are party to the 150 conclusions of the seven Round Table 
Conferences held in 2004 covering all eighteen identified dimensions of Panchayati 
Raj. Those conclusions were reinforced by Memoranda of Understanding or joint 
Statements of Conclusions signed by the Chief Ministers and the Union Minister of 
Panchayati Raj, including agreed state-specific action points. Accelerated 
implementation by state and central governments of these agreed action points will 
contribute greatly to securing inclusive growth through inclusive governance in the 
North-East Region. A common feature of these diverse systems of self-governance 
is that all need strengthening. This is as true of the North East as it is of most parts 
of the country. 
 
2. Progress in the Five States 
Sikkim has completed activity mapping, including detailed assignment of funds to 
Panchayats and of the officials who will be attached to each Panchayat for the 
performance of devolved activities.  
 
 
 
Minister Aiyar with villagers  
of Tuithumhnar, Mizoram 
 
The Arunachal Pradesh Activity Mapping Order 2007 was issued in October 2007 
and the executive order for devolution of 29 subjects of activity mapping 
subsequently issued in February, 2008, covering 20 government departments. 
There is overlap of some of the functions devolved to different tiers of Panchayats 
and more clarity is required to specify devolved functions in terms of policy, 
planning, implementation, and coordination and control.  Furthermore, the relevant 
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government functionaries (officials) have yet to be transferred to Panchayats, 
although the Directorate of Panchayati Raj has initiated the process in consultation 
with the departments concerned.  
 
Assam has 21 districts covered under Part IX of the Constitution whilst other areas 
fall under the Sixth Schedule. The Government of Assam issued a notification in 
June 2007 through which functions, functionaries and funds in respect of 23 
subjects were devolved to the three tiers of the Panchayats. The responsibilities of 
each tier are clearly demarcated and these have been distributed according to the 
capacity of each level of Panchayat.  The activity mapping also indicates in detail 
the staff transferred to the Panchayats and the accounts from which funds will be 
drawn for the activities assigned to the Panchayats.   However, elections to the 
Panchayats in Assam were held in December 2007 and it is still to be seen whether 
the notification regarding activity mapping has been effectively implemented.   
 
The Manipur Panchayati Raj Act of 1994 details the intended devolution of 
functions to the PRIs, covering all 29 items listed in Schedule 11 of the 
Constitution. However, activity mapping approved by the state cabinet in 
September 2005 lists only 16 of these items, and no funds and functionaries have 
been devolved.  Whilst the state government has undertaken to transfer all 
functionaries along with functions and finances to the Panchayats, and to frame 
rules for Panchayat-based cadres of technical and other support services recruited 
at the Panchayat level, there is no visible progress in this regard.   
 
In Tripura, activity mapping was completed in 2005.  This also covered the 29 
items listed in the 11th Schedule and applies to 21 departments.  The government of 
Tripura has taken a decision to implement the activity mapping in phases. To date, 
irrigation schemes, primary schools and institutions relating to the Ministry of 
Women and Child Development (WCD) have been transferred to the Panchayats 
through executive orders.  Functionaries for five items from the 11th Schedule have 
been devolved to Panchayats, who review their work and have the power to 
recommend payment of salary, transfers, grants of leave and disciplinary action.  
However, overall controlling authority remains with the line departments and the 
state has continued to recruit further staff after devolving functionaries to 
Panchayats.   
 
All five States will need to clearly identify those budgetary items that ought to go 
to the Panchayats and to separately earmark them through a Panchayat sector 
window in the budgets of the relevant line departments. This will ensure the flow 
of funds required for undertaking devolved activities. Functionaries will need to be 
devolved to the appropriate level of the Panchayati Raj system to reflect any given 
activity assigned in the activity map, and in conformity with the pattern of 
devolution of functions and finances. These are all works in progress and activity 
in this regard over the last few years has been encouraging. The stage is, therefore, 
well and truly set for ‘inclusive growth through inclusive governance’ provided this 
is given priority and followed through assiduously and conscientiously. 
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Institutionalising participative planning from the grassroots level in the preparation 
of a district plan is another key step in the strengthening of Panchayats.  As 
mandated in the Constitution, 80% of the members of District Planning 
Committees (DPCs) are required to be elected by and from amongst the elected 
members of the district level Panchayat (Zilla Parishad) and the municipalities 
within the district. Although most of the five states falling under Part IX of the 
Constitution now have DPCs with constitutions, in Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura 
some issues relating to the composition of the DPCs still remain to be clarified, 
owing to special circumstances.  
 
The district plan must emerge from plans prepared by each village Panchayat, 
intermediate Panchayat, district Panchayat and municipality for their respective 
geographical areas and functional competencies. To this end, state governments 
need to clearly inform Panchayats at each level (and the municipalities) about the 
resources likely to be available and the activities entrusted to them. DPCs have the 
responsibility of ‘consolidating’ these local plans into a draft district development 
plan and forwarding it to the state government.  
 
The North Eastern Region states concerned have commenced the process of district 
planning through the Panchayats in districts covered by the Backward Regions 
Grant Fund. However, steps will need to be taken to ensure that these guidelines 
are fully followed and district planning is established as a practice in all districts in 
the region. 
 
We must put an end to planning from above. We must put an end to priorities 
being conceived and decided at ethereal heights, far removed from the realities on 
the ground. We must initiate a process of people’s planning.  (Shri Rajiv Gandhi) 
 
3. Governance Reforms in Exempt Areas  
All of Meghalaya and Mizoram, and large tracts of Tripura, come under the 
provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. Nagaland and the hill areas of 
Manipur are governed by similar arrangements through state legislation. Such 
special arrangements are aimed at the protection of tribal areas and interests, by 
mandating district or regional local self-government institutions entrusted with the 
dual tasks of protecting tribal culture and customs, and undertaking development 
activities. However, unlike their Panchayati Raj counterparts, the Autonomous 
Developmental Councils that are supposed to establish responsive administrations 
and undertake development planning functions (with maximum participation of the 
people), are yet to fulfil their role effectively.  
 
In order to maximize people’s participation in governance and to chart a clear 
roadmap to involve these institutions in grassroots planning, the Ministry of 
Panchayati Raj appointed an Expert Group on Grassroots Planning for the Sixth 
Schedule Areas (and those areas not covered by Parts IX and IXA of the 
Constitution). The Expert Group has suggested a series of sequential steps for 
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building the district plan. First, a district vision that sets out the goals and outcomes 
for the next 10-15 years will need to be fashioned through participative processes 
starting from the grassroots level upwards. Each planning unit should then 
articulate the vision and set out goals and outcomes in terms of human 
development indicators, infrastructure development and development in the 
productive sectors of the economy, based on available physical and human 
resources. 
 
4. Conclusion  
While the Constitution leaves it to the states to determine the nature, direction and 
pace of devolution, there is a crying need to motivate the states to further empower 
their PRIs, and also to provide incentives for PRIs to be transparent and 
accountable in their transactions. As the Eleventh Five Year Plan states: 
 
…there is a need to build in incentives that will encourage the States to devolve 
functions, funds and functionaries to the PRIs.  In order to capture the extent to 
which this process and empowerment of PRIs has actually progressed in a State, a 
suitable devolution index will be developed and will be called the PRI-
Empowerment Index. (para 1.148)   
 
Central government could greatly accelerate and rationalise this process by 
adapting the guidelines of Central Sector and Centrally Sponsored Schemes (the 
principal sources of funding for PRIs), to ensure the importance of PRIs in the 
planning and implementation of these schemes in conformity with the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution.  
    
There is also an imperative to make available untied block grants to the PRIs so 
that they have an adequate reservoir of financial resources to plan and implement 
neighbourhood economic development and social justice programs, as envisaged in 
Parts IX and IXA. The 13th Finance Commission (http://fincomindia.nic.in) has a 
golden opportunity to build on the tentative beginnings of previous Commissions 
by increasing untied grants, particularly for maintenance of community assets and 
improved service delivery.  
 
We continue to rely heavily on a creaking bureaucratic delivery system, fashioned 
into administrative silos, which over six decades has proved to be quite unequal to 
the task of delivering development. The Eleventh Five Year Plan says: 
 
The DRDAs (District Rural Development Agencies, the bureaucratic arm of the 
Ministry of Rural Development) in their current form and content do not appear 
to have the requisite wherewithal to handle a complex issue such as poverty. The 
current administrative set up at the national level is unequal to a large task such 
as poverty elimination across geographical and social complexity… (para 4.70) 
 
Our need is not bureaucratic development but participative development, that is, 
grassroots development through grassroots democracy. The path to such 
development was charted through the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution 
which resulted in the present Part IX (‘The Panchayats’) and Part IXA (‘The 
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Municipalities’). In these two parts of the Constitution we have the key to inclusive 
growth through inclusive governance. For inclusive growth, we need to hitch the 
horse of accelerated growth to the wagon of participative development. 
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Robin Hambleton and Jill Simone Gross have assembled a collection of papers 
which powerfully supports their argument that “those concerned with the future of 
cities, whether as academics or practitioners, should devote more time to 
instrumental learning from abroad.” Contributions range widely from the influence 
of globalisation and urbanisation, to the importance of understanding the unique 
impact of our own context; from innovation in the leading ‘world cities’ of the 
developed world, to the seemingly intractable problems of cities in the developing 
world; from celebrating the importance of a shift from government to governance, 
to contributions highlighting the potential of governance to undermine local 
democracy; and from the role of leadership to the dangers of persistent 
managerialism. 
 
A central theme throughout the book is the relationship between government, the 
formal institutions of the state, and governance – government plus the looser 
processes of influencing and negotiating with a range of public and private sector 
agencies to achieve desired outcomes. The editors in their opening chapter set out a 
focus on governing cities based on the argument that governance in the absence of 
strong government can lead to urban breakdown. Two contributions provide 
valuable empirical evidence on the shortcomings of an over-emphasis on 
governance. 
 
Judd and Smith discuss the role of special-purpose authorities in urban 
development in the United States. These are stand-alone entities (often formed as 
special districts with their own independent revenue sources), typically established 
to develop and run major projects (stadia, convention centres, major cultural 
initiatives), usually to distance them from the uncertainties of public processes 
(consultation, referenda etc). The model is very much governance in terms of local 
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government working with a range of public and private sector parties to establish 
and fund these entities. Judd and Smith argue that the public has been the loser by 
being distanced from local democratic accountability, citing research that: 
“historically, advocates for these major projects have invariably over-estimated use 
and revenues and under-estimated costs. The reasons are not hard to find. Working 
in a closed world of supporters of their projects, participants and the consultants 
who advise them share an interest in moving forward.” 
 
Davies considers partnership building in the UK within the framework of local 
governance. Drawing on his own and others' research he argues that “community 
participation is being subverted to managerial and technocratic ends.” Evaluation 
of New Deal for Communities funding concluded: “the original assumption that 
partnerships should be given a strong degree of local flexibility and freedom has 
been steadily eroded.” Essentially, the key condition for genuine partnership 
working, that partners respect each other's views and seek to achieve consensus, 
was not present. Government and managerial objectives overrode community 
interests. 
 
From this reviewer's perspective the major interest of this work lies in its 
contributions to understanding different arrangements for metropolitan governance, 
including how they have evolved, and the effect of local context (historical, social, 
political, economic, geographic). Röber and Schröter, comparing institutional 
reform in Berlin, London and Paris, draw valuable attention to the importance of 
historical context, whilst at the same time highlighting a common theme of the 
search for a means of managing strategic decision-making at the level of the 
metropolitan region. It is not just London which has seen the importance of 
separating responsibility for regional strategic issues from service delivery. 
 
Tsukamoto and Vogel review a range of literature on the role of the state in the rise 
of world cities, much of which argues that globalisation leads to decentralisation 
because of the need for localities to be internationally competitive: “nation states 
should promote devolution if they seek to enhance the competitiveness of their 
cities.” Their own research, focused on twenty world cities, leads to the conclusion 
that “globalisation is almost as likely to lead to greater political centralisation as 
(to) decentralisation”, with a major factor being intervention by central 
governments to promote development. 
 
For this reviewer, the discussion of the role of the state would have benefited from 
considering the research on the hostility which many central governments have 
shown to the emergence of a strong metropolitan level (OECD 2004, Davoudi 
2006). This has been an important factor in developments (or the lack of them) in 
metropolitan governance in, for example, Canada and Australia, where 
metropolitan regions such as Toronto and Sydney labour under dysfunctional 
governance arrangements. 
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Kübler and Randolph’s account of metropolitan governance in Australia through 
the Sydney experience is a timely reminder of the very high costs of failure to deal 
adequately with the challenge of metropolitan governance, as well as an illustration 
of the potential for local governments in a fragmented system to develop coping 
mechanisms. In this respect, Kübler and Randolph describe the emergence of 
strong collaboration amongst eleven councils in Western Sydney, driven by the 
failure of the state government to deal with a major infrastructure deficit. There is 
an interesting if somewhat loose parallel with Zhang’s account of evolving urban 
governance in Shanghai, where building owner associations (commercial) and 
property owner associations (residential) have come to play an important role in 
urban governance, effectively filling a gap, driven by the incentive to protect their 
significant investments. At least where the inherent capability is present, it does 
seem that local governance will out. 
 
Other contributors provide valuable insights into the role of leadership within local 
government, including John Nalbandian who considers the response of 
professionals to the conflicting forces of administrative modernisation and civic 
engagement, balancing new public management driven demands with the 
imperatives of local democracy. Nalbandian makes the very valuable point that the 
growing professionalism of local government management in recent years has 
further widened the capability gap between management and elected members, a 
phenomenon which is an increasingly significant issue in a number of jurisdictions. 
 
In their concluding chapter, Hambleton and Gross end by revisiting two scenarios 
developed in their opening chapter for the future of cities – a balkanised world of 
fortified enclaves and widening social divisions, or a revitalisation of local 
democracy with cities re-establishing themselves as centres of culture and civilised 
living. Part way through this chapter they set out what this reviewer regards as the 
essential prerequisite for the optimistic scenario: 
 
… it seems clear that higher-level governments have a responsibility to ensure 
that effective governance arrangements and resources are in place. In too many 
countries national governments are failing to rise to this challenge…. local 
leadership and an enlivened local democracy are crucial for urban success, but 
these local energies need to be orchestrated and supported by higher levels of 
government (state and federal in federal systems, national in unitary systems). 
This means ensuring that the powers, funding, and the configuration of local 
democratic institutions are suited to modern challenges rather than to a bygone 
era. 
 
Hambleton and Gross have provided a very valuable resource for anyone 
concerned with the future of metropolitan and city governance. That said there are 
two things that they might like to consider. The first is the possibility of producing 
a layman’s version capable of being easily assimilated by the typical elected 
member. The second is whether the global credit crunch, and the potential retreat 
from reliance on markets which have set so much of the context for urban 
development in recent years, might not justify a second edition revisiting some of 
the judgements about the forces driving the development of our cities. 
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This is a rich collection of case studies and will be valuable to anyone seeking a 
wide range of examples of local governance and decentralisation in developing 
countries. It covers Indonesia, India (Kerala and Karnataka), Sri Lanka, Uganda, 
South Africa and Ghana. With the exception of Sri Lanka, all the countries have 
two chapters devoted to them by different authors, thus providing a broader 
perspective on both the context of decentralisation and research findings. 
 
It is also interesting to have the perspectives of different national outlooks and 
disciplines – anthropologists, scholars of public administration, geographers, 
economists and political scientists.  
 
However the studies are of variable quality. It is a major editing challenge to bring 
together such varied perspectives to produce a coherent publication, and that has 
not been fully achieved in this instance. Many of the chapters would have benefited 
from rigorous sub-editing to reach an evenness of international English. This may 
have resulted in the loss of distinctive voices, but it would have improved the 
readability of the book as a whole.  
 
In the introduction, Saito seeks to bring a binding theme to the whole book. 
However, there are many generalisations and over-extended assertions lacking 
evidence or substantiation. At one point he asserts: “In the context of developing 
countries, the decentralized state is considered ideal to help reduce pervasive 
poverty. The world today is following the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which was [sic] adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
2000.” Who considers the decentralized state ideal? Few countries devolve 
sufficient finance for local governance to be truly successful, and few allow even a 
measure of autonomy over the finances.  
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Whether intentional or not, Saito appears to adopt an extremely managerialist line 
in the introduction, for example asserting the view that the requirement placed on 
UK local government to work in partnership with local public private and voluntary 
sector bodies is a process fraught with tension. But the real point here is that local 
government is expected to provide strategic leadership for the area, manage the 
tensions, and make the delivery of key outcomes more likely and more efficient in 
doing so. This is not a ‘process’ in the management sense: it is a series of political 
challenges and responses.  
 
In most cases the two chapters on each country are split between a substantial 
description of the local government system in one, followed by an analytical 
chapter. The descriptive chapters are excellent and very useful: basic descriptions 
of local government systems are hard to find and their contribution should not be 
overlooked. 
 
The chapters on Indonesia are fascinating, but frustratingly ahistorical. At one point 
Tikson writes that: “Outside Java, the administration reforms that took place in the 
1930s were actually made to accommodate the existence of traditional laws.” 
Without going into the issue of the origins and validity of the so-called traditional 
laws, why should this be of any surprise? This was an administrative reform driven 
by the metropolitan power to make colonial rule more efficient – indirect rule 
through traditional leaders was simply cheaper. At around this time a similar 
approach to indirect rule was being applied across British Africa, and there was 
much interaction on the administration of indigenous peoples between the Dutch 
and British in this period.  
 
The chapters on India are excellent – both sharply focused on the core issues and 
yet providing the reader with a strong sense of the external and internal pressures 
for change. Writing on Kerala, Harilal notes the tensions between state and local 
government, arguing that the relationships need restructuring.  
 
The analytical chapters on Uganda, South Africa and Ghana all bring out the 
tensions that exist in those systems, and should be put to good use by those 
interested in local government and development. It is often the case that local 
government cannot drive development, but that it can help remove some of the 
barriers to development, and so it is important to have lucid analyses of the 
systemic tensions – tensions to which practitioners are often blind. 
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DIY Community Action: Neighbourhood problems 
and community self-help 
Liz Richardson (The Policy Press, University of Bristol, 2008)
 
 
 
This book explores collaborative community engagement for local well-being 
initiatives, and is substantially based on the experiences and perspectives of activist 
groups in low-income neighbourhoods across the United Kingdom. It gives a voice 
to people in precarious communities and “helps to explain the strong desire that 
people feel to organize themselves at a level below that of official structures, no 
matter how low or lowly.” 
  
The value of volunteering, how groups organize, what gives groups the right to 
organize, obstacles and barriers to self-help, and supports that can maximize the 
potential for self-help groups, are all canvassed. The book provides significant 
insights into, for example, personal motivations behind participation; the ongoing 
significance of community to residents; ways in which governments, formal 
organizations and employed staff can undermine groups, rather than support 
engagement; and the attributes of effective community self-help groups. 
 
The book concludes with the lessons from the overall research and a range of 
recommendations for promoting a broad community building framework that gives 
equal weighting to the following four factors:  
 
• Facilitation of self-help groups  
• Good quality services and management of neighbourhoods  
• Civic engagement, democratic renewal and local accountability 
• Stable and strong communities. 
 
DIY community action is defined as “informal groups of people, acting on a 
voluntary basis, working together to solve problems by taking actions themselves, 
and with others.” The qualitative and stimulating information in this 
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comprehensive book is sourced from wide-ranging interviews with 300 community 
volunteers from 82 deprived areas, and material from many others who participated 
in a national program of intensive training and small grants to stimulate and 
facilitate self-help actions. This five-year project, carried out between 1996 and 
2001, was funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation.  
 
Whilst focused on lower-income areas the scope of the book is wide and its content 
will be of interest to all those residents, activists, organisations and governments 
interested in community building, community well-being, neighbourhood renewal, 
and local social and political advocacy. 
 
The book’s nine chapters of nearly 300 pages clearly set out information, analysis, 
figures, information boxes, explanatory tables and summaries which should assist 
the reader to come to a more in-depth understanding of the complexity of broad 
concepts such as community, local empowerment and social exclusion. At the same 
time the book provides easy access and insights into specific topics which may be 
of relevance to particular readers, for example, team work and leadership, and the 
value of volunteering. 
 
The project activists involved in this research impress as resilient, resourceful and 
down-to-earth people. They see the importance of strong community spirit and 
attachments to place, whilst at the same time admitting that there can be negative 
impacts for broader social inclusion in tight-knit, insular communities. Their 
comments indicate that they are cognizant of the many local difficulties and 
tensions surrounding them as they tackle, albeit on a small scale, the problems that 
directly impinge on the quality of life of their communities, such as poor services, 
bad design, management and maintenance of estates, and anti-social behaviour.  
 
It is acknowledged that the self-help group members studied represent only a small 
proportion of the population; but rather than simply seeing the activists as the 
“usual suspects,” or what others may term “squeaky wheels”, and accordingly 
dismissing their efforts and inputs, the book argues that they constitute a legitimate 
part of the participatory process. On this basis the book constructively puts forward 
a number of accountability and transparency suggestions that could enhance 
legitimacy of the groups in their direct and informal relationships, in the 
neighbourhoods, and also in interfacing with the wider community and external 
bodies: for example having other residents help raise funds or give financial 
backing, reaching out to the wider community, more openness to outside scrutiny, 
and the promotion of diversity.  
 
It is refreshing to have research and discussion grounded in a clear concept of 
community, rather than arguing about differing interpretations that tend to negate 
the existence or validity of communities. Community in this instance is spatial and 
geographical and a set of social relationships, i.e. both ‘place’ and ‘people.’ The 
definition used “does not presume that neighbourhoods should be a primary focus 
for residents’ careers, leisure time or social lives”, but acknowledges that the 
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quality of neighbourhoods, services, and the behaviour of others impacts upon the 
quality of peoples’ everyday lives, “whether we care about those people, or not.” 
The ability to engage, with the purpose of influencing quality of life community 
outcomes, is therefore seen as an important aspect of social inclusion and of 
fundamental consideration in any approaches to community building. 
 
Engagement is also seen as important in terms of the relationship between direct 
participatory democracy and representative democracy. The book argues that if 
different forms of accountability and legitimacy were understood and respected 
between stakeholders then all would be empowered.  
 
Residents can engage and contribute to local democracy, and can start co-
producing. They are more likely to be encouraged to make self-help inputs to 
their own quality of life. Local politicians could be better stimulated to play an 
effective community leadership role and contribute to local democracy. Local 
workers and other professionals could be encouraged to problem solve at the 
front line. This could add professional expertise and feed in evidence to guide 
options for local actions to raise the quality of the decision-making process.  
 
This view provides a timely challenge, reminding us all that empowerment calls for 
transformational changes in the way in which people relate and that tinkering with 
power bases will not necessarily result in sustained changes in community well-
being. 
 
The book offers seven lessons about community building which reinforce the 
comprehensive approach taken in this self-help study. They are: 
 
• Neighbourhood renewal and social inclusion are about more than just 
tackling poverty 
• Neighbourhoods and communities matter to people 
• Self-help in all forms is at the base of community building 
• Community self-help is a choice by the minority that produces benefits for 
the majority 
• Community self-help in poor communities provides triple benefits, viz. 
improving mainstream services, contributing to neighbourhood renewal, 
underpinning democracy through civic engagement in decision-making and 
civic responsibility 
• The legitimacy of community groups was questioned by many other bodies 
and often misunderstood 
• Community organizing is strong, yet fragile. 
 
These lessons are then reinforced with final recommendations for promoting a 
community building strategy. Add the four community building framework factors 
and a complete package is provided for enhancing overall community well-being 
through self-help. In addition, the inclusion of specific suggestions for targeted 
actions by different stakeholders makes this publication an invaluable resource for 
all those committed to achieving changes for the better at neighbourhood and 
community levels. 
